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Abstract 
The following dissertation assesses the works of Lucian of Samosata, a satirist writing 
during the Second Century AD. It is proposed that in his satires, Lucian uses the theme 
of hybridity in order to critique contemporary philosophical ideals and practices, 
framing the philosopher-sophists of the period as hybrids through their unsuccessful 
melding of the virtues of philosophy with the power of rhetoric. The theme of hybridity 
is explored in multiple ways, and this dissertation recognises Lucian’s own hybridity, 
both in terms of his ethnicity and of his use of the serio-comic genre.  
Lucian, in a number of his works, underscores what a true hybrid and a false 
hybrid is, and the motif of the centaur serves to illustrate his point well, being 
simultaneously an admired figure through the mythical tradition surrounding Cheiron, 
while also being a source of violence and uncivilised behaviour, as evident in tales of 
the Centauromachy. It is proposed that Lucian, rather than dismissing his hybridity, 
acknowledges (Bis. Acc. 33) and utilises it to create a more informed critique of the 
philosopher-sophists, establishing a series of works that serve to address both elite and 
non-elite concerns simultaneously. This is explored through an Aesopic framework, as 
it reveals how many of the tensions of high and low culture are present throughout the 
fable, and within tradition surrounding Aesop himself.  
Using this framework, the theme of hybridity is explored through various 
examples of the human-animal hybrid; exploring physical hybridity through the 
centaur, while also discussing hybrid wisdom through modes of speech, and the 
capacity for hybridity to stretch across multiple spheres. In doing so, it is shown that 
Lucian frames the philosopher-sophists as hybrids who, through their concerted effort 
to appear as a source of wisdom, have in fact failed to reach such heights, merely 
becoming a source of corrupted, false wisdom.  
 1 
Introduction 
 What is most monstrous of all, I have been turned into a 
surprising blend, for I am neither afoot nor a horseback, 
neither prose nor verse, but seem to my hearers a strange 
phenomenon made up of different elements, like a Centaur.  
(Bis. Acc. 33) 
Dialogue’s assertion that the ‘Syrian’ has transformed him into some form of monstrous 
hybrid summarises what is one of the core defining features of Lucian’s satires. Having 
taken inspiration from his spiritual predecessor Menippus1, Lucian is frequently 
charged with the crime of merging the genres of Dialogue and Comedy, genres that are 
wholly incompatible (Prom. Es. 6). Their incompatibility, states Lucian in his 
Prometheus es in Verbis, derives largely from the nature of their respective 
occupations; where Dialogue is concerned with “philosophising about nature and 
virtue,” Comedy is far more interested in laughing, joking, and generally deriding those 
who devote themselves to the high culture of philosophical discourse. In the context of 
music, he states, there are two octaves that separate them, from the highest pitch 
(ὀξυτάτος) to the lowest (βαρύτατος).2 Dialogue considers such an inconsistency to be 
as monstrous as the Centaur, representing an ineffectual and disjointed blend of two 
disparate elements. Such a claim is similarly made in Prometheus es in Verbis by 
Lucian himself; despite mixing two beautiful things (comedy and dialogue), he fears 
he has created something lacking in beauty (Prom. Es. 5). He portrays himself as 
creating a hybrid genre, one that sits between the high culture of dialogue and the low 
1 Lucian’s relationship to Menippus is discussed in full below.  
2 Such a retort is similarly utilised in the Syrian’s defence of his hybrid literary form, wherein he 
asserts that Dialogue’s complaints stem not from his embrace of Dialogue per se, but that he does not 
employ Dialogue as a means of discussing high philosophical topics, such as those found in Plato (Bis. 
Acc. 34).  
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culture of comedy, and admits that he has perhaps eschewed beauty of form over the 
temptation of literary novelty.3  
It is precisely this occupation of a position between the high and the low that 
forms the focus for the following discussion, for the way in which Lucian utilises this 
balance as a means to critique and discredit contemporary philosophy. Lucian’s 
“surprising blend” of genres results in an equally surprising blend of alternative 
dichotomies that address the effect of the hybrid as a creature representing two spheres 
of influence. It is the construction of a hybrid world throughout Lucian’s works that is 
explored in the following discussion, for the way in which the animal hybrid becomes 
a literary tool allowing a forceful and informed critique of the philosopher-sophists 
while maintaining the popular appeal of comedic effect.  
Scholars agree that Lucian’s treatment of the contemporary philosopher-
sophists is constructed as a social satire against their claims to wisdom.4 Throughout 
his works, it is clear that Lucian utilises the tools of Second Sophistic education as a 
means to highlight the inconsistencies and incredulities that pervade this so-called form 
of higher learning. It cannot be ignored the paradox surrounding Lucian’s critique, as 
he is, in essence, a philosopher-sophist himself given the nature of his dialogues as 
having a rhetorical flair. The following discussion nevertheless positions Lucian as 
distinct from those who he critiques, and proposes Lucian embraces the theme of the 
hybrid as an overarching tool with which to engage with his contemporary society. The 
hybrid creature comes to be a means not only to critique the nature of rhetoric and its 
practitioners, but through a recognition of the development and background of the 
hybrid in both Western and Eastern mythology and fiction, it is possible to identify 
Lucian’s playful relationship with themes of transgression and corruption. The hybrid, 
fundamentally no more than a mix of disparate objects, is traditionally a representation 
of the monstrous. However in Lucian’s works, the hybrid has a dual role; it may be 
presented as an admirable concept, a culmination of two disparate objects combining 
to create an improved whole, however this is often in a direct opposition to the more 
traditional monstrous hybrid. It is proposed that Lucian presents this successful hybrid 
                                               
3 For a fuller discussion of Lucian’s mixing of genres, see A. Billault and E. Marquis (eds.), Mixis: Le 
mélange des genres chez Lucien de Samosate (Paris: Demopolis, 2017).  
4 See C.P. Jones, ‘Two Enemies of Lucian’ Greek and Roman Byzantine Studies 13 (1972): 475-487; 
B. Baldwin, ‘Lucian as Social Satirist’ The Classical Quarterly 11:2 (1961): 199-208; R. B. Branham, 
‘Lucian’s Prologues: Introducing a Sophist’ Transactions of the American Philological Association 
(1974-2014) 115 (1985): 237-243. 
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through an engagement with the fable genre, suggesting that the corruption of the 
hybrid form derives from a corruption of social values. It is through Lucian’s 
recognition of his own hybridity, and manipulation of the rules governing hybridity that 
the concept of the philosopher-sophist becomes subverted. Lucian himself is able to 
invert elite and non-elite power structures, taking the place of the Aesopic dung-beetle, 
and becomes a superior force over his contemporary purveyors of false wisdom. 
 
The Hybrid  
 
It is first crucial to underpin what is meant by the hybrid.  The term ‘hybrid’ 
encompasses a wide variety of different notions and disciplines, and contemporary 
scholarship on the hybrid and hybrid theory exemplifies the fluidity of the term. While, 
put simply, the hybrid can be defined as a “composite,” there exists a greater 
heterogeneity implied in the term, because it encompasses both physical and 
metaphorical hybridity. As Kapchan and Strong state, “not only animals and plants may 
be seen as hybrid, but people, cultures, traditions, and languages as well.”5 What’s 
more, hybridity does not simply exist in the combination of ethnicity, but it is “effected 
whenever two or more historically separate realms come together in any degree that 
challenges their socially constructed autonomy.”6  
The challenge to a “socially constructed autonomy” is a core feature of 
formulating a hybrid. Stross notes that the boundaries between the two “parents”7 of 
the hybrid must be separate enough in order to qualify as a true hybrid.8 He gives the 
example of two breeds of floppy-eared rabbits, arguing that despite the difference in 
breeds, the progeny of the two animals is insufficiently different to be considered a true 
hybrid. However they must also be significantly similar, noting the impracticality of a 
hybrid consisting of an elephant and a canary,9 and moreover this infeasibility of what 
he deems “biological” hybridity, must be applied in a similar manner to notions of 
                                               
5 D.A. Kapchan and P.T. Strong, ‘Theorizing the Hybrid’ The Journal of American Folklore 112:445 
(1999): 240.  
6 D. A. Kapchan, Gender on the Market: Moroccan Women and the Revoicing of Tradition 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) 6. 
7 On the subject of hybrid parents, Stross does acknowledge that the cultural hybrid, in contrast to the 
biological hybrid, may consist of two parents, due to the means by which hybridity occurs as processes 
of “diffusion, invention, learning, cultural assimilation and construction” (B. Stross, ‘The Hybrid 
Metaphor,’ The Journal of American Folklore 112:445 (1999): 264). 
8 B. Stross ‘The Hybrid Metaphor,’ 258. 
9 B. Stross, ‘The Hybrid Metaphor,’ 259. 
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“cultural” hybridity, that is, the combination of disparate “discourse genres, languages 
and other cultural phenomena.”10 The formulation of the hybrid, therefore, must follow 
something of a set of rules; the hybrid must successfully challenge the “socially 
constructed autonomy” through a combination of sufficiently “separate realms.” 
In the context of the following discussion, it becomes clear that these separate 
cultural realms are many and varied, as Lucian engages with distinct geographic, ethnic 
and linguistic spheres. The primary challenge to the socially constructed autonomy is 
prevalent in the melding of the “historically separate” realms of dialogue and comedy, 
in which the rules of hybridising appropriately disproportionate parents are followed.  
However this hybrid of disparate spheres in Lucian is evident not only through 
hybridity of genre but also through the presence of hybridised animals. The inclusion, 
it is argued, of topics that seem to appeal to a relatively broad audience (such as fables, 
hybrid animals and comedy), do not simply facilitate his critique, but solidify his work 
as a hybrid attracting the audience of the elite and non-elite. As Canclini argues, in the 
context of Latin America, “the formation of specialized collections of high art and 
folklore was a device…for ordering symbolic goods in separate groups and 
hierarchizing them.”11 It is the hybridisation of literary form that allows for these 
hierarchies to be dissolved, encouraging an audience of both the elite and the popular.12  
The spheres of the elite and the popular converge to create the hybrid of 
Lucianic satire, as these spheres are separate enough to allow a reinvigorated pure form. 
Lucian’s hybrid of the elite and the popular and of comedy and dialogue creates what 
Stross considers to be “hybrid vigour,” the capacity, and perhaps expectation, for the 
hybrid to exceed and amplify the qualities of its two “parents”. It is the identification 
of hybrid vigour in the context of a cultural hybrid that allows for the subsequent 
identification of the successful hybrid. By adapting to one’s environment through the 
act of hybridity, “an efflorescence of creativity often results…engag[ing] the needs and 
exploit[ing] the potential” of the new environment.13 From this creation of the 
successful hybrid, the hybrid is thus able to develop further, becoming a part of the 
                                               
10 B. Stross, ‘The Hybrid Metaphor,’ 257. 
11 N. C. Canclini, Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity, translated by C. L. 
Chiappari and S.L. Lopez, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) 223. 
12 D.A. Kapchan and P.T. Strong, ‘Theorizing the Hybrid’ 246, drawing upon M. Lauer, ‘Néstor García 
Canclini’s culturas híbridas: Estragegias para entrar y salir de la modernidad (Mexico 1990)’ 
Travesia 1:2 (1992): 123-133.  
13 B. Stross, ‘The Hybrid Metaphor,’ 264. 
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“hybridity cycle,”14 wherein the hybrid becomes an object in its own right, given its 
capacity to adapt and change effectively to its environment, to the extent that it becomes 
named. Stross states that “naming the hybrid indicates societal recognition of the hybrid 
as a legitimate entity,” and removes it from the perhaps pejorative nature that its role 
as hybrid once held.15 Such a development can be evidenced in the works of Lucian, as 
in the case of both Lucian’s hybrid genre and his illustrations of hybrid creatures, the 
hybrid proves itself to be a superior creation. Moreover, the literary hybrid, the 
seriocomic, not only engages with dual genres, audiences and spaces, but as is shown, 
becomes a superior genre and means to attain true wisdom. 
The hybrid comes, in Lucian, to be a successful melding of dialogue and 
comedy. However the presence of other ‘successful’ hybrids littered throughout 
Lucian’s works, there exists an outlier that consistently fails to abide by the ‘rules’ of 
hybridity set out by Stross. The philosopher-sophists of Lucian’s satire are neither 
different enough to be considered sufficiently challenging to socially constructed 
ideals, nor are they similar enough, on account of their fraudulent claims to possessing 
wisdom. It is this tension between hybridity and similarity that pervades Lucian’s 
critique of contemporary philosophers, as he methodically demonstrates the difficulty 
even in determining the hybrid philosopher-sophist from the ‘pure’ philosopher. Where 
the hybrid animal traditionally verges on the side of a grotesque mixture, representing 
the more prevalent “mongrel factor,”16 Lucian highlights the inherent validity of his 
hybridity in comparison to the artificial hybridity of the philosopher sophists. While 
Lucian admits his hybrid literary genre is centaur–like, he distinguishes between the 
successful hybrid creation and the philosopher-sophists, characterising the hybrid 
philosophers as the embodiment of the savage centaur, overstepping their established 
boundaries and becoming a corrupting force. 
Hybridity, in the context of Lucian’s works, takes on a dual nature, much like 
the dual audience of the works themselves, as it functions both to validate Lucian 
himself, while invalidating the contemporary philosophers. Just as the hybridity of 
Lucian is proven to be a reflection of his wisdom, it is the absence of true hybridity in 
the philosopher-sophists that serves to reveal their inability to strive towards true 
wisdom. What’s more, the philosopher-sophists become robbed of their capacity for 
                                               
14 B. Stross, ‘The Hybrid Metaphor,’ 265. 
15 B. Stross, ‘The Hybrid Metaphor,’ 266. 
16 D.A. Kapchan and P. T. Strong, ‘Theorizing the Hybrid,’ 247. 
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‘evolution,’ being an inferior melding of philosophy and sophistry. Rather than 
becoming in essence a ‘successful’ form of the hybrid, they remain a corrupted source, 
who are portrayed as achieving quite the opposite effect to the Lucianic hybrid. The 
pseudo-hybrid, the pseudo-philosopher, is little more than a spokesperson for pseudo-
wisdom.  
Lucian’s hybrid genre, the centaur-like creature of Dialogue and Comedy, 
presents the features of non-elite literature through the medium of the elite. What 
follows is an examination of the rhetorical and literary tools by which such a hybrid is 
created, with a particular focus upon the presence of the actualised hybrid throughout 
the dialogues and essays. In so doing, it is clear that Lucian utilises hybridity and its 
associated characteristics to skilfully critique the so-called wisdom of contemporary 
philosophers.  
 
Sophists, Philosophers and Philosopher-Sophists 
 
The following section conducts an overview of the Second Sophistic and 
Lucian’s place within the time period, so as to provide a temporal basis from which to 
further the discussion. The significance of such an overview is great, as it allows for 
the zeitgeist of the era to be better understood. In so doing, it becomes clear that 
Lucian’s concern with hybridity derives precisely from his contemporary society. The 
Second Sophistic represents a period of renewed cultural activity, and facilitated an 
environment in which such hybridity of form and genre could occur.   
The Second Sophistic cannot be defined in a single category, as this would 
disregard the multifaceted nature of both the texts and authors of this era. Philostratus, 
coining the term Second Sophistic in his Lives of the Sophists (VS. 1.481.16ff), does 
apply the term ‘sophist’ to some who were predominantly engaged in philosophical 
pursuits. (VS. 1.484.11ff). However, the philosophers who ‘had the reputation of 
sophists’ (ἐν δόξῃ τοῦ σοφιστεῦσαι VS. 1.491.6-7) are presented separately from those 
whom Philostratus considers sophists proper, suggesting a distinct but nevertheless 
close relationship between the two modes of intellectual inquiry. This distinction 
between the sophist and the philosopher sophist, as Eshleman deftly outlines, is part of 
 7 
his own favouritism for those associated with Herodes Atticus,17 yet it nevertheless 
offers a useful starting point for determining the environment of the Second Sophistic 
period. What follows is not intended to be a comprehensive outline of this incredibly 
complex time. Rather, I will examine the aspects of the Second Sophistic that may 
influence or define Lucian’s position within the period, focusing primarily upon the 
agonistic environment that was bred among sophists and orators, and the way in which 
the Second Sophistic itself exudes hybridity of culture, language and philosophy.  
The hybrid nature of philosophy during the Second Sophistic is shown to be a 
core concern for the satirist Lucian. Throughout the works of Lucian and his 
contemporaries, it is possible to view the influence of hybridity upon the rhetorical 
stage, though this is not to be confused with the potentially hybrid nature of different 
philosophical schools’ convergence of ideals. Many authors’ declamatory assertions 
are underpinned by their individual assessment of a growing philosophical syncretism, 
a concerted attempt to successfully position themselves in the midst of this hybrid, fluid 
culture. In what follows, I will outline some of the core discussions around the Second 
Sophistic and their relationship to Lucian’s works, prior to turning to a more focused 
discussion of Lucian himself.  
  
Secondary scholarship on the Second Sophistic and the literature of the period 
has been thriving since Bowersock’s 1969 Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire. 
Bowersock’s work sets up the significant role the sophists of the Roman Empire played 
in the creation of a cohesive culture, spreading sophistic teachings through the power 
of rhetoric. It is from this most basic definition of sophistic practice that the following 
overview develops, as it is possible to view the period as embracing a form of cultural 
hybridity. These ‘Greek Sophists,’ stretch between Roman and Greek identities, elite 
and non-elite audiences, and traditional and modern genres, allowing the period to 
become a Protean figure in its own right, “beguiling but endlessly elusive.”18 
Bowersock’s work underpins the beguiling and elusive nature of the Second Sophistic, 
and outlines its core features.  
  Following Bowersock, a wealth of secondary scholarship began to emerge, with 
Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire breathing new life into studies of this period. 
                                               
17 K. Eshleman, ‘Defining the Circle of Sophists: Philostratus and the Construction of the Second 
Sophistic’ Classical Philology 103 (2008): 395-413.  
18 T. Whitmarsh, The Second Sophistic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 19.  
 8 
Anderson, who is discussed in greater detail in regards to his influential work on 
Lucian, “confirms the image of sophists as vain, contentious and sometimes 
superficial”19 in his 1995 work The Second Sophistic. Anderson’s work primarily aims 
to set up a historical context of the era, and outlines the core genres that sophists 
engaged with in an attempt to satisfy their own vanity. Of greatest importance is 
Anderson’s recognition of the sophistic striving for fame and reputation, and the fact 
that Lucian positions himself simultaneously within and outside of this contentious 
group. He aptly states as his discussion draws to a close that “only Lucian will have a 
clear vision of the vanity of it all, but his is still a testimony from within. We do not 
have to look far for characteristic self-display, rhetorical overindulgence and a measure 
of sheer conceit; but there is also conviction, real skill, and not a little wit as well.”20 
Anderson’s views on Lucian in the context of the Second Sophistic provide a core basis 
from which the following discussion is framed, as what follows further engages with 
Lucian’s position as being both in and outside this convoluted period of self-expression.  
 A primary characteristic of the period of the Second Sophistic relates directly 
to the inherent divide between Greek and Roman cultural ideals. Swain’s Hellenism 
and Empire offers scholars an informed overview of this divide, focussing primarily 
upon issues of cultural identity and the desire for authors of this period to justify and 
rationalise their position within a period that denies definition. Of significance to the 
following discussion is Swain’s discussion of Lucian, outlining his own self-
presentation as simultaneously Greek, Roman and Syrian. Swain focusses on the way 
in which Lucian seamlessly integrates himself into Roman culture and elitism, while 
also congratulating the wealth of wisdom that may be derived from Greek culture. 
Crucially, he states, “Lucian’s adopted cultural identity as a Hellene did not clash with 
his loyalties to Rome’s Empire. But in cases where Greek culture was abused by Roman 
power, it is clear where he stood.”21 It is this tension between Greek culture and Roman 
power that serves to inform the following discussion, as it is possible to see Lucian’s 
concern with such a divide being centred upon the sophists of the period. The Roman 
                                               
19 D. Lateiner, review of The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire by G. 
Anderson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) quoting the volume’s blurb 
(http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1994/94.10.06.html). 
20 G. Anderson, The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire (Oxford: 
Routledge, 1983) 233.  
21 S. Swain, Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism and Power in the Greek World AD 50-250. 
(Oxford: Clarndon Press, 1996) 329.  
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drive towards power and reputation stand at loggerheads to claims to Greek wisdom, 
and it is the philosopher-sophists who profit and propagate such corruption of Hellenic 
culture.  
 This tension between Greek and Roman culture is further discussed in König’s 
Greek Literature in the Roman Empire. König provides a useful and informed starting 
point from which to assess the literary hybridity that pervaded the 2nd the 4th centuries 
AD, which is significant in the context of the intense cultural hybridity of the period. 
The work, organised by genre, encourages a view of the literary environment as fluid 
and varied, exploring notions of authorship (or lack thereof) throughout the works and 
their role within the broader conception among the educated elite. Of particular 
importance for the following discussion is of course his analysis of satire, and while 
König’s focus is rightly structured around the figure of Lucian, the importance for the 
following discussion is upon his identification of features of the Second Sophistic ethos 
that may be elucidated from the genre. These features include a focus upon elitism, 
rhetoric, reputation and notions of Greek-ness, however in the context of satire, it is 
possible to see a direct opposition to such traits. 
At the most basic level, the extant texts of this period are inherently a product 
of elite society, with authors frequently trumpeting their own education and intellect, 
often in a concerted effort to better their reputation. This, as will be shown, is precisely 
the concern of Lucian’s satire, as it is this focus upon reputation that comes to override 
philosophical teaching. Nevertheless, external to the genre of satire, the presentation of 
an elite and learned voice is crucial. König highlights these elite pretences in the context 
of the ancient novel,22 noting specifically that the elitism that pervades these texts is 
directly presented as Greek superiority, idealising Classical Greece in direct opposition 
to the comparatively foreign culture of the Roman Empire.23  
Another significant contribution to the scholarly world of the Second Sophistic 
is Eshleman’s The Social World of Intellectuals in the Roman Empire: Sophists, 
Philosophers and Christians. Eshleman’s work deals, as the title suggests, with the 
process of defining and understanding the extremely varied culture that surrounds the 
Second Sophistic, paying particular attention to the processes of self-definition that 
                                               
22 For a detailed analysis of the ancient novel and modes of defining the novel, see N. Holzberg, The 
Ancient Novel, translated by C. Jackson-Holzberg. (London: Routledge) 1995 and S. Bartsch, 
Decoding the Ancient Novel (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1989.  
23 J. König, Greek Literature in the Roman Empire, (London: Bristol Classical Press, 2009) 19-21. 
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governs individuals living in the Roman Empire during this time. The notions of being 
an insider and an outsider are returned to in this work, although Eshleman brings her 
focus inwards, discussing the tension between being a sophist, a philosopher, or a 
Christian. Chapters Two and Three of Eshleman’s work in particular are of the primary 
focus here, as much of the following discussion similarly considers the divine between 
these three distinct modes of self-fashioning. Eshleman states that the “stereotyped 
hierarchy of expert speaker and inexpert audience is belied by the fact that audiences 
were typically dominated by members of the educated elite, especially other specialists 
– whose presence was in fact a point of pride for our subjects.”24 This, in the context of 
inclusion and exclusion, is an important consideration for the following discussion, as 
Lucian’s works often deal with concerns over the insider and the outsider, and the 
perception of inclusion. The philosopher-sophists, self-fashioning themselves as 
insiders to the sphere of the educated elite are not considered to be educated on account 
of their wisdom, but rather their appearance of wisdom through public display. It is 
their pride over their inclusion that Lucian disparages frequently, showing that such 
inclusion is merely a veil for their own desires for reputation and fame.  
It is also worth noting the role of Schmidt and Fleury’s edited collection, 
Perceptions of the Second Sophistic and its Times/Regards sur la Seconde Sophistique 
et son époque, which consolidates a number of the themes outlined above. Many of the 
papers draw upon these notions of inclusion and exclusion, focusing upon the rhetorical 
tools sophists of the era may use in order to disseminate their views to the willing 
audience. Of particular importance is Henderson’s chapter, as its discussion of the non-
elite in this context stands to underpin the motives and techniques of Lucian himself. 
Lucian in particular stands as an outsider to the Second Sophistic, both ethnically and 
in terms of genre. Henderson states that Lucian is unable to manipulate the themes and 
tropes that the ‘real’ sophists utilise in order to fully integrate himself into this ‘circle’ 
of sophists, as his “unconcealed, yet de-emphasized ‘Assyrian’ ethnicity was obtrusive 
enough in live performance to deny him success in the sophists’ defining, public 
medium.”25 Lucian’s stark absence from literary accounts of the era serves as evidence 
of this, however in the discussion that follows, I argue that there is more to be drawn 
                                               
24 K. Eshleman, The Social World of Intellectuals in the Roman Empire: Sophists, Philosophers and 
Christians, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 89.  
25 I. Henderson, ‘The Second Sophistic and Non-Elite Speakers’ in Perceptions of the Second Sophistic 
and its Times – Regards sur la Seconde Sophistique et son époque, edited by T. Schmidt and P. Fleury, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011) 29. 
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from this ‘failure’ to be included among the sophists. Lucian’s use of sophistic tools 
and techniques rather allows for him to be precisely integrated enough in order to 
achieve his satirical goal, being able to position himself as both within this ‘circle’ and 
distinctly outside of it.  
More recently, Richter and Johnson’s Handbook of the Second Sophistic is a 
much-needed contribution to Second Sophistic studies, compiling an informed and 
considered overview of the time period and its influential authors. The Handbook 
compiles many ways of understanding the Second Sophistic, and its large temporal and 
literary scope earn it the worthy title of ‘Forty Three Ways of Thinking about the So-
called "Second Sophistic."26 Richter’s own chapter in the work deals with Lucian, and 
is significant for the following discussion for the recognition of Lucian as an “ethno-
cultural hybrid”.27 Like Richter, I do not make any attempt to discern the real Lucian 
behind his own literary persona, but rather I draw on the hybridity of ethnicity and 
culture evoked from the biographical tradition. Lucian is himself, a hybrid, and it is 
proposed that his own hybridity serves to facilitate and enhance his own satire by 
engaging with the overall hybridity of the era itself.  
 
As the above overview has shown, scholarship on the Second Sophistic is extremely 
varied, and I make no attempt to discuss the full range of perspectives upon the 
literature and culture of the time. Rather, through the select authors outlined above, it 
becomes clear that the works of Lucian occupy something of a unique position. The 
philosopher-sophists of Lucian’s works are portrayed as proponents of wisdom, who 
use rhetorical techniques to acquire and solidify their own reputation. Lucian however, 
being an individual who is both a part of the culture and outside of it, stands at the 
outskirts of such vanity, using his own hybridity to critique the philosopher-sophists 
who dominate the Second Sophistic. Lucian represents the hybridity of culture, of 
ethnicity, and of class, and it is his role as a ‘middle-man’ that serves to facilitate his 
critique. The philosopher-sophists too, are hybrids, but their role within the community 
positions them as corrupted and corrupting hybrids; they are neither sophists nor 
                                               
26 J. Alvares, review of The Oxford Handbook of the Second Sophistic by D.S. Richter and W.A. 
Johnson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017; http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2018/2018-07-10.html). 
27 D. S. Richter, ‘Lucian of Samosata’ in The Oxford Handbook of The Second Sophistic, edited by D. 
S. Richter and W. A. Johnson, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 327.  
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philosophers, but a vile mix of both, producing the appearance of wisdom for the sake 
of their own reputation.    
 
Who is this Lucian person anyway?  
 
As noted above, the following dissertation makes no attempt to discern the biography 
of Lucian of Samosata. For my purposes, the focus is strictly upon the way in which 
Lucian constructs his works in order to critique the philosopher-sophists. Nevertheless, 
it is important to outline some of the core features of the tradition surrounding Lucian, 
especially given the wealth of scholarship that has been produced in recent years. 
Lucian of Samosata was born in Syria during the second century AD,28 
composing satirical dialogues and treatises. Little more is definitively known about the 
figure of Lucian, and while attempts have been made to infer biographical information 
from his works, it is crucial to understand that this can only be speculation. Much of 
the speculation regarding the real persona of Lucian derives from the sheer range of 
characters that he includes in his works, with each of these characters standing as a 
representation of the overall message that Lucian wishes to present. The alignment of 
these characters with the person of Lucian is attributed to the similarity of the 
characters’ names and personalities to his own, making the figure of Lucian even more 
beguiling and complex. Though the Lucianic character is a core feature of his works, 
the following discussion chooses to focus less upon the character of Lucian, and rather 
considers more heavily the characteristics of his works overall.29  
It is crucial to note the work of Bompaire, who in 1958 revitalised scholarly 
studies in Lucian with his volume Lucien écrivain: Imitation et creation. Bompaire’s 
work is particularly exhaustive, and offers a valuable insight into many facets of 
Lucian’s works, namely regarding their attribution and inspiration. Bompaire’s 
consideration of the primary figures of influence for Lucian and his subsequent 
                                               
28 The exact date of Lucian’s birth is unknown. The Suda states that he wrote during Trajan’s reign (λ 
683), however secondary scholarship, through analysis of his works proposes that he was born following 
Trajan’s time as Emperor. For a detailed discussion of this, see C.P. Jones, Culture and Society in Lucian, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986) 167ff and J.A. Hall, Lucian’s Satire (New York: Arno 
Press, 1981) 13-16.   
29 For a detailed and constructive discussion of the Lucianic character and its role in his satirical 
persona, see A. Camerotto, Gli occhi e la lingua della satira. Studi sull’ eroe satirico in Luciano de 
Samosata (Milan: Mimesis Edizioni, 2014).  
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manipulation of their respective works positions Bompaire’s work as one of the core 
studies for Lucianic scholars, despite its relative age.  
Following Bompaire, one of the early scholars looking at the satires of Lucian 
is Baldwin, who positions his satires in the context of the Roman Empire, and proposes 
that Lucian should be read within this context,30 a theme which continues with his 
monograph, Studies in Lucian.31  As alluded to earlier, it is possible to identify a period 
of renewed interest in the satirist by this point, signified not only by Baldwin’s works, 
but also that of Anderson. Lucian: Theme and Variation in the Second Sophistic, 
discusses the way in which certain tropes or themes present themselves in Lucian, 
stating that he “varies a small amount of material to an exhaustive degree.”32 Of 
importance in the following discussion is Lucian’s critique of the philosopher-sophists 
of the period, as what follows delves into the way in which Lucian constructs this 
critique. It is argued that through the theme of hybridity, Lucian is able to extend his 
satire of the philosopher-sophists and applies this corrupted hybrid theme to the state 
of humanity and the gods.  
An additional source worthy of note is Branham’s Unruly Eloquence, which 
aims to focus more upon Lucian’s manipulation of the serio-comic genre. Branham’s 
work discusses the role of humour more broadly, and notes that Lucian’s use of the 
satire serves to reflect upon the use by his predecessors, namely that of Plato through 
the trope of the ignorant interlocutor. Lucian’s use of the serio-comic, I argue, extends 
beyond such a role, as it is possible to view Lucian’s own reflection upon his use of the 
genre. His ‘creation’ of a hybrid genre, one that merges the features of dialogue and 
comedy, serves to reflect upon the hybridity of the Second Sophistic period, and 
ultimately, those who write during it.  
These three core texts form the basis for any study of Lucian’s works, and allow 
for an understanding of both his role in the social milieu of the Second Sophistic, and 
the core features that pervade his work. More recently is the work of ní Mheallaigh, 
who primarily focusses upon identifying the distinction between reality and fiction in 
Lucian’s works, and other authors of the Second Sophistic more broadly. Of particular 
significance for the following discussion is ní Mheallaigh’s assessment of hybridity, 
and its relationship to Lucian’s works and biographical tradition. While she speaks of 
                                               
30 B. Baldwin, ‘Lucian as Social Satirist’ Classical Quarterly 11:2 (1961): 199-208.  
31 B. Baldwin, Studies in Lucian (Toronto: Hakert, 1973). 
32 G. Anderson, Theme and Variation in the Second Sophistic, (Leiden: Brill, 1976). 
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Lucian’s hybridity predominantly regarding his use of hybrid genres, she nevertheless 
notes the effect that such hybridity has upon the reception of his work, in the context 
of addressing high and low cultures. ní Mheallaigh aptly states:  
 
Lucian’s hybrid and mutable ‘sculptures’ hint at the imaginative 
possibilities of the ‘open’ literary work, while the glutinous plasticity of 
Lucian’s wax and clay evokes the visceral abandon of the Bakhtinian 
carnivalesque and suggests too, an honesty or openness about the creative 
processes that lurk behind every completed artefact, but which the more 
refined ‘classical’ materials such as gold or marble less readily disclose.33 
 
It is in this context that the following dissertation should be viewed, as I aim to 
expand upon the work of ní Mheallaigh, and apply this hybridity of form and 
substance to a number of Lucian’s other works, and show that his own hybridity 
serves to directly critique the corrupted hybridity of the philosopher-sophists.  
 
 
Lucian the Literary Cynic 
 
Lucian’s attitude to Cynicism has implications for the interpretation of his satire. 
Bernays’ Lucian und die Kyniker34 remains one of the core texts for considering the use 
of Cynicism and Cynic ideals by Lucian, yet it should not be ignored that much work 
has been done in subsequent years. Consequently, what follows does not intend to be a 
comprehensive overview of the development of Cynicism, but rather aims to 
underscore the key tenets of the philosophy, and view the use of the doggish philosophy 
as a foundational position from which Lucian conducts his satire.  Of particular 
importance is the effect the Cynic doctrine has upon the literary sphere, evidenced 
through the early Cynics such as Diogenes and Crates. As will be shown, the Cynic 
philosophy undergoes a number of changes from its first incarnation to the second 
century AD, attracting praise and scorn in equal measure. Cynicism holds a unique 
place in Lucian’s works, being portrayed as the essence of the hybrid philosopher (Fug. 
                                               
33 K. Ní Mheallaigh, Reading Fiction with Lucian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 23.  
34 J. Bernays, Lucian und die Kyniker, ( Berlin: W. Hertz, 1879). 
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10), yet nevertheless acts as a core means for Lucian to ensure a dual audience for his 
works. Its characterisation as the “philosophy of the proletariat”35 allows for Lucian to 
engage with both upper and lower-class concerns, encouraging a broader audience 
engagement with this satire. Lucian adopts what can be understood as literary 
Cynicism,36 utilising the ideals of the Cynic doctrine to facilitate the appeal of his 
satirical works. In what follows, I argued that literary cynicism allows Lucian to adopt 
the hybrid genre, yet also engage with his hybrid audience, bridging the space between 
high and low culture.  There is a distinct separation between ‘types’ of Cynicism, with 
the true and uncorrupted Cynic being viewed as a relic of the Golden Age.  
 
The founding of the Cynic philosophy is most commonly ascribed to Diogenes of 
Sinope, the irreverent, bedraggled philosopher who took up residence in a tub. 37 Rather 
than attempting to discern the character of Diogenes, the focus of the following 
discussion rests primarily upon what can be considered the core principles of this initial 
incarnation of the Cynic doctrine.38 Dudley notes that much of what is understood about 
Diogenes and early Cynicism derives from later literature, and he divides this literature 
into two “classes” – that which occupies the Cynic and Stoic philosophical works, and 
that which concentrates primarily upon anecdotes and stories surrounding his persona. 
He notes that the works of Crates, Diogenes’ successor, are the “best authority for 
contemporary cynic practices,”39 and through the idealistic portrayals of him in later 
philosophical sources, it is possible to see the significant influence the character of 
Diogenes had upon the expansion and development of the doctrine proper. 
At the core of the Cynic doctrine are two principles, these being παρρησία and 
ἀναίδεια. Outspokenness is essential for the desire to become a σοφός, for it allows 
resistance to the “coercion of tyrants,” and the capacity to “expose the pretentions of 
‘intellectuals’ and politicians.”40 What’s more, shamelessness comes to underpin the 
                                               
35 D.R. Dudley, History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century, (Hildesheim: Georg Olms 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967) xi. 
36 Bosman states that “Lucian was attracted to the literary potential of the cynic style,” carefully 
distinguishing between literary cynicism and actual cynicism (P.R. Bosman, ‘Lucian Among the 
Cynics: The ‘Zeus Refuted’ and the Cynic Tradition’ Classical Quarterly 62:2 (2012): 793).  
37 The evidence for Antisthenes as the founder of Cynicism is not strong, as Dudley has argued (D.R. 
Dudley, History of Cynicism, 1ff).  
38 For an overview of ancient Cynicism and its relationship to modern interpretations see J.C. Laursen, 
‘Cynicism Then and Now’, Iris: European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 1:2 (2009) 469-
482.  
39 D.R. Dudley, History of Cynicism, 18. 
40 D.R. Dudley, History of Cynicism, 28. 
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Cynic’s capacity to speak freely – there is no need to conform to social convention, but 
rather one must become dog-like, free from any particular Greek ideal, living in 
accordance with nature.41 It is during the third century BC that Cynicism comes to be 
an influential and pervasive doctrine throughout the Greek world. Diogenes had already 
believed in the importance of presenting his beliefs in a form that embraced the 
populace, speaking not in a wholly serious manner, but in a form that could be easily 
remembered.42 This characteristic of the Cynic speech became increasingly important 
through the writers of the third century BC, as the serio-comic diatribe was embraced 
and developed by individuals who were perhaps less concerned with treating Cynicism 
as a way of life, but more as a tool with which to present critique and satire, with such 
a feature of the philosophy being heavily adopted by Lucian some centuries following.  
In what follows, the figure of Menippus will be the primary focus. It is a well 
established fact that Lucian took much inspiration from the Cynic from Gadara, and 
thus in understanding his literary predecessor, much can be gleaned about Lucian’s own 
Cynic background.43 For Menippus, Cynicism is a literary tool, and it is this aspect that 
is of greatest importance for Lucian. The tropes of Cynicism, despite Lucian’s overt 
critique of contemporary practitioners, are nevertheless crucial to his own satire, 
justifying the hybridity of form, genre and audience.  
Dudley states that “the name of Menippus is familiar; yet we have surprisingly 
little detailed information about him; like the Cheshire cat, he has faded away to a 
grin.”44 Despite the absence of information about his life, Menippus nevertheless is a 
persistent figure throughout literary history. Diogenes Laertius dedicates a chapter to 
the figure of Menippus, stating that there are thirteen works attributed to him (D.L. 2.8), 
although these are now lost.  He states that his “books overflow with laughter,” and 
although the nature of his satire are not discussed, secondary scholarship has made 
significant strides in attempting to discern the core features, and their reception 
throughout antiquity and beyond. Relihan is at the forefront of such studies, with his 
                                               
41 D.R. Dudley, History of Cynicism, 29. See too W.D. Desmond, The Greek Praise of Poverty: 
Origins of Ancient Cynicism, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2006), 27ff.  
42 D.R. Dudley, History of Cynicism, 110-111. Desmond too, notes the importance of speaking freely 
and adopting shamelessness in order to effectively present an argument to the masses (W.D. Desmond, 
The Greek Praise of Poverty, 154ff). 
43 The primary discussion of on Lucian’s relationship to Menippus is Helm’s Lukian und Menipp (R. 
Helm, Lucian und Menipp. (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1906), however in more recent years, Bosman’s 
work on identifying the Cynic elements in Lucian provides a useful overview for the persistent 
presence of Menippus (P. R.Bosman, ‘Lucian Among the Cynics’, 785-795).  
44 D.R. Dudley, History of Cynicism, 69. 
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work Ancient Menippean Satire. The primary feature of Menippean satire, argues 
Relihan, is the presence of an incompetent narrator, who is satirised through his quest 
for philosophical knowledge, a feature of the main character of the Satyricon, 
Encolpius. Relihan outlines the presence of this Menippean satire in a number of works 
from antiquity, categorising them as works which “strain the limits”45 of convention. 
Menippean satire, however, is of course not limited to the works of antiquity, as W.D. 
Weinbrot aptly observes. He defines the genre as “a form that uses at least two other 
genres, languages, cultures, or changes of voice to oppose a dangerous, false, or 
specious and threatening orthodoxy.” 46 It is this broad-reaching and ultimately anti-
authoritarian aspect of the satirical form that facilitates its use throughout contemporary 
culture. The works of Bakhtin on Menippean satire systematically break down the core 
aspects of the genre, so it is important to consider these here. Bakhtin’s treatment of 
Menippean satire encourages the view that the very nature of the satire defies definition, 
however its primary features include the presence of the carnivalesque, the fantastical, 
and importantly, a reflection upon philosophical truth through these overarching 
themes.47  
It is not difficult to identify such features in the works of Lucian, especially 
given the prominence of Menippus as a character in his works. Two works in particular, 
Icaromenippus and Nekyomanteia, feature Menippus as the main character, and he 
frequently appears in the underworld throughout Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead. This 
alignment with Menippean themes and techniques, given Menippus’ identification as a 
Cynic, is crucial for studying the works of Lucian, and it is from this that we are able 
to see Lucian engaging with a form of literary cynicism. As Bosman states, “the shifting 
stance and absence of philosophical commitment disallow easy equation of 
philosophical ideas with the convictions of the historical figure.”48 Thus, I argue that 
the Cynic doctrine that pervades Lucian’s works is to be considered literary Cynicism; 
it is not a reflection of a particular philosophical stance, but rather, a tool by which 
Lucian may critique contemporary philosophy as a whole. As will be shown, the Cynic 
                                               
45 J. Relihan, Ancient Menippean Satire (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993) 187.  
46 H.D. Weinbrot, Menippean Satire Reconsidered: From Antiquity to the Eighteenth Century, 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2005) 6.  
47 M. Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics, edited and translated by C. Emerson and M. 
Holquist, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984) 114. For an organised outline of 
Bakhtin’s primary principles of Menippean Satire, see M.K. Booker, Flann O’Brien, Bakhtin and 
Menippean Satire (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995) 143ff.  
48 P.R. Bosman, Lucian Among the Cynics, 785. 
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philosopher is explicitly characterised as the worst of the philosophical hybrids, yet is 
nevertheless the embodiment of Lucianic ideals, harmoniously mixing low and high 
culture so as to unveil the corruption of the philosophical hybrid.  
 
There are four key dialogues of Lucian’s that present a fuller treatment of the Cynic 
doctrine. Of these four, two may be considered to be a praise of a Cynicism,49 while the 
other two represent direct disagreement with the doctrine. In what follows, I will 
discuss those which are considered a critique of Cynicism, and show the way in which 
these dialogues are not strictly a critique of Cynicism, but rather a critique of the 
hybridity of those who follow such a doctrine. The dialogue of the false Cynic, 
Peregrinus, treats Cynics as the epitome of the corrupted philosopher-sophist. As will 
be shown, while these dialogues present themselves as obliquely critiquing the 
philosophy and those who practice it, it is crucial to view them within their context.  
The Lucianic epistolographic text detailing his account of the death of the 
philosopher Peregrinus is a core starting point for assessing Lucian’s relationship with 
the Cynic philosophy. Lucian presents his authorial voice as wholly against the actions 
of Peregrinus, the quintessential philosopher-sophist who is concerned with little more 
than his own reputation and glory. He himself is a hybrid figure – not in form, but in 
his role as the Christian-turned-Cynic, which is treated throughout the dialogue. Yet as 
König notes, there are additional intermingled roles that the character of Peregrinus 
plays – he notes the allusion to not only Socratic practices, but also the practices of the 
Brahmins.50 Through Fields’ careful analysis of the text,51 it is clear that there exists an 
alignment between Lucian and the Cynic doctrine. It is not the Cynicism of Peregrinus 
that offends the satirist, but rather the act of striving towards glory through a form of 
Cynic hybridity.52 Critique is consistently hurled at the followers of Peregrinus, who 
                                               
49 Lucian’s Demonax and Cynicus are loosely regarded to be works that praise the Cynic doctrine. 
Demonax, as the title suggests, details the life and achievements of this Cynic philosopher, whom we 
know of exclusively from Lucian’s work (A.M. Harmon, Lucian I. 141). The Cynicus, is considered to 
be a pseudo-work, but such an assertion is somewhat simplistic, as it is based purely upon the fact that 
the dialogue serves to defend and praise Cynicism, and thus I attribute the work to Lucian. For the 
purposes of the following discussion however, these two dialogues are not discussed in full. What is 
significant is the dialogues that seem to openly critique the Cynic doctrine, as they serve to underpin 
Lucian’s use of hybridity to critique contemporary philosophical practice.  
50 J. König, ‘The Cynic and Christian Lives of Peregrinus’ in The Limits of Ancient Biography by B. 
McGing and J. Mossman, (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2006) 240. 
51 D. Fields, ‘The Reflections of Satire: Lucian and Peregrinus’ Transactions of the American 
Philosophical Association 143: 1 (2013) 213-245. 
52 Criticisms regarding attention seeking are found Diogenes Laertius’ biography of Diogenes. 
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are foolish enough to believe and worship his faux philosophical stance. However as 
König notes, this too can be viewed as representing Lucian’s own alignment with the 
Cynic doctrine. When he openly criticises Peregrinus in front of his followers, the 
Cynics flock to defend his honour, and are described as almost tearing the satirist “limb 
from limb…just as Actaeon was by his dogs or his cousin Pentheus by the Maenads” 
(Peregr. 2). The choice of likeness here suggests more than the savagery of their attack, 
as it also implies that Lucian is being attacked by his own kin or associates.53 Lucian 
does not disparage Peregrinus for his philosophical doctrine, but the manner in which 
he conducts himself. He is not only a fraud, but he is an incompetent fraud54 - the overt 
desire for glory is an embarrassment to the ‘true’ dedicatees of Cynicism.  
This distinction between ‘true’ Cynicism and ‘incompetent’ Cynicism is crucial 
for the following discussion, as it is argued that such a sentiment exists also in Lucian’s 
Fugitivi. As has been noted, this dialogue is the primary motivation for considering the 
Cynicus to be falsely attributed,55 an argument which I consider superficial. The Cynic 
is portrayed as the epitome of corrupted hybridity, however the κυνικὸς βίος itself is 
not the target of critique. During the Second Century AD, many authors expressed their 
distaste towards the Cynics, yet nevertheless consider these distinct from true 
representatives of the philosophy. Instead the contemporary Cynics are portrayed as 
“bring[ing] the name of philosophy into disgrace”56 Lucian’s Fugitivi is no exception; 
the contemporary Cynics cannot be compared to the likes of Diogenes, Antisthenes or 
Crates (Fug. 20), and with these contemporary Cynics acting as representatives of the 
philosophy, the populace are now scornful of the school itself (Fug. 21).  
The focus for the following discussion is the consistent representation of the 
Cynic philosophy as a hybrid creature. In Fugitivi, Philosophy begins her tirade against 
contemporary philosophers, and specifically states that philosophers themselves have 
not caused her any dishonour. Rather, it is those who are in the middle of the 
philosophers and the populace; they appear to be philosophers in “deportment, glance 
and gait,” (Fug. 4), yet in truth they are ignorant and insulting to the name of 
philosophy. In this first instance, the fraudulent philosophers are clearly characterised 
                                               
53 König, ‘The Cynic and Christian Lives of Peregrinus,’ 244. 
54 König, ‘The Cynic and Christian Lives of Peregrinus,’ 247. 
55 J. Bridge, ‘On the Authorship of the Cynicus of Lucian’ Transactions of the American Philological 
Association 18 (1888): 33.  
56 D.R. Dudley History of Cynicism, 145.  
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as being hybrids, being literally described as ἐν µεταιχµίῳ.57 Further in the dialogue, 
the sophists are described as like the centaur, a mixture of false pretentions and 
philosophy (Fug. 10), and the woman captured by the runaway slave-cynics proclaims 
that they are a “dog at the front, and lion at the back, and in the middle, a χίµαιρα (Fug. 
30), emphasising the monstrosity of the hybrid.   
 
This hybridity of the Cynic becomes especially important when considered in 
conjunction with the Cynic alignment with living in accordance with nature. In Fugitivi, 
Philosophy herself attacks the contemporary Cynics, critiquing the lavish existence of 
the fraudulent philosophers. To them, she states, their life appears to be as in the age of 
Kronos, the gifts and adoration of the populace was as if honey was coming from the 
heavens into their mouths (Fug. 17; Ov. Met. 1.88). Martin discusses the relationship 
between the idealised Golden Age and the Cynic philosophy and identifies such an 
existence in a number of authors from antiquity. Notably, he highlights that life in the 
age of Kronos becomes a core feature of the Cynic view of living in accordance with 
nature, citing the lifestyle of Diogenes as representing a Golden Age existence among 
the corruption of the Iron Age.58 The Iron Age becomes the beginning of civilisation, a 
triumph of mankind but nevertheless a period of corrupted virtue. Civilisation, as Moles 
notes, is a corrupting force on account of “all the evils it brings with it – greed, love of 
glory, wars, addiction to pleasures,” and thus virtue in the Cynic ideal is a “return to 
man’s natural state.” Such a return positions the Cynic life in the era of the Golden Age 
– prior to the pollution that is the civilised world.59 What is significant about this divide 
between the ideal Golden Age and the corrupted Iron Age is that the Cynics similarly 
attribute a culprit to such a development. This corruption is considered to be fault of 
none other than Prometheus,60 who is considered wholly responsible for the corruption 
of man’s natural state.61 Promethean innovation has debased Golden Age existence, by 
introducing humanity to the evils of greed and love of glory.  
                                               
57 Note that this term is more literally translated as ‘between two armies.’  
58 T.W. Martin, ‘The Chronos Myth in Cynic Philosophy,’ Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 31:1 
(1997): 92.  
59 J.L. Moles, ‘Cynics and Politics,’ in Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and 
Political Philosophy edited by A. Laks and M. Schofield, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995) 129-160. 
60 M-O. Goulet-Cazé, L’ascèse cynique: Un commentaire de Diogène Laëce VI 70-71, (Paris: Vrin, 
1986) 59. 
61 Goulet-Cazé states that “Cynics were anti-Prometheus because Prometheus bequeathed culture upon 
humans” (M-O. Goulet-Cazé, L’ascèse cynique’, 60). 
 21 
There is a clear parallel to be drawn here, between Lucian’s own literary hybrid 
innovations and the corruption of Cynicism. Lucian claims that he is not, as others had 
claimed, a “literary Prometheus,” (Prom. Es.) on the basis of his innovations, yet 
concedes that there is a modicum of likeness in terms of his blending of genres (Prom. 
Es. 7). Viewed in the context of Lucian’s alignment with Cynicism, his self-professed 
similarity to Prometheus invites a reflection upon apparent critique of the modern Cynic 
doctrine. The ideal Cynic life exists in the Golden Age, prior to the corruption of the 
Promethean hybrid innovation. Similarly, for Lucian, the ideal Cynics exist in a Golden 
Age, and while Lucian does not consider himself responsible for the fraudulent and 
polluted actions of the contemporary Cynics, he nevertheless positions him apart from 
them. He cannot deny that his literary works are of a hybrid nature, yet frames himself 
as a relic of the Cynic Golden Age. As will be shown, Lucian’s alignment with the 
Cynic doctrine extends not only to include the idealising Golden Age but also to engage 
with its broader connections. Such connections, I argue, include an engagement with 
fable, and the Aesopic tradition.   
Lucian utilises the ideals of Cynicism in the literary sphere to facilitate his 
critique of contemporary philosophers. The Cynic is inherently a form of hybrid – the 
dog-like philosopher – yet I also argue that striving towards a life in accordance with 
nature instils a further form of hybridity. By embracing παρρησία and αὐταρχεία, the 
Cynic philosophical doctrine positions itself as a hybrid between popular and elite 
culture. Diogenes Laertius states of Diogenes of Sinope that he discovered prattling 
(τερετίζω) to be a more effective means of drawing a crowd to hear his speeches (D.L. 
6.27), commenting upon the most effective means of providing philosophical discourse 
to the common audience. As Dudley states, “they [the populace] wanted the lessons of 
philosophy presented readily digested, and in an easily remembered form,”62 a format 
to which the Cynic ideal readily conforms. Presenting philosophy or satire in this 
“readily digested” form is a technique that Lucian uses throughout his dialogues.  
It what follows, it is argued that Lucian utilises and manipulates Cynicism to 
create a form of literary Cynicism – his works embody and align with Cynic ideals, 
facilitating their reception by a broader audience. The idealism of the Golden Age that 
so defines the Cynic path to virtue is reflected through the consistent and deliberate use 
of the Aesopic tradition, both in terms of the fables and the biographical caricature of 
                                               
62 D.R. Dudley, History of Cynicism, 111. 
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Aesop himself. Lucian’s literary Cynicism allows for him to utilise his hybrid genre as 
a reflection upon contemporary philosophy, while simultaneously maintaining distance 
from the critique itself. These pseudo-philosophers, he states, are corrupted hybrids not 
unlike the centaur, yet in his guise as the literary Cynic, he becomes exempt from such 
a charge.  
 
Hybrid Sophists and φιλοδοξία 
 
Chapter One sets up a framework from which to fully understand Lucian’s use of 
hybridity, by outlining the presence and use of Aesop and the fable tradition in his 
works. Aesopic hybridity presents itself as bridging the space between man and animal, 
yet also bridging literary spheres and social boundaries. By utilising this Aesopic 
framework, it is similarly possible to identify such hybridity in the works of Lucian, 
precisely through his overt engagement with Aesop and the fable. The chapter is 
divided into five main parts. First, the fable and its broader adoption throughout 
antiquity is considered, ranging from its use in early texts such as Hesiod, and following 
its presence throughout the Classical era, noting its particular significance in the genre 
of comedy. Secondly, this chapter discusses the anonymous Life of Aesop, as it is from 
this work that much of the tradition surrounding the figure of Aesop is derived, in 
particular the role of Aesop as the intelligent slave. Following this, it is outlined how 
the fable, Aesop and the broader tradition have a close relationship to the doctrine of 
Cynicism, with many features of the tradition such as the natural world and simplicity 
aligning well with the philosophy. With this association in mind, the chapter moves on 
to consider the role of the Aesopic tradition in the Second Sophistic period, as while 
there are similarities to its treatment earlier in antiquity, Aesop during this time is used 
less as a moral centre and more as a source of wisdom. Finally, the chapter turns to 
Lucian’s use of the Aesopic, and to demonstrate the prevalence of the tradition 
throughout his works. It is from this background that an analysis of the Aesopic in 
Lucian may be conducted, for the rich and intricate history of the tradition is evident in 
the Lucianic treatment, and sets up a basis from which to discuss the hybridity of culture 
and society that defined Lucian’s own satires.  
 Chapter Two expands upon the notion of the hybrid in Lucian’s works, in 
particular focusing upon the imagery and symbolism of the centaur. Philosophy herself, 
in Lucian’s Fugitivi, deems the philosopher-sophist to be not unlike the centaur - a 
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hybrid creature, incapable of being wholly dedicated to philosophy or to ignorance 
(Luc. Fug. 10). This motif of the philosopher-sophist being like the centaur is discussed 
in detail, as it is used to underpin what can be understood to be two distinct ‘forms’ of 
hybridity in Lucian. The first section of this chapter utilises Plato to define the nature 
of the sophist, showing the way in which Lucian uses these Platonic definitions in his 
satire. The following section then draws upon these definitions through a discussion of 
two core dialogues, the Sale of Lives and The Fisherman. In Sale of Lives, Lucian places 
a monetary value upon the philosopher-sophists, obliquely commenting upon their 
philosophical value. In the companion dialogue, The Fisherman, this motif is expanded 
upon. The representatives of various philosophical doctrines are shown to be fish lured 
in by gold, portraying them as literal hybrids who are driven merely by greed. The 
second half of this chapter delves deeper into the motif of the hybrid centaur, first 
outlining the symbolism of the centaur in antiquity, and assessing this symbolism in 
Lucian and identifying his manipulation of the motif more broadly. It is shown, through 
a comparative analysis of Lucian’s Zeuxis and Symposium, that the philosopher-sophist 
is a corrupted hybrid centaur, being uncivilised and uneducated.  
 Chapter Three focusses primarily on Lucian’s Gallus, for its representation of 
the talking animal as an interpretation of the hybrid form. Lucian utilises the talking 
rooster to critique the ideals that the philosopher-sophists espouse, positioning the 
animal hybrid as a greater source of wisdom than his human interlocutor. The first 
section of this chapter discusses the significance of speech more broadly, as its role in 
establishing ‘Greekness’ is pervasive throughout many texts of antiquity. In this 
context, it is then considered how the presence of animal speech is portrayed, 
particularly regarding the way in which it is utilised to defend or reject wisdom of 
animals and their capacity for reason. With broader perceptions of animal speech in 
mind, the chapter then turns to the Gallus dialogue. The dialogue features a reincarnated 
Pythagoras as a rooster, serving to comment upon the nature of philosophical wisdom. 
By positioning the wise philosopher in the body of a rooster, Lucian comments upon 
the present state of philosophy in his contemporary age. By comparing the wise 
alektruo-Pythagoras with the ignorant Micyllus, Lucian differentiates between hybrid 
wisdom and hybrid corruption, as Micyllus is portrayed as driven by greed and 
appearance, only learning philosophical wisdom through the speaking animal.  
 Chapter Four approaches the hybrid by engaging with the motif of viewing from 
above. In the dialogue Icaromenippus, the title character attaches the wings of an eagle 
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and a vulture in order to ascend to the heavens, becoming a literal hybrid between 
human and animal. The chapter first identifies the use of ascent as a literary trope, 
focusing primarily upon its treatment in Plato and relationship to the ascent of the soul. 
The chapter considers this motif and its connection with virtue and wisdom in the 
context of two Lucianic dialogues, Icaromenippus and Charon. In both of these 
dialogues, the main characters ascend to the skies, and are able to look down upon the 
world from below. Here, it is possible to see a direct critique of the philosopher-
sophists, as the primary motivation for Menippus’ ascent to the heavens is his 
dissatisfaction with contemporary philosophy. This chapter then deals with various 
modes of viewing, with the two characters being granted sharpness of sight to see the 
world below them. This sight, as is outlined in the next section, can be identified as 
largely inhuman, with Menippus utilising the wings of the eagle, and Charon using the 
magic of Homeric verses. Crucially, in viewing from above, these two characters are 
able to see the effect that the philosopher-sophists have had upon humans below – they 
are shown to be driven purely by greed and reputation, the contemporary philosophers 
having corrupted the virtue of humanity.  
 Chapter Five, the final chapter, expands upon the themes treated in the previous 
one, discussing the corruption of the philosopher-sophists upon the heavens. This 
chapter first outlines the notion of hybrid deities, focusing upon the presence of hybrid 
deities that occupy the Graeco-Roman pantheon of gods. These hybrid gods come in 
many forms, and often have a form of cult following, inviting a collection of followers 
that often come to resemble the corrupted hybrid. It is shown that such a dichotomy 
between the singular and plural hybrid deity is similarly reflected in the make-up of the 
philosopher-sophists. In this chapter, three primary dialogues are discussed, Parliament 
of the Gods, Jupiter Tragodus and Icaromenippus, so as to show that the hybrid deities 
that now occupy the Olympian heavens are cast as corruptions themselves on account 
of the corrupted hybrid philosopher-sophists. Rather than the presence of hybrid gods 
reflecting a Lucianic distaste with hybrid deities, the presence of hybrid gods serves to 
exemplify the problem with the philosopher-sophists. The realm of the heavens is no 
longer solely occupied by ‘real’ gods, but also by those who merely appear divine, and 
it is necessary to discern the real from the false. Similarly, the false philosopher-sophist 
hybrids are poor replicas of the true philosopher, and have fooled everyone into 
thinking they are a source of true wisdom. The chapter concludes with a case study that 
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confirms such corruption, as the Lucianic dialogue Peregrinus is outlined, 
underpinning the desire for reputation that so defines these philosophical hybrids.  
 Throughout these five chapters, it is shown that Lucian’s dialogues utilise 
hybridity in order to denigrate the philosopher-sophists who characterise the Second 
Sophistic period. Owing to their greed and desire for fame, they are unable and 
unwilling to strive towards true wisdom. Rather, their professions of false wisdom are 
shown to have no benefit for the broader community, corrupting the makeup of both 
humanity and the divine sphere. Crucially, Lucian’s philosopher-sophist hybrid should 
be distinguished from the successful hybrid who acts as an improvement of both its 
separate halves. It is thus clear that Lucian uses the motif of hybridity to both disparage 
the philosopher-sophists and simultaneously heighten his own success as a hybrid. His 
own melding of dialogue and comedy has created a genre that is not unlike the centaur. 
Yet this centaur-like creation is neither a corruption nor a deception, but rather, Lucian 
successfully merges these genres to create a form that speaks to both high and low 
cultures, critiquing the deception of the so-called philosophers by using their own 
tricks.  
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Aesop and the Fable 
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A donkey put on the skin of a lion and went around frightening 
all the animals. The donkey saw a fox and tried to frighten her 
too, but she had heard his voice first, so she said to the donkey, 
‘You can be sure that I too would have been afraid, if I had not 
already heard the sound of your bray.’  
 
Likewise, there are certain ignorant people whose outward 
affectations give them an air of importance, but their true 
identity comes out as soon as they open their big mouths.63 
 
       Perry 188 
    The Fox, the Donkey and the Lion Skin 
 
The hybrid animal, in its many incarnations, plays a particular role in the literary 
imagination of the classical world. The following chapter assesses the hybrid animal in 
the context of the Aesopic fable, as assessing hybridity in this context serves to frame 
the bulk of the following dissertation. The hybrid animal, as it is depicted in the Aesopic 
fable, bears similarity to the Lucianic treatment of the hybrid, in that hybridity is 
presented as having a dual purpose or nature. The fable anthropomorphises its animal 
characters, by its very nature dealing with animal-human hybrids. However it also 
engages with a form of cultural hybridity, combining what may be understood as ‘low’ 
and ‘high’ cultural spheres. Aesop as an individual, drawn from the representation in 
the anonymous Life of Aesop, forms a precedent from which to consider Lucian’s own 
hybridity, due to the way in which the two author-figures are situated between the lower 
classes and the elite, both in genre and in circumstance. Consequently, the fable and 
Aesop himself form a useful framework within which to structure the analysis of 
hybridity in Lucianic satire. The following discussion provides an assessment of the 
core features of the fable and the figure of Aesop. By identifying these features, it is 
thus possible to view Lucian’s satire through this Aesopic framework on account of 
their mutual engagement with notions of hybridity. Aesopic hybridity presents itself as 
bridging the space between man and animal, yet also bridging literary spheres and 
social boundaries. By utilising this Aesopic framework, it is similarly possible to 
                                               
63 Aesop’s Fables translated by L. Gibbs, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 154. 
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identify such hybridity in the works of Lucian, precisely through his overt engagement 
with Aesop and the fable.  
 
In his analysis of Apuleius’ Golden Ass, Winkler sees in the Anonymous Life of Aesop 
a resistance to elite culture, identifying the use of what may be deemed ‘lower-class’ 
themes, embedded in narratives concerned with non-elite intellect. Winkler states of 
the Life that the synthesis of vulgar themes with intellectual pursuits is “not the 
uncensored reality of low life, but represents rather a specific animus against the claims 
of the educated elite to have proprietary rights over wisdom and shrewdness.”64 This 
tension between the elite and the non-elite, or the strong and the weak, is a core feature 
of the fable genre. Clayton notes that the fable offers an analogy, through the use of 
animal characters, to actualised “hierarchy and power relations,” presenting a 
politically charged image to both low and high cultures. The fables offer a “cautionary 
tale” to the members of the lower class, portraying the state of their subordination by 
the stronger, elite classes. Yet the fables can also act as a tool by the elite classes to 
solidify their position, “indoctrinating” the lower classes with lessons in 
subordination.65 Yet Clayton also notes that through the differences between the fable 
and actualised society, it is possible to view the genre as one promoting the freedom of 
the lower classes from their position below the elite. This, he states, is based on the 
Aristotelian assessment of animals as incapable of reason, implying that the human 
audience of the fables, being comparatively reasoned creatures, have the capacity to 
change their environment unlike the animal characters of fable.66 This ability for the 
genre to attract a dual audience is of utmost importance for the following discussion. 
As is argued, the Aesopic genre of animal fable and the anonymous Life of Aesop 
provide a useful framework in which to view the satirical works of Lucian, as the dual, 
hybrid audience is used to similar effect.   
In examining the function of hybridity in the context of the non-elite, it is useful 
to return to Canclini’s discussion of folklore. The role of folklore, he argues, is to act 
as a bridge between the elite and the popular, allowing for the popular to no longer be 
excluded from elite knowledge on the basis of social restrictions. He states that 
                                               
64 J. Winkler, Auctor and Actor: A Narratological Reading of Apuleius’ Golden Ass (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985) 282.  
65 E. Clayton, ‘Aesop, Aristotle and Animals: The Role of Fables in Human Life’ Humanitas 21:2  
(2008): 182-3. 
66 E. Clayton, ‘Aesop, Aristotle and Animals’195. 
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“knowledge of the popular world is no longer required only to form modern integrated 
nations, but also to free the oppressed and resolve the struggle between classes."67 
Through folklore, the two realms of the elite and the non-elite converge, melding the 
culture of the populace with that of the higher classes. Lucian engages with the era of 
the Golden Age and the fable tradition, in order to present a similar convergence of elite 
and non-elite culture. In his guise as satirist, Lucian utilises a combination of low and 
high culture in a manner like that of the Aesopic tradition, merging the features of the 
fable and satire into an informed critique of contemporary philosophy. Kurke states of 
the Life of Aesop, that it “appropriates and reuses traditional tales about Aesop’s 
distinctive discursive weapons and his critique of sophia from below for his own 
purposes of playful parody of the institutions of education - academic philosophy and 
rhetoric.”68 It is this characteristic of the Aesopic tradition surrounding both the fable 
and the Life that is the focus for the following discussion, due to the way in which 
Lucian harnesses such characteristics of the Aesopic tradition for similar ends. By 
embracing the dual function of the fable, Lucian uses the dichotomy of the elite and 
non-elite to suggest a desire for a true sage not unlike Aesop himself. Lucian’s 
dialogues become more than a hybrid between the dialogue and comedy, but also act 
as a narrative that critiques hybrid social order. Lucian uses the animal fable to reflect 
it back upon the society managed by the class of pseudo-intellectuals. 
 
It is necessary to outline what is meant by the ‘Aesopic tradition’ in order to 
subsequently identify similar themes in Lucian’s work. Crucial to this discussion is 
Kurke’s Aesopic Conversations, which primarily aims to identify the function and 
symbolism of the figure of Aesop throughout antiquity, and the effect of such a figure 
upon the formulation of Greek prose. Kurke states that Aesop occupies a position 
between a number of binary oppositions: “the lowly and common versus the wealth of 
ranked valuables (gold, silver, ivory); animals versus human wisdom; tales told by 
females versus authoritative male speech genres; and traditions that belong to 
childhood…versus grown-up poetry and philosophy.”69 It is this dichotomy between 
the elite and non-elite culture that shapes the composition of the following argument, 
                                               
67 N. G. Canclini, Hybrid Cultures, 148. Emphasis added.  
68 L. Kurke, Aesopic Conversations: Popular Tradition, Cultural Dialogue, and the Invention of Greek 
Prose, Leslie Kurke, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) 42. 
69 L. Kurke, Aesopic Conversations, 1-2.  
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for as will be shown, Lucian engages with these aspects of the Aesopic tradition, 
himself bridging the divide between elite pretensions of wisdom and the veracity of 
lower-class intellect through the medium of satire.   
 
The Fable  
 
First, it is necessary to outline the perception and role of the fable more broadly.70 In 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the fable is treated as a rhetorical tool, as one of two means of 
conducting reasoning (Arist. Rhet. 1393a23-1394a18).71 Holzberg places Aristotle’s 
assessment at the “first stage in the development of this narrative form,”72 wherein it 
evolves to become solely “an exemplum within a given literary context.”73  Similarly, 
Aelius Theon defines the fable (µῦθος) as a “λόγος ψευδὴς εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν” 
(Theon. 2.72). Adrados highlights that even prior to the classical era, the fable was an 
“exemplum that the poet directs at somebody to offer an illusion or illustration of reality 
or to suggest a form of behavior to them, always from a critical perspective.”74 These 
definitions of the fable identify some of its key features. The fable is used as a literary 
tool within a broader discourse, allowing both for its transmission throughout antiquity, 
and as a means for an author to present critique in a less overt manner. This prevalence 
of the fable in antiquity also facilitates the use of the fable in literary works without 
even a mention of Aesop himself75 – as will be shown, by the Imperial period Aesop 
and the associated fables are arguably so engrained in the culture that an overt reference 
to Aesop becomes wholly unnecessary. 
                                               
70 Due to space constraints, a comprehensive assessment of fable throughout antiquity is not possible 
here. However, for further reading see G-J. Van Dijk, Ainoi, Mythoi, Logoi: Fables in Archaic, 
Classical and Hellenistic Greek Literature – With a Study of the Theory and Terminology of the Genre 
(Brill: 1997) Leiden; N. Holzberg, C. Jackson Holzberg (tr.) The Ancient Fable (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2002); M. Nøjgaard, La Fable Antique (Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold 
Busck, 1964);  F.R. Adrados, History of the Greco-Latin Fable (Leiden: Brill, 1999);  T. Karadagli, 
Fabel und Ainos (Meisenheim: Anton Hain 1981) Meisenheim. 
71 F. R. Adrados, L.A. Ray (tr.) and G-J. van Dijk (ed.) History of the Graeco-Latin Fable Volume 
One: Introduction and From the Origins to the Hellenistic Age (Leiden: Brill, 1999) 368.  
72 See too, the work of Mueli, who argues that the initial conception of a given fable derives from an 
external need to mark an occasion, in this case, through the construction of the αἶνος (Κ. Mueli, 
Herkunft und Wesen der Fabel (Basel: Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Volkskunde: 1975) 743).  
73 N. Holzberg and C. Jackson-Holzberg (tr.), The Ancient Fable: An Introduction (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2002) 12.  
74 F.R. Adrados, History of the Graeco Latin Fable I, 368.  
75 Such an omission of Aesop in retellings of the fables is particularly evident in Aelian’s NA. 
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As the length of Van Dijk’s Ainoi, Mythoi, Logoi76 may suggest, defining the 
fable is no straightforward task, and thus what follows by no means claims to be 
comprehensive. Rather, the focus is restricted to select core features of the fable, with 
particular attention to its role within literary works. By outlining the characteristics of 
the fable, it is possible to identify such features in the works of Lucian, namely the use 
of animal characters, golden age idealism and an exploration of the tension between 
elite and non-elite audiences, from which Lucian is able to profess truths disguised as 
overt fiction. Consequently, it may be argued that Lucian’s dialogues, in both their 
intent and construction, embody the qualities of the Aesopic tradition, and thus act as a 
series of discourses that act as a bridge between disparate cultures and spheres.  
 
 
The Fable and the Golden Age 
 
In order to assess the significance of the fable to the works of Lucian, it is useful to 
provide a summary of the tradition so as to observe the above traits in practice. The 
fable customarily situates itself in the time of the Golden Age. In the time of the 
mythical Greek Golden Age, humans, animals and gods are said to have been able to 
speak a common language. Babrius, prefacing his collection of versified fables, 
explains that in this Golden Age, “the other animals used to possess articulate speech 
and understood words just like we employ with each other” (Babr. 1). Babrius’ 
depiction of the Golden Age does, to a certain extent, aim to justify the presence of 
speaking animals in the fables that follow,77 however the notion of the mythic past 
being filled with garrulous animals is not unique to the second-century AD fabulist. 
The Platonic dialogue The Statesman already includes speaking animals in the Golden 
Age, as the Stranger states to a young Socrates that the “foster children” of Kronos had 
“the ability to converse not only with human beings but also with beasts” (Pl. Plt. 
272b).78  
                                               
76 G-J. Van Dijk, Ainoi, Mythoi, Logoi (Leiden: Brill, 1997).  
77 D. Gera, Ancient Greek Ideas on Speech, Language and Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003) 19. 
78 Plato, Statesman, Philebus, Ion, translated by H.N. Fowler and W.R.M. Lamb, Loeb Classical 
Library 164 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925) 61. Xenophon likewise makes mention 
of freely-speaking animals during the golden age in his Memorabilia (X. Mem. 2. 7.13). 
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However the capacity for animal speech is subsequently removed in the present 
age, relegating the fable to the time of the mythical golden age. The expulsion of animal 
speech is similarly attested throughout the literary record.  Philo speaks of the utopian 
period when all animals spoke a universal language, and concurs with Plato that such 
an existence was profitable for each species. The downfall of this communal existence, 
according to Philo, comes as the result of animal arrogance; in desiring immortality on 
the basis of their perceived superiority, their common language was divided between 
species. (Philo De Confusione Linguarum 7-8) While this anecdote is contained in the 
context of the ‘Tower of Babel’ story so as to underpin the specifically human 
differences in language, it is a curious contrast to another major account. Gera observes 
the difference between accounts of the communicative and communal Golden Age in 
reference to a Callimachean fragment. While Philo retains the animal capacity for a 
separate language, Callimachus removes animals’ capacity for language altogether. 
(Call. Iamb 2) The animals’ desire for immortality likewise results in their language 
being transferred to the race of man, but, “the animals’ loss of speech leads to a 
linguistic break between men and animals, rather than among the animals 
themselves.”79 
The Greek Golden Age, according to the above literary accounts, had as one of 
its primary features the possession by animals of a form of language, and in some 
versions this language was even shared by humans. It is in this sense, therefore, that the 
hybrid may be identified as a core aspect of the Aesopic fable. While the animal 
endowed with speech acts a means to evoke the mythical Golden Age, the speaking 
animal is also inherently a human-animal hybrid. This feature, as is discussed, is 
significant for the identification of hybridity in the works of Lucian, namely through 
the means by which animal and human reason is explored. As is discussed in Chapter 
3, these concerns with animal reason and hybridity come to the forefront; Lucian 
presents the speaking animal of fable as an occupant of both the elite and non-elite 
sphere.   
 
Hesiod and Callimachus  
 
                                               
79 D. Gera, Ancient Greek Ideas on Speech, Language and Civilization, 31-32. See too T. Hawkins, 
‘Eloquent Alogia: Animal Narrators in Ancient Greek Literature’ Humanities 6(2): 37 (2017):4-5.  
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The presence of animal speech in the fable tradition (and its associated difficulties) is 
illustrated through two of the more well-known excerpts concerning fable from authors 
in antiquity, those of Hesiod and Callimachus. Hesiod’s telling of the Hawk and the 
Nightingale fable in his Work and Days has earned him the mantel of the first known 
Greek fabulist.80 Given the wealth of scholarship on Hesiod’s treatment of the fable, 
the following discussion is limited to the political and social implications of the fable, 
primarily its relationship to the Aesopic tradition succeeding it.81 In Hesiod’s retelling 
of the ‘Hawk and the Nightingale’ (OP. 202-212), the characteristic portrayal of animal 
speech is largely significant for its relationship to power struggles between the elite and 
non-elite members of society. The speech of the nightingale, protesting against being 
taken by the hawk, is proven to be entirely ineffectual, showing the superiority of power 
that the hawk holds over the nightingale. As Steiner states, “a hostile encounter between 
two birds not only configures a contrast between two ethical systems but also between 
the two styles and genres of poetry that articulate those values,” directly proposing that 
power and speech are intrinsically linked.82 Through an engagement with the qualities 
of the two animals, the power struggle in the fable between a weak and strong party 
presents itself explicitly, and implies that the inferior party is in essence ineffectual 
largely due to its deprivation of speech.  
However there also exists the suggestion of reversal between the two 
dichotomous roles; while the nightingale is not shown victorious in the fable itself, the 
narrating voice grants triumph to the nightingale by relating a story of Dike (justice) 
having revenge over corrupt kings, interpreted as representative of the hawk in the fable 
prior.83 The fable of Hesiod underpins the primary tropes of the animal fable – animal 
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and R. Scodel, ‘Callimachus and Fable’ in B. Acosta-Hughes, L. Lehnus and S. Stephens, Brill’s 
Companion to Callimachus (Leiden: Brill, 2011) Leiden, 369). 
81 For fuller discussions of the Hesiodic fable, see D. Steiner, ‘Fables and Frames: The Poetics and 
Politics of Animal Fables in Hesiod, Archilochus and the Aesopica,’ Arethusa 45 (2012): 1-41; D. 
Steiner, ‘Feathers Flying: Avian Poetics in Hesiod, Pindar and Callimachus’ The American Journal of 
Philology 128:2 (2007): 177-108; R. Hunter, Hesiodic Voices: Studies in the Ancient Reception of 
Hesiod’s Works and Days (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014) 239-256; G-J. Van Dijk, 
Ainoi, Mythoi, Logoi, 127-134. 
82 D. Steiner, ‘Feathers Flying,’ 188.  
83 D. Steiner, ‘Fables and Frames,’ 10. In addition to Hesiod, as Aelius Theon states (Theon Prog. 
73.16-18), Archilochus is also counted among those authors who preceded Aesop in the composition of 
fable. The Archilochean fable of the eagle and the fox, argues Steiner, follows the same format as 
Hesiod in terms of presenting a battle between weak and strong wherein the weaker party proves 
victorious (D. Steiner, ‘Fables and Frames’, 14). 
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speech, reversal of power struggles and framing the truth within a fictional narrative, 
reflecting a broader commentary on social power dynamics. As is evidenced in the 
following discussion, Lucian engages with the fable to comment on the contemporary 
tensions between the elite and the popular classes, and their engagement with 
philosophical discussion. 
 
The ancient animal fable is also employed in the fragments of Callimachus, as 
evidenced above in his aetiological explanation for animals’ loss of speech following 
the time of the Golden Age. The Callimachean composition of fable embraces many of 
the themes found in Hesiod: animal speech, role reversal and power struggle. However 
as Acosta-Hughes and Scodel argue, the Iambi in particular reflect a concern with 
literary power struggles.84 In Iamb 2, it is explained that the reason for animals’ lack 
of speech is their arrogance, with a fox and a swan approaching Zeus with complaints. 
The poem utilises this tale as an explanation for the loquacious nature of humans 
themselves, as rather than simply removing the voices of the animals, these voices were 
passed onto humans (Iamb 2.15-17).  
 However, the significance of speech is also evident in Iamb 4, the other of 
Callimachus’ fable pieces, through a similar presentation of the appropriateness of 
speech.85 Iamb 4 relates the argument between the laurel and the olive over which ought 
to be more highly praised. After some back and forth86 between the aggressors, the 
olive maintains that it is superior, due to having overheard a conversation between two 
birds. The birds are said87 to have praised the olive for its superiority in origin, divine 
protection and the usefulness of its fruit – all of which send the laurel into a fuming 
rage. However before she may retort, the bramble interjects, suggesting that they cease 
their argument, inciting the final extant88 argument of the poem, only to conclude before 
                                               
84 B. Acosta-Hughes and R. Scodel, ‘Aesop Poeta: Aesop and the Fable in Callimachus’ Iambi’  in 
Callimachus Two: Hellenistica Groningana Groningen Workshops on Hellenistic Poetry (Leuven: 
Peeters, 2004) Leuven; D. Steiner, ‘Feathers Flying,’ 177-108. See too D. Steiner, ‘Framing the Fox: 
Callimachus’ Second “Iamb” and its Predecessors’ The Journal of Hellenic Studies 130 (2010): 97-
107.  
85 B. Acosta-Hughes and R. Scodel, ‘Aesop Poeta’ 11. 
86 For detailed analyses of the Iamb, see Kerkhecker (A. Kerkhecker, Callimachus’ Book of Iambi 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) 83-122), and Acosta-Hughes (B. Acosta-Hughes, Polyeideia: The 
Iambi of Callimachus and the Archaic Iambic Tradition, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2002) 152-204, esp. 190ff.  
87 Kerkhecker notes that it is likely that the olive is making the anecdote up, but its role within the 
poem is not affected by its fictitious nature (A. Kerkhecker, Callimachus’ Book of Iambi, 101-2). 
88 D.L. Clayman, ‘Callimachus’ Fourth Iamb’ The Classical Journal 74:2 (1978): 142-148.  
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its proper end.89 As Dawson suggests, the laurel may have rebuked the bramble for 
daring to intrude upon their conversation, considering the bramble to be an inferior 
party – a Callimachean commentary upon inferior forms of literary composition making 
inappropriate intrusions on elite literature.90 As Acosta-Hughes and Scodel argue, the 
bramble represents a transgression of speech, yet it is significant that the olive utilises 
the crow to present its argument. The crow comes to represent the main proponents of 
critiquing the literature of the elite,91 creating something of an imbalance between the 
interlocutors on account of the elite nature of Callimachus’ work. The arrogance of the 
laurel’s superiority reflects an inferiority of style – despite pretentions of superiority, 
the laurel is ultimately ‘defeated’ by bastions of low, non-elite culture, such as fable 
(through the anecdote of the crows) and the lowly bramble.92 
 
These two early uses of fable in the ‘high’ literary context, are useful for understanding 
Lucian’s particular use of fable in the dialogues. In both Hesiod and Callimachus, it is 
possible to see how this feature of animal speech creates a dichotomy between the types 
of literature that would usually dismiss the genre of the fable and the very nature of the 
fable itself, as it allows (not unlike the interjection of the bramble) the presence of an 
additional voice. As will be argued, Lucian’s dialogues similarly utilise these 
characteristics of the fable tradition in order to critique contemporary philosophy. His 
characters engage with features of this Golden Age ideal, and evoke the world of the 
fable through animal speech and Aesopic allusion. In doing so, Lucian bridges the gap 
between elite and non-elite culture, by utilising the culture of the fable as a familiar, 
literary motif that allows his philosophical critique to engage with a broad audience. 
 
Aristophanes  
 
Prior to turning to the use of the fable during the Roman empire, it is important to  
comment upon the role of fable in ancient comedy, in particular that of Aristophanes. 
Given the wealth of scholarship on the Aristophanic fable, the fables are not discussed 
                                               
89 A. Kerkhecker, Callimachus’ Book of Iambi, 110-11. 
90 C. M. Dawson, ‘The Iambi of Callimachus: A Hellenistic Poet’s Experimental Laboratory’ Yale 
Classical Studies 11 (1950): 51. Kerkhecker expands upon this suggestion in relation to the association 
of the olive as being Callmachus himself, concluding that the poem is less about poetic superiority than 
it is about the nature of quarrelling (A. Kerkhecker, Callimachus’ Book of Iambi, 111-115). 
91 B. Acosta-Hughes and R. Scodel, ‘Aesop Poeta: Aesop and the Fable in Callimachus’ Iambi’ 11. 
92 B. Acosta-Hughes and R. Scodel, ‘Aesop Poeta: Aesop and the Fable in Callimachus’ Iambi’ 12. 
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in full here.93 Nevertheless, Aristophanes’ use of the fable throughout his comedies are 
worth considering, due to the frequency with which Lucian appears directly to reference 
the Aristophanic fable in his own dialogues. Given the satirical nature of Lucian’s 
works, there are a number of parallels to be drawn between Aristophanes’ use of fable 
and Lucian’s. While such parallels are evident through overt references to Aristophanic 
treatments of fable in Lucian (Peace 127-134),94 there are a number of stylistic 
similarities to be identified. Importantly, the tension between the elite and non-elite as 
evidenced in Aristophanes’ use of fable is directly related to Aristophanes’ position as 
a composer of comedies.95 As Pertsinidis has noted, such a tension continues to be 
reflected in modern scholarship on Aristophanes, and thus due caution should be 
exercised in considering the fable in this context as ‘low culture’.96 
 One of the most significant uses of Aesop by Aristophanes presents itself in the 
Wasps, where the fable appears as a frequent source of tension between the characters 
Bdelykleon and Philokleon. Rothwell states it is possible to see a divide between the 
“sub-literary” and “high literature”,97  yet such a tension should be viewed in the 
context of fable as an embedded form of rhetorical argument. This use of fable, as 
evidenced in Hesiod’s telling of the Hawk and the Nightingale, allows for this tension 
to be reflected through the fictional medium. Of particular significance is Aristophanes’ 
use of the Eagle and the Dung Beetle fable. Pertsinidis discusses the presence of fable 
in the Wasps, and notes that the use of fable in discussion between the son and his father 
comes to reflect concerns about appearances; Philokleon, in dressing himself up in 
appropriate attire to attend a symposium considers himself a weasel dressed as food 
and alludes to a fable that reflects his position (Perry 303). There is initially the sense 
here that indeed, the fable belongs to the lower classes of society, as Bdelykleon 
reproaches his father, and states that he should not be telling such stories at the upper-
class symposium (Vesp. 1180). This is followed by a recommendation by Bdelykleon 
to use fable as a means to get out of a quarrel (Vesp. 1260), for the matter at hand 
                                               
93 For discussions of Aristophanes’ use of fable, see S. Pertsinidis, ‘The Fabulist Aristophanes,’ Fabula 
50 (2009): 208-226; K. S. Rothwell Jr., ‘Aristophanes’ “Wasps” and the Sociopolitics of Aesop’s 
Fables’ The Classical Journal 90:3 (1995): 233; G.J. van Dijk, Ainoi, Mythoi, Logoi, 188ff.  
94 E. Bowie, ‘The Ups and Downs of Aristphanic Travel’ in Aristophanes in Performance, 421 BC – 
AD 2007: Peace, Birds and Frogs, edited by E. Hall and A. Wrigley. (London: Modern Humanities 
Research Association and Maney Publishing, 2007) 34ff, esp 36.  
95 For a discussion of the relationship between the genres of fable and comedy, see F.R. Adrados, 
History of the Graeco-Latin Fable, 216ff.  
96 S. Pertsinidis, ‘The Fabulist Aristophanes,’ 208-226. 
97 K. S. Rothwell Jr., ‘Aristophanes’ “Wasps” and the Sociopolitics of Aesop’s Fables’233. 
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becomes a joke. In this brief interlude into the world of fable, the fable is considered to 
be a literary form that belongs to the lower classes. As Pertsinidis notes, such an 
assessment is complicated by the fact that Bdelykleon claims that Philokleon will learn 
the appropriate fables to tell at a symposium at the symposium, suggesting that the fable 
is a genre appropriate to all classes.98  What is more, it is revealed that the lower class 
nature of Philokleon, as determined by his dress, is in fact not indicative of his social 
status at all. He is shown to have wealth, but chooses not to act in the same manner as 
his son, choosing not to parade his wealth through appearance, and shows little concern 
with his reputation. The seemingly lower-class Philokleon is in fact cast as the ideal 
Cynic, and this is in the context of the fable genre becomes an important 
consideration.99 The relationship of Cynicism to the fable encourages a reflection upon 
Lucian’s own relationship to the fable.100 It is possible to see the means by which 
Lucian too engages with the ‘Aristophanic’ fable. There exists a similar reflection upon 
the tension present in reciting fable; as Adrados notes, the classical era relied entirely 
upon the recitation of fable in the oral and sympotic setting, with no strict collection of 
fable being produced during this time.101 It is possible to see the impetus of addressing 
a broad audience emerging, with the need to simultaneously reflect upon popular 
tradition, although in an arguably elite environment. In what follows, it is possible to 
see this emerging too in Lucian, as the intellectual satirist comes to occupy both the 
elite and non-elite space, precisely by engaging with the malleable genre of fable.  
 The fable, in the context of the Wasps, undergoes a number of different 
incarnations, and exemplifies the fluidity of the genre within the context of a comedy 
largely concerned with the divide between the upper and the lower class, and 
                                               
98 S. Pertsinidis, ‘The Fabulist Aristophanes,’ 220. Kurke also comments on the use of fable in the 
sympotic setting, citing the fable-like nature of Alcibiades’ speech in Plato’s Symposium, with the fable 
in this context providing an example of the correct manner of utilising fable in the symposium (L. 
Kurke, ‘Plato, Aesop and the Beginnings of Mimetic Prose’ Representations 94:1 (2006): 31). 
99 S. Pertsinidis, ‘The Fabulist Aristophanes,’ 217. 
100 Cynicism, as has been shown in the introduction to this dissertation and will be evaluated further in 
the context of the figure of Aesop himself, is frequently connected with the fable genre. Zafiropoulos 
argues against the suggestions of Adrados, states that there is little to indicate a definitive association 
of Cynicism to the fable. While such a position should not be ignored, it is nevertheless an important 
consideration in any assessment of the fable, given the pervasive nature of Cynicism, especially during 
the period of the second century AD. As Zafriropoulous outlines, Adrados identifies a number of core 
Cynic themes that present themselves in the fable genre: “disapproval of wealth, abuse of power, false 
beauty, hedonism; condemnation of ingratitude, selfishness and hypocrisy; criticism of custom, 
boastfulness, imprudence” (Zafiropoulos, 35). As will be shown below, it is clear that these aspects of 
the doctrine are clear in both the Aesopic tradition, and significantly, are engegd with throughout the 
Lucianic corpus (C.A Zafiropoulos, Ethics in Aesop’s Fables: The Augustana Collection (Leiden: Brill, 
2001). 
101 F. R. Adrados, History of the Graeco-Latin Fable, 378-9.  
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encouraging the perception that such a divide stretches between generations. This is not 
to say that the fable reflects lower class concerns, but rather that it acts as a useful tool 
for the playwright to engage with a dual audience, by making the fable-teller a likeable 
character (throughout his extant plays) and one who challenges, in the case of the 
Wasps, the society that values the appearance of wealth and virtue over the actualised 
embodiment of it. The fable, as utilised in Aristophanes’ plays acts as a means to create 
an “accord between the character and the outlook of the fable teller/hero and the 
playwright himself.”102 It is this feature of the Aristophanic fable that is crucial for 
understanding the use of fable in Lucian, as it is possible to understand the fable, in this 
Aristophanic context, as being manipulated and utilised by Lucian. As Adrados states, 
the Wasps exemplifies the important role of the symposium for the transmission of 
fable; the fable exists in a “potential state,” 103 neither collated nor collected, and 
entirely reliant upon oral transmission. The fable too, is a tool that becomes inextricable 
from the persona of Aesop, and thus associations of wit and cleverness similarly 
become attached to the fable genre. Lucian’s engagement with the animal fable elicits 
a response similar to that of Aristophanes, as I will argue more fully below. The fable, 
as a ‘lower class’ form of literature is utilised to critique elite themes in the context of 
the satirical performance space. 
 
As will be argued, speech and power dynamics become crucial in Lucian’s use of the 
fable genre. Lucian not only attributes speech to non-human interlocutors, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 3, but he also uses such speech to comment upon the perception 
of intellect that is derived from the human capacity for speech. Literary speech, when 
utilised in the correct manner and in the correct environment, has been shown to offer 
writers, especially of the early Roman Empire, a means of encouraging a particular 
perception of their works. The adoption of fable, as will be argued, invites readers to 
interpret Lucian’s texts as both rhetorical virtuoso-pieces and popular commentary. The 
long-standing role of fable in rhetoric and as social commentary acts as a cue to read 
with an eye to both rhetoric and politics. In this context, Lucian’s use of fable 
throughout his works becomes a rhetorical tool in and of itself, addressing his 
hybridised audience through the hybridised literary form.  
                                               
102 S. Pertsinidis, ‘The Fabulist Aristophanes’, 224. 
103 F.R. Adrados, History of the Graeco-Latin Fable 378. 
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The Life of Aesop 
 
Prior to turning to fables of the Imperial era, it is necessary to assess the development 
of the fable tradition in the context of the Life of Aesop, as much of the reception of 
fable relies upon an understanding of the fabulist. The biographical tradition of Aesop 
exists well before the composition of the Life; Herodotus relates that he was a slave in 
Samos and that he died in Delphi (2.123-5), and the circumstances surrounding his 
demise in Delphi can be found in Aristophanes’ Wasps (1446-1448). As Miles and 
Demoen note, the tradition surrounding he fabulist is, by the Imperial era, well 
established and well known.104 It is this biographical tradition, be it fictional or 
otherwise, that is significant for the following discussion. Aesop, as he is presented in 
the anonymous Life, is a character who represents the popular classes, but is 
nevertheless shown as a highly intelligent individual. This feature of the Aesopic 
tradition and the fable permeates the works of Lucian, positioning his satires in a similar 
hybrid position to that of Aesop himself. 
The Life of Aesop, a text dated to the 1st century AD,105 is subject to much 
conjecture, due to the dearth of information concerning its composition and 
transmission. As Kurke argues, the extant manuscript is the end product of a long-
standing tradition regarding Aesop, and it is through such a tradition that the figure of 
‘Aesop’ comes to be available to the literary world as a “mask or alibi for critique, 
parody, or cunning resistance by any who felt themselves disempowered in the face of 
some kind of unjust or inequitable institutional authority.”106 This ‘mask’ is arguably 
most apparent in the Life, and it is from such an emphasis in the work that Lucian, and 
other authors of the Imperial era, may adopt and adapt Aesop’s anti-authoritarian107 
                                               
104 G. Miles and K. Demoen, ‘In Praise of the Fable,’ 37.  
105 For a discussion of the manuscript tradition surrounding the Life of Aesop, see L. Kurke, Aesopic 
Conversations,16ff, and the original preface of Perry’s Aesopica (B.E. Perry, Aesopica: A series of 
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106 L. Kurke, Aesopic Conversations, 12. 
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Novel and Beyond edited by S. Panayotakis, M. Zimmerman and W. H. Keulen (Leiden: Brill, 2003) 
43-47).  
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stance. In what follows, I will examine the literary significance of the Life and its 
particular role in the works of Lucian. Lucian frames his satires around Aesop and his 
fables, utilising the speaking animal and candid nature of the figure of Aesop to critique, 
and render illegitimate, the contemporary philosopher-sophists.  
 
The biography primarily portrays the tense relationship between Aesop, and his 
philosopher-master Xanthos. The composition of the life reveals that the figure of 
Aesop undergoes a process of transmission not dissimilar to that of the fables 
themselves, as there exists a long-standing tradition surrounding the fabulist. As 
Adrados summarises, Aesop is well-known not only as the teller of fables, but also as 
the Oriental sage “merged into the Thracian or Phrygian Aesop, the slave and the 
scholar, the narrator of fables, the solver of enigmas, protected by Apollo, yet unjustly 
killed” in Delphi.108 The character of Aesop, therefore, is arguably embedded in the 
traditional narrative as something of a hybrid character in and of himself; he is both the 
slave and the scholar, and the widespread transmission of the fables comes to reflects 
this. In the discussion that follows, it will be shown how the character of Aesop in the 
Life is constructed in such a way as to continue bridging the divide between the 
symbolically low culture of the slave, and the elite culture of philosophical inquiry 
through the fable genre. Xanthos, in the memorable first third of the Life,109 is 
intellectually belittled by his slave, who not only reveals himself to be a creature of 
rational thought, but also one who expresses a knowledge of philosophical truths. In 
addition to the fable genre itself, Lucian also adopts this particular feature of the 
Aesopic ethos, as I shall argue more fully below. The characters of Lucian’s satires 
come to represent this hybridity of form and function in a similar manner to Aesop 
himself, acting as figures who are able to bridge the divide between low and high 
                                               
108 F.R. Adrados, History of the Graeco-Latin Fable I, 647. The association of Aesop with Delphi, 
while it is a significant aspect of the Aesopic tradition, is not treated in the following discussion, as the 
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Classical Greece", La Fable (Vandœuvres–Genève: Fondation Hardt, Entretiens XXX 1984) 105–36. 
109 Holzberg, N. ‘Der Äsop-Roman: Eine strukturanalytische Interpretation’ in Der Äsop-Roman: 
Motivgesichichte und Erzählstruktur, edited by N. Holzberg, with A. Beschorner and S. Merkle, 
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culture, not only within the literary sphere (by merging the genres of comedy and 
dialogue), but by adopting Aesopic interpretations of temporal and cultural hybridity.   
 
As Socrates himself illustrates in the Phaedo (61b) and Symposium (233c-d), there is 
space for disparate genres to converge. Socrates proposes at the closing of Plato’s 
Symposium that one skilled in composing tragedy may also have the knowledge to 
compose works of comedy, just as he himself proves skilled both in reason and in 
storytelling when versifying the fables of Aesop while awaiting his execution. Socrates 
not only embraces the potential for genre to have a hybrid form (and exists himself 
within the hybrid genre of Platonic dialogue), but becomes himself a link in the 
transmission of the fable tradition. As duBois asserts, the “philosopher might be a 
fabulist, even a slave,”110 and it is in this context that much of the following discussion 
is framed. This association with philosophy and the fable tradition is not only repeated 
in the Life of Aesop, but also in the works of Lucian. In the Life of Aesop, we are offered 
an image of a slave who, despite his master’s best efforts, is able to prove himself as 
being superior in terms of philosophical prowess, through his own apparently innate 
mastery over rhetoric and sophia. For Lucian, the fable tradition is similarly presented 
in direct opposition to the present philosophical environment, framing these lower-class 
themes and genres as uncharacteristically superior to the appearance of sophia. Just as 
Socrates is able to adopt the skills of reason and storytelling, Aesop himself is portrayed 
as representing reason through storytelling. It is this aspect of the Aesopic tradition that 
Lucian is able successfully to utilise in his dialogues, presenting the audience with the 
fable as both a narrative device and philosophical reflection.  
 
Aesop the Slave 
 
The significance of the slave culture background to the figure of Aesop is pivotal for 
the following discussion. This is not simply due to the characterisation of Aesop himself 
as a slave, but also the consistent association of the fable themselves with slave 
culture.111 The servile background of the genre persists through the characterisation of 
                                               
110 P. duBois, Slaves and Other Objects (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2003) 182. 
111 S. Forsdyke, Slaves Tell Tales, esp.  37-89; K. S. Rothwell, ‘Aristophanes' "Wasps" and the 
Sociopolitics of Aesop's Fables,’ 233-254; A. Patterson, Fables of Power: Aesopian Writing and 
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142. See too Perry 545, Aesop and the Ugly Mistress for the association of Aesop himself as a slave; 
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the slave not simply below the master, but as a subhuman figure. Much of the 
identification of the slave as subhuman derives from antiquity’s assessment of reason 
– in particular, the lack of it that is exhibited in slaves and inhuman objects. One of the 
more pervasive views upon ancient slavery is found in Aristotle. In discussion the 
nature of friendship, Aristotle states that there cannot be friendship nor justice between 
inanimate objects (tools) and those who utilise them, a statement that also stands for 
the relationship between master and slave. A slave, for Aristotle, is merely a “living 
tool”, while the tool is an “inanimate slave” (Arist. EN. 1161b).112 The slave, therefore, 
is characterised as being little more than an animated tool, and corporeally on par with 
the non-human animal. Such an identification is significant for the characterisation of 
Aesop in the Life, as Aesop as a slave acts in a manner contrary to the Aristotelian 
definition. Rather than succumb to an existence of silence and subjugation, Aesop 
exhibits precisely the quality of the slave that had been previously denied: reason.  
 
The Life of Aesop opens with an emphasis upon two features of the fabulist: his 
appearance (unfavourable, including attributes such as a misshapen head and a pot 
belly) and his lack of capacity for speech. The latter is demonstrated through the re-
telling of a short anecdote, wherein Aesop is framed for eating the master’s figs, a crime 
committed by his fellow slaves, but pinned on him precisely due to his inability to 
speak. Aesop, however, exhibits almost immediately his capacity for reason, proving 
to the irate master through his ‘resourcefulness’113 (πολυπειρία, Vita G.3) that it was 
not he who ate the figs, but the other slaves. The anecdote marks the first of many 
instances in the Life where Aesop proves himself to be more than an animated tool, by 
showing a capacity for intellect in the face of adversity. In the subsequent passage, 
                                               
Perry 382, The Delphians and their Ancestors for Aesopic accusations of slavery towards the 
Delphians, related to his eventual death by their hands.  
112 As duBois notes, drawing upon this and a further discussion in the Eudemian Ethics, the slave is 
positioned between the master and the tool – having the animation of the master, but nevertheless 
lacking his capacity for rational thought (P. duBois, Slaves and Other Objects, 129). The perception 
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113 Upon being accused of eating the figs, Aesop forces himself to vomit, revealing that he had in fact 
not eaten anything. The other slaves, however, when told by the master to similarly vomit, discharged 
the figs, proving their guilt (G 3). 
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Aesop’s other non-human quality, his lack of speech, is rectified through a visitation of 
the goddess Isis, who restores his speech as payment for his piety (Vita G.5; 7-8).114  
In this brief introduction, the rise of Aesop from a lowly slave to one who moves 
above the slave class is foreshadowed. The acquisition of speech, argues Hunter, not 
only represents the development of the character of Aesop, but also reflects a scientific 
explanation of the development of speech more broadly. He states that such a “double 
explanation” encourages the reader to “associate a productive tension within such 
literature between the naiveté of the characters and the sophistication of the art which 
describes them.”115 The naïve characters of the Life are not figured through the 
character of Aesop himself, but through his various interlocutors, who, by making 
assumptions of his intellect prove themselves to be inferior to the mute slave. By the 
time the narrative reaches the first interaction between Aesop and his soon-to-be master 
Xanthos, it has already been firmly established116 that Aesop is a shrewd character, who 
despite being a slave, consistently trumps his interlocutors.  
In portraying this initial rise of Aesop, the Life evokes a similar rise of the slave 
culture, by humanising its participants through an acquisition of both speech and 
reason. Aesop is no longer the animated, animal-like tool of Aristotle, but in a swift 
turn of events, becomes a source of fear for his former master. Aesop, now that he 
speaks, represents a threat to his master Zenas, who immediately takes action to rid 
himself of the rational slave (Vita. 9-11). The threat of Aesop to his master, as the 
narrative continues, comes to be a valid concern while he is in the possession of 
Xanthos, and as Hopkins asserts, “Aesop represents all that a master might despise and 
fear in a slave.”117 This representation of the threat a slave may pose to a master, 
                                               
114 The inclusion of Isis in the Life is a feature only of Recension G. For a detailed discussion of Isis 
and her role in the characterisation of Aesop, see J. J. Winkler, Auctor and Actor: A Narratological 
Reading of Apuleius’ Golden Ass (Berkeley: University of California Press: 1985) 276-291. 
115 R. Hunter, ‘Isis and the Language of Aesop’ in Pastoral Palimpsests: Essays in the Reception of 
Theocritus and Virgil, edited by M. Paschalis (Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 2007) 49-53. 
116 Following his sale by Zenas, Aesop once again proves his intellect over his fellow slaves. Aesop 
chooses to carry a package on the road to Ephesus that bears the weight better suited to a mule (Vita 
G.18). The fellow slaves, incredulous that the new slave would choose the heaviest of the packages, are 
soon astonished by Aesop’s wit: the package contained the bread that would be eaten over the course 
of the journey, thus making the burden the lightest of all by the end of the trip (Vita G.19). In this 
anecdote, Aesop both exhibits his capacity to reason beyond instinct (to take up the lighter package 
from the beginning) and his capacity to exceed the qualities of animals. 
117 K. Hopkins, ‘Novel Evidence for Roman Slavery’, Past and Present: 138 (1993): 14. As Hopkins 
outlines, the character of Aesop both represents the slave-owner’s deepest fears (an intelligent slave 
with the propensity towards rebellion) and proposes something of a code of conduct for slave owners to 
follow if they wish to receive ‘good service’ from their slave. This latter message, that is largely 
directed towards elite audiences, is discussed below (K. Hopkins, ‘Novel Evidence for Roman 
Slavery,’ 22-4). 
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presented in a fictional biography of the famously lower-class fabulist, underpins 
Hunter’s ‘productive tension’; the text presents the common fable trope of slave-master 
role reversal,118 actualised not through animal allegory, but through the medium of both 
biography and human agents.   
 
 
However it is through Aesop’s interactions with Xanthos that the fabulist’s intellect is 
evidenced not through his overt wit, but through what Hopkins terms “wilful 
misunderstanding.”119 These instances reveal the necessity of ensuring a mutually 
beneficial relationship between master and slave, and warn against treating the slave as 
a creature without rational thought. Aesop’s wilful misunderstanding first manifests 
itself when he is asked by Xanthos to bring an oil flask to him at the baths. In response 
to Xanthos requesting Aesop not do anything “more or less than you are told,” Aesop 
brings only the flask, but does not fill it with oil. Unsurprisingly, Aesop is reproached 
for his actions, yet with childlike innocence, Aesop claims he was simply doing exactly 
as he was told (Vita. G.38). This interaction incites a reflection upon the treatment of 
slaves more broadly, and can be understood as a “mismanagement” of the relationship 
between master and slave.120 The slave, in being treated as a being without reason and 
rationality, teaches his master a lesson by proving an absence of common sense. Such 
an action is similarly in force in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses; as Lucius’ transformation 
into the donkey (and his subsequent treatment as a donkey) incites an internal dilemma 
for the human-minded creature. Bradley states that the actual condition of slaves is 
reflected through the torment of Lucius, as their “freedom to act on the impulse of 
intelligence and emotion was threatened with near extinction by submission to a 
superior force.”121 The treatment of Aesop by his master Xanthos threatens his intellect, 
                                               
118 Such role reversal is of course not unique to the Life, but is a well extablished tradition in the 
comedy genre. Aristophanic comedy in particular utilises such a theme, as explicitly satirised in the 
Frogs, (Ar. Ra. 496ff.) and such a trope continues throughout Roman era comedy. For detailed 
discussions on this fluid dichotomy in the context of comedy, see K. McCarthy, Slaves, Masters and 
the Art of Authority in Plautine Comedy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); P. W. Harsh, 
‘The Intriguing Slave in Greek Comedy,’ Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological 
Association 86 (1955): 135-142. See too Goins on the role of Aristophanic comedy on the composition 
of the Life (S. E. Goins, ‘The Influence of Old Comedy on the Vita Aesopi,’ The Classical World 83 :1 
(1989): 38-30).  
119 K. Hopkins, ‘Novel Evidence for Roman Slavery’, 18. 
120 S. Forsdyke, Slaves Tell Tales, 76-77. 
121 K. Bradley, ‘Animalizing the Slave: The Truth of Fiction,’ The Journal of Roman Studies 90 (2000): 
120. 
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and capacity for rational thought; as a lesson in humanity, Aesop wilfully responds by 
acting in the manner in which he is treated.  
 By highlighting questions of slave intellect as reflected in the Life, it is possible 
to see such questions similarly treated in the works of Lucian. Most significantly, it is 
possible to identify such a theme in his Dream, or Gallus, precisely on account of the 
concerns raised regarding intellect and speech. In Chapter Three, it will be shown that 
the character of the rooster, a reincarnation of the philosopher Pythagoras, demonstrates 
the difficulties associated with denying animals the capacity for speech. The rooster is 
able to regain the capacity for human speech, and it is only through his interlocutor that 
Micyllus is able to find wisdom. Rather than merely desiring wealth, Pythagoras 
teaches him that the life in poverty is not only a far more pleasant experience, but is 
more admirable. The Life thus aids in positioning Lucian’s works in the context of the 
fable genre. The dialogue, Gallus, not only positions itself in the era of the fable through 
the existence of animal speech, but it simultaneously engages with the Aesopic 
concerns of considering appearance a reflection of intellectual capacity. The Rooster, 
much like Aesop himself, is proven to be more intelligent that the human interlocutor, 
and as will be shown, both human characters (Micyllus and Xanthos) come to learn true 
philosophy from their apparently speechless companion. As the narrative continues, it 
is revealed that Aesop surpasses his master in philosophic and linguistic intellect. 
Aesop’s role as “le vrai sage”122 is established through characteristics of popular 
knowledge, yet simultaneously through utilising elite conceptions of knowledge as a 
means to debunk and discredit the philosophical professions of false wisdom, prevalent 
among the upper classes of society.  
Through this brief overview of the text, it is clear that Aesop in the Life 
represents precisely the hybridity of Adrados’ ‘slave and scholar,’ and while the Life 
indeed serves to preserve other archaic aspects of the Aesopic tradition123 it is this 
                                               
122 S. Jedrkiewicz, ‘Quelques traits sceptiques dans l’image populaire du philosophe au début de notre 
ère’ Platon 46 (1994) : 129-134. 
123 Of particular prominence is the tradition surrounding Aesop and Delphi. As noted above, this tale 
presents itself in the fables themselves (Perry 382), however it can also be evidenced in older 
traditions. For detailed discussions of Delphi and its relationship to Aesop, see Wiechers (A. Wiechers, 
Aesop in Delphi, Meisenheim: Anton Hain Verlag, 1961). Additionally, it is worth noting the 
similarities between the Aesopic tradition and the tradition surrounding the figure of Ahikar, to the 
extent that aspects of the Life are modelled directly on the Life of Ahikar (F.R. Adrados, ‘The "Life of 
Aesop" and the Origins of Novel in Antiquity’ Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica, New Series 1 
(1979): 98ff.; F. Lissarrague, ‘Aesop, Between Man and Beast: Ancient Portraits and Illustrations’, in 
Not the Classical Ideal: Athens and the Construction of the Other in Greek Art, edited by B. Cohen 
(Leiden: Brill, 2000, 113). 
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dichotomy between popular and elite culture that is the focus for the following 
discussion. Here, it is possible to identify hybridity of both form and function, as Aesop 
and Lucian alike use the genre of fable to address concerns to a broad audience. In so 
doing, Lucian inevitably engages with the imagery of the fable, and its representation 
of the hybrid animal. In turn, it is possible to identify a further layer to Lucian’s dual 
audience; not only does the satirist construct his dialogues so as to speak to the popular 
and elite classes, but in addition, these elite classes are ultimately undermined precisely 
on account of being simultaneously too much of a hybrid, and not hybridised enough.  
 
Fables, Aesop and Cynicism 
 
As alluded to earlier, the capacity of Aesop and the fable to move between high and 
low literature and culture (and Lucian’s adoption of these qualities), must be considered 
in the context of the Cynic doctrine. Cynicism, in its most base understanding, can be 
understood as representing the concerns of the popular class, focussing neither on 
reputation nor amassing material wealth, being more concerned with living in 
alignment with nature. As Kidd summarises, “the end of life is happiness, which is 
achieved by living a life of virtue and self-sufficiency in accordance with nature…To 
the Cynic, happiness depends on being self-sufficient, which is a matter of mental 
attitude. The road to self-sufficiency was to dissociate oneself actively from any 
influence, external or internal, which might fetter one’s individual freedom.”124 In 
direct contrast to this, the philosophical mindset that presents itself in the antagonists 
of both the Life and Lucian’s dialogues does not focus upon this life in accordance with 
nature, but instead allows the influence of reputation to overcome them. Given Lucian’s 
own relationship with Cynicism that was outlined in the introduction to this 
dissertation, it is crucial to expand upon this in the context of Lucian’s use of Aesop.  
 
The relationship of Cynicism to the fable and to Aesop is hardly difficult to identify. 
Adrados’ overview of the Cynic elements of the fable is both informative and 
comprehensive, and thus a large portion of the following discussion expands upon this 
previous work. Nevertheless, it is important to outline the core aspects of the Cynic 
                                               
124 I. G. Kidd, ‘Cynicism’ in The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy, edited by J. Rée and J. 
O. Urmson (London: Routledge, 2005) 82.  
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fable so as to further this analysis in the context of Lucian. Cynicism and the Aesopic 
tradition, even prior to Demetrius of Phalerum’s collection,125 are intrinsically 
entwined. The Cynic ideals of wisdom over aspirations to wealth, emphasis upon the 
victory of the weak over the powerful and, of course, a stress upon the immutability of 
nature, are found throughout the fables.126 Yet Adrados notes that there exists a number 
of fables that go beyond these basic Cynic themes, encouraging these particular fables 
to be viewed perhaps as of especial significance to those favourable to the Cynic ideal. 
Adrados divides such fables into eight127 main categories, and it is from these clear 
divisions that an overall image of the Cynic fable may be formed.  
The first of these categories, and arguably the most evident, is the theme of 
nature, as reflected through the animal fable and its associated commentary upon the 
‘core’ characteristics of each animal. The characteristics of the fable genre are wholly 
representative of the characteristics of the animal in question as evidenced in nature, 
either for an aetiological purpose or, importantly, in the context of proving their 
excellence in a particular characteristic. This element of Cynicism is arguably the most 
important for the following discussion, as the notion of proving oneself in a natural 
environment should be considered as a major aspect of the Lucianic use of fable, as 
there must always be a clear ‘winner.’ The agonistic environment that is evident in the 
fable genre, in the context of its Cynic emphasis upon nature, offers a capacity to reflect 
upon contemporary agon in human nature. The fable’s message of encouraging 
‘victory’ for the one who appears at first glance to be the inferior party, becomes a core 
tenet of both the Cynic doctrine and Lucian’s engagement with it. As Adrados states of 
nature in the fable, “friendship is impossible between animals of different natures,”128 
as one’s nature is, in essence, unchangeable. Even if a wolf dresses up as a sheep, the 
true nature of the wolf is ultimately revealed (Perry 451). This theme of the fable is 
intrinsic to Lucian’s work. Such a theme is evident in a number of places throughout 
Lucian’s dialogues, although for the following discussion, the focus is upon the act of 
                                               
125 Demetrius of Phalerum was a Cynic philosopher of the second century BC, attributed with 
composing an early collection of fables (D.L. 5.5; J. F. Kindstrand, ‘Demetrius the Cynic’ Philologus 
124:1 (2016) 83-98).  
126 Adrados notes the presence of Cynic-esque themes in a variety of Archaic and Classic authors, 
including Archilochus, Theognis, Sophocles and Xenophon. F.R. Adrados, History of the Graeco-Latin 
Fable, 605-606.  
127 While Adrados divides his analysis of the cynic fable into these eight categories, my discussion 
chooses to focus on a select few of these as the ultimate focus is upon Lucian’s interpretation of the 
Cynic fable.  For the full discussion, see F.R. Adrados, History of the Graeco-Latin Fable, 604-635.  
128 F.R. Adrados, History of the Graeco-Latin Fable, 613.  
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distinguishing between the philosopher-sophist, and what may be understood as the 
‘real,’ or ‘natural’ philosopher.129 In Chapters 2 and 4, I treat two distinct yet 
interrelated interpretations of this theme. Chapter 2 outlines the means by which Lucian 
first portrays the philosopher-sophists as largely unnatural creatures, only to show in 
Chapter 4, the means by which one may maintain their allegiance with the natural 
world. In Chapter 4, the character of Menippus is analysed in his role as Icaromenippus, 
basing his capacity to reach the Heavens precisely on account of the fact that Aesop 
allowed dung-beetles and camels to do so. Lucian’s engagement with the animal fable 
has a direct relationship to the philosophy of the Cynics. The animals of the Aesopic 
fable are uncorrupted, representing the Cynic ideal of living in accordance with nature. 
Lucian manipulates this theme in order to apply it to the unnatural hybridity of the 
philosophers, while simultaneously enhancing his own natural hybrid state. 
 
The preoccupation with nature is also largely responsible for the fable’s dismissal of 
wealth and prestige as admirable qualities, a feature that is strongly Cynic in nature. 
The fable often warns against the dangers of greed, and Adrados highlights the 
relationship of wealth to aspirations to, or exploitation of power, which is commonly 
shown in the context of elite characters being defeated by ‘lower class’ cunning.130 
What’s more, the greedy often have what Adrados deems “vanity of life,” by failing to 
recognise their own morality. Adrados notes the prominence of this theme throughout 
the fable, and aligns it to the doctrine of Cynicism – it is only through a recognition and 
acceptance of one’s mortality that one is able truly to live in a natural state.131 By 
valuing the natural elements of Cynicism, the fable also values the ‘low’ and ‘popular’ 
over the pretensions of elite culture, the most prominent (and in some ways, clichéd) 
example of this being the oft-told interaction between Diogenes and Alexander the 
Great (D.L. 6.79). This characteristic of the fable, and of Cynicism, are prevalent 
throughout the works of Lucian, supporting the notion that Lucian continues the 
tradition of employing animal fable. In what follows, it is clear that Lucian relates 
                                               
129 This theme of distinguishing between the real and the false appears throughout Lucian’s works. 
Lucian’s True Histories explicitly engages with such a theme, introducing the fantastical work as an 
entirely false story, as a parody of contemporary literature. Lucian’s Lexiphanes and Ignorant Book 
Collector too, comment on the act of appearing to be educated, acting falsely proficient with language, 
or utilising material objects as ‘proof’ of their education. In the context of philosophical veracity, the 
figure of Peregrinus also engages with the notion of appearance of truth, with the title character’s true 
nature similarly being revealed as merely a façade.  
130 F.R. Adrados, History of the Graeco-Latin Fable, 615-616. 
131 F.R. Adrados, History of the Graeco-Latin Fable, 622-623. 
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similar concerns to those reflected in the Cynic fable. The Gallus dialogue, which is 
the main focus of discussion for Chapter Three, reflects precisely these related concerns 
of elite greed and popular intellect, as the money hungry Micyllus is taught, not unlike 
the audiences of fables before him, the dangers of greed and desiring power. At the core 
of this dialogue is the figure of Pythagoras, in his guise as a reincarnated rooster, once 
again presenting the importance and benefit of living and aligning with the natural 
world. The perhaps ‘lowly’ rooster is shown to be not only capable but superior to his 
interlocutor in philosophical wisdom; a clear parallel to the figure of Aesop himself. 
Additionally, Lucian follows through with this message through a concerted reflection 
upon life after death, having his characters (frequently Menippus, the Cynic), travel to 
both the heavens and the underworld in order to determine the true existence in death. 
In both of the Menippean dialogues (Nekyomanteia and Icaromenippus), the fable, the 
Aesopic tradition and the Cynic doctrine converge, allowing Lucian to present his 
satirical critique through this malleable and effective framework.  
 
In what follows, the Aesopic tradition and its relationship to the Cynic doctrine is 
considered in the context of the Second Sophistic, and the means by which authors 
during that time similarly used (or in some cases, omitted) the Aesopic tradition from 
their own works. Having established this, it is possible to underpin the way in which 
the fable may be utilised as a means to critique contemporary philosophy by engaging 
the broader associations of Aesop and the Aesopic, and a dual audience between low 
and high culture. ní Mheallaigh, in her 2014 work Reading Fiction with Lucian, 
discusses the low and high culture of Lucian in the context of his work as a hybrid 
between comedy and dialogue. She highlights that Lucian’s dialogue On the Dance is 
most evocative of this integration of high and low culture, through the way in which 
Lucian “elevate[s] the cultural prestige of pantomime…[and] assimilates a low-cultural 
art form to his own poetics.”132 She draws upon the argument of Lada-Richards,133 who 
states that Lucian’s use of the pantomime as a setting speaks not only of the nature of 
pantomime as an art form, but of “Lucian’s synoptic, cannibalizing view of culture 
                                               
132 K. ní Mheallaigh, Reading Fiction with Lucian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 18. 
133 I. Lada-Richards, Silent Eloquence: Lucian and Pantomime Dancing (London: Bloomsbury, 2007) 
102. 
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which assimilated so many contemporary art-forms, both high and low (tragedy, 
comedy, painting, sculpture and dance) to his own.”134 
 
It is this assimilation of the high and low that is crucial for the following discussion, as 
it is argued that the high and low culture in a number of Lucian’s works stems from an 
engagement with the Aesopic tradition, and arguably becomes emphasised through the 
philosophical doctrine of Cynicism. In what follows, the fable is shown to present itself 
throughout Lucian by creating a disguise for his critique of philosophy. Forsdyke notes 
that “the very fact that popular culture has infiltrated or been appropriated into elite 
literary texts means that some aspects of the “living” culture of non-elites have 
survived…the trick is recognising these appropriations and to decode what these 
images and themes would have signified to non-elite audiences." In what follows, 
through a consideration of the fable culture and the Life of Aesop, such a decoding of 
the infiltrations of the popular culture in the elite literary texts is attempted. It is possible 
to view this thematic use of fable manifest specifically through the animal and the fable 
in Lucian, reading the use of ‘lower’ literary forms as a means to engage with non-elite 
audiences. As will be argued, the core features of the fable, being role reversal, animal 
speech and impossible situations are features that are embraced by Lucian in his satire 
of contemporary philosophy. He creates an overtly fictional situation in which to 
position a truth in disguise, facilitating a satire of philosophers, for philosophers and 
the non-elite classes alike.  
 
 
Aesop and the Fable in the Second Sophistic 
 
Aelius Theon, in his Progymnasmata, states that despite Hesiod, Homer and 
Archilochus being among the first to use fables, the attribution of the name ‘Aesopic’ 
derives from Aesop, not for his role as inventor, but for being the first to write them 
down extensively. Aesop’s role in the composition of fable, he states, is not unlike the 
use of metre as found in Aristophanes and Alcaeus – they are not credited with its 
invention, but rather, they gave it worth (Prog. 73). There are many literary forms of 
the fable, he states, and thus it is useful to assess the fable in the context of Second 
                                               
134 K. ní Mheallaigh, Reading Fiction with Lucian, 20.  
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Sophistic authors on account of their allusion to and adaptation of the fable in their 
rhetorical works. The use of the fable in the Imperial era differs in an important aspect 
from that of authors preceding it. First, as Holzberg notes, the vast majority of authors 
from the Imperial era who engaged with the fable genre were members of the elite and 
intellectuals, and thus the use of fable as a means of rhetorical reasoning becomes 
forefront.135 Significantly, as will be shown, the authors of the Imperial era and their 
use of Aesop and the fable not only enforce the perception of the fable being 
inextricable from the figure of Aesop, but also portray the Aesopic tradition as a source 
of wisdom.136 By viewing the fable in the context of Plutarch, Philostratus, Dio 
Chrysostom, and Aelian, it is possible to conduct a more thorough analysis of Lucian’s 
use of fable, by assessing the relevant differences and similarities. In doing so, it is 
possible to identify more effectively the dual audience that Lucian embraces in his 
satires, for while Lucian represents the intellectual satirist engaged in philosophical 
critique, his works, through an interaction with fable and Aesop, align with the Life of 
Aesop itself, replicating the “fondness for witty satire and caustic ridicule,”137 that 
embodies the high and low literary cultures.  
 
Plutarch138 
 
While the name of Aesop and references to his fables appear frequently throughout 
Plutarch’s Moralia,139 it is the retelling of the Dinner of the Seven Sages that is most 
pertinent to the following discussion. Among the attendees of the dinner is Aesop, who 
frequently appears to act as a counter-figure to the present intellectuals. As each of the 
Sages offer a piece of wisdom on how to be an effective ruler, Aesop speaks up as if he 
were conducting a cross-examination (οἷον ἐλεγκτικῶς), critiquing the Sages by stating 
that it is inappropriate for them to make complaints about rulers among company. Yet 
Jedrkiewicz, in his Il convitato sullo sgabello: Plutarco, Esopo ed i Sette Savi states 
                                               
135 N. Holzberg, The Ancient Fable, 25-26.  
136 N. Holzberg, The Ancient Fable, 26. 
137 N. Holzberg, The Ancient Fable, 27. It is important to note that for the purposes of the following 
discussion, Lucian’s engagement with an Aesopic tradition is the focus, not necessarily  
138 Though Plutarch would likely be turning in his grave at the notion of being included among Second 
Sophistic authors, for the purposes of structural simplicity, I have chosen to discuss him here.  
139 Adrados comprehensively collates the extensive presence of Aesop throughout Plutarch’s Moralia. 
Of particular note are the following dialogues, How to Profit by One's Enemies 86e-f; Advice to Bride 
and Groom 139d, 141d, 143e and On Compliancy 531, 535. For a complete list of Aesopic allusions in 
Plutarch, see F.R. Adrados, History of the Graeco-Latin Fable, 733. 
 52 
quite explicitly that “there is not even a trace of either ideological or class hostility 
between Aesop and the seven sages in Plutarch’s Banquet,” but rather that he “occupies 
an exceptional place,” arguing that “Plutarch’s Aesop is not a lowly guest at the 
banquet, but an admirable philosopher in his own right, utterly unlike the scandalous 
hero of the Life of Aesop.” 140 This exceptional place, states Gibbs, perhaps appears 
“subordinate and marginalized,”141 yet is part of the performance142 of wisdom in the 
banquet setting, in which Aesop comes to represent a playful (and perhaps more 
accessible) form of wisdom. Plutarch, she summarises, “uses the banquet scene of the 
sages to stage an interplay between a variety of modes of philosophical discourse,” 143 
in which the higher and lower forms can be skilfully merged. The presence of Aesop in 
this sympotic setting becomes particularly significant in my Chapter Two, wherein the 
notions of hybrids in a transgressive state is addressed. There I will argue that there are 
levels of hybridity, and the infiltration of corrupted hybrids in the sympotic space 
becomes a core means of critiquing the hybridity of contemporary philosophers. This 
mixing of high and low culture in the context of space directly embraces this Aesopic 
hybridity of wisdom in fable.     
 With this perspective upon Plutarch’s Aesop in mind, it is useful to consider the 
presence of the fable itself at the banquet. There are two explicit references to Aesop’s 
fables in the Banquet: the first of these acts as an illustration of hypocrisy, wherein 
Aesop relates the story of the wolf coming upon the shepherd eating a sheep, and the 
wolf remarks that the shepherd would make uproar if the roles were reversed (Perry 
453). The second of the fables is related not by Aesop, but by Cleobulus, and tells of 
the Dog in the Winter and Summer (Perry 449). In defining an individual as “one man 
and sometimes another in his needs, which vary according to his desires and fortunes” 
(Plut. Septem. 14), he is compared to the dog of Aesop, who, despite curling up into a 
ball due to the winter’s cold, considered the task of making himself shelter by the 
summer (when he was outstretched) to be too great.  
                                               
140 Stefano Jedrkiewicz, Il convitato sullo sgabello: Plutarco, Esopo ed i Sette Savi. Filologia e Critica, 
80. (Pisa/Rome:  Istituti editoriali e poligrafici internazionali, 1997) 171.  
141 L. Gibbs, Review of Stefano Jedrkiewicz, Il convitato sullo sgabello: Plutarco, Esopo ed i Sette 
Savi. Filologia e Critica, 80.  (Pisa/Rome:  Istituti editoriali e poligrafici internazionali, 1997) in Bryn 
Mawr Classical Review 1999.05.23. 
142 For more on the notion of performance in the symposium, see R. Martin, ‘The Seven Sages as 
Performers of Wisdom’ in Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece: Cult, Performance, Politics edited by 
L. Kurke and C. Dougherty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 108-130.  
143 L. Gibbs, Review of Stefano Jedrkiewicz, Il convitato sullo sgabello. 
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The fable, and the figure of Aesop, are utilised in this single dialogue of 
Plutarch’s to great effect. The inclusion of the fable offers a tone of popular culture, 
however in the context of the dinner, the fable is also representative of the wisdom of 
the Sages, as exemplified by the figure of Aesop. Where Aesop is traditionally a 
subversive, lesser figure, in the Plutarchan imagination his presence is valued 
immensely.  
 
In addition to these representations of fable and Aesop, as Kurke notes, it is possible to 
identify a number of other similarities between the Plutarchan Dinner and the 
anonymous Life of Aesop. Kurke argues that the Life deliberately alludes to the 
Symposium through anecdotes of the Seven Sages being transferred to Aesop, 
portraying the Aesopic parody of “high wisdom.”144 Two instances are most striking, 
for as we will see, the words of wisdom that emanate from Bias, one of the Seven Sages, 
come to be replicated and twisted by the character of Aesop. Kurke identifies two 
primary instances in Plutarch’s banquet that are satirised in the Life. The first of these, 
she states, is replicated almost exactly; Bias receives a request from Amasis (Egyptian 
pharaoh) to solve a puzzle that will prove his wisdom, having been given the challenge 
by the Ethiopian King to “drink the sea.” Bias provides a solution with ease, stating that 
he must “hold back the rivers that case their water into the sea, while he himself is 
drinking up the sea as it is now,” as “the order concerns this, not the sea as it will be 
later” (Plut. Banq. 6.151d). This anecdote is replicated exactly in the Life of Aesop, to 
the extent that not only does the wise sage solve the problem (in this case, Aesop 
himself), but the solution itself is identical.145  
 Kurke gives far more attention to the second of the Sage’s wise words, largely 
due to their different contexts in the Life. This instance concerns Bias’ solution to the 
problem sent to him by the King, wherein he is to choose the part of an animal for 
sacrifice that is the best and the worst,146 and decides to choose the tongue (Plut. Banq. 
                                               
144 L. Kurke, Aesopic Conversations, 217. The Aesopic parody of Plutarch’s Banquet is also noted by 
Nagy, yet states in contrast that “Aesopic discourse as not only a parodistic alternative version of 
socially higher forms of comparable discourse but also as an actual cognate of these higher forms” (G. 
Nagy, ‘Diachrony and the Case of Aesop’ Classics@ 9: (2011): 66.  
145 L. Kurke, Aesopic Conversations, 218. 
146 Discussions of the traditions surrounding the Seven Sages can be found in I.M. Konstantakos, ‘Trial 
by Riddle: The Testing of the Counsellor and the Contest of Kings in the Legend of Amasis and Bias’ 
Classica et mediaevalia 55 (2004): 90-100 and C. Jouanno, ‘Vie d’Esope’ in La Roue à livres 47 
(Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2006) 20-21. 
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2.146). While the Life also features Aesop proving the tongue to be the ‘best’ and 
‘worst’ part of an animal, as Kurke notes, the context does not relate to sacrifice of the 
animal, but rather, the tongue is bought as a commodity for the consumption by 
Xanthus’ guests.147 There is the suggestion that there is not only a parody of the wisdom 
of Bias in the Life, but also a parody of assumed equality in the division of sacrificial 
meat; rather than being divided among the population, the sacrificial tongue of 
Plutarch’s Banquet is bought and fed to the elite members of society, and becomes a 
symbol of the grotesque and the abject.148  
 In this context, the treatment of Aesop in Plutarch’s Banquet reveals once again 
the assimilation of wisdom to the fabulist, while simultaneously embracing the 
association with fable that the name Aesop implies. It is, however, the subsequent 
treatment of the Aesopic tradition that is crucial, for while the appearance of Aesop in 
Plutarch’s works reveals the importance of Aesop as a Sage, the Life of Aesop 
exemplifies the tales in their role as rhetorical tools. As Kurke states, the anecdote about 
the tongue is attributed to a variety of wise figures in various ancient sources,149 and it 
is the manipulation of this topos in periods following that is crucial for the following 
discussion. As will be shown, like the Life, Lucian similarly embraces elements of the 
elite and the popular culture in his satires, transforming the voices of popular culture 
into the true philosophers of the second century AD.  
 
Dio Chrysostom  
 
The orations of Dio Chrysostom too, show the relationship of the figure of Aesop to 
wisdom, most prominently in his seventy-second oration. Here, Aesop is once again 
acknowledged as being included among the seven sages, being praised for both his 
wisdom, and his skill in composing tales for they who took pleasure in listening to him 
(οἳων αὐτοὶ ἥδιστ᾽ἂν ἀκούοιεν; D. Chr. 72.13). As with Plutarch above, in this Second 
Sophistic context, the figure of Aesop becomes inextricable from the fable genre.  
The oration is concerned with personal appearance, and the way in which an 
individual’s dress invites assumptions about their profession, by reference to standards 
                                               
147 L. Kurke, Aesopic Conversations, 221. 
148 L. Kurke, Aesopic Conversations, 222. 
149 L. Kurke, Aesopic Conversations, 218-9, n. 41. Forefront among these is Plutarch himself, 
referencing the tale in Mor. 38b, (On Listening to Lectures and 506c (Concerning Talkativeness). 
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of appropriate dress. However the focus, for Dio, are those who dress in a cloak, have 
a beard and provoke a strong reaction from the public; the philosopher is mocked, 
irritated and accosted, despite the public perception that he wears the traditional dress 
of the philosopher. Dio then concludes his introduction with a proverb that ridicules the 
sheer mass of philosophers who are now living in the city (72.4),150 and goes on to 
explain the reasons why the philosophers are scorned; they are ignorant and they make 
fun of the public behind their back, considering them to be unenlightened (72.8). There 
is an exception to this opinion of philosophers, those who fawn over the so-called 
philosophers merely on account of their appearance. Dio illustrates the dangers of such 
behavior by showing that the flatterers expect the kind of wisdom that had, in the past, 
been espoused by figures such as Diogenes and Socrates, but they are to be sorely 
disappointed, as shown by the fable following.  
 Dio recounts the fable of the Owl and the Other Birds (Perry 437), wherein the 
birds, having sought advice from the Owl, choose to reject the course of action 
proposed. It is only after the fact that the advice of the Owl was proven to be correct, 
and thus the birds now dedicate themselves to the wisdom of the Owl. In Dio’s version, 
despite such dedication from the birds, the owls of contemporary times no longer 
possess the wisdom of the Owl, but only their feathers, eyes and beak, and are 
considered more ignorant than the other birds (72.15).151 It is clear that the fable is used 
to act as a comparison to contemporary philosophers; they too, merely have the 
appearance of the philosopher, but cannot offer the wisdom that is associated with the 
title.152  
 Dio’s use of the fable in this oration is especially significant for the following 
discussion, as it is argued that Lucian utilises the Aesopic tradition to a similar effect. 
By attributing animal characteristics to contemporary philosophers, and engaging with 
the fable genre, Lucian cleverly engages with the fable and Aesop as a means of 
                                               
150 “…the whole world to-day is virtually crowded with persons such as I have described [philosophers 
with long hair, beard and no tunic], yes, I might almost say that they have grown more numerous than 
the shoemakers and fullers and jesters or the workers at any other occupation whatever. Therefore in 
our day too possibly it could be said with good reason that every catboat is under sail and every cow is 
dragging a plow (Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 61-80, Fragments, Letters. Edited and translated by H. 
L. Crosby, Loeb Classical Library 385 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961) 179. 
151 Perry includes this alternative ending in his collection of fables, however the traditional conclusion 
has the Owl refusing to give any further advice, and merely complaining. (L. Gibbs, Aesop’s Fables, 
226) 
152 Dio’s 12th Olympian Oration also evokes such a sentiment, describing the means by which the 
manner and appearance of the peacock attracts the “spectator’s gaze,” yet is perhaps not as deserving 
as the less overtly appealing nightingale (Dio. Chr. 12. 2-3).  
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critique. While the fable is utilised in the above examples in quite oblique ways, it is 
argued that Lucian’s engagement with the Aesopic extends beyond fable parallels. 
Rather, Lucian also embraces the hybridity of high and low culture that is facilitated by 
the fable, creating a critique for a popular audience.  
 
Aelian  
 
It is also useful to view the works of Aelian through this Aesopic framework, not on 
account of the prevalence of fable, but rather due to the notable absence of the figure 
of Aesop. Unlike the authors discussed previously, Aelian, in his De natura animalium 
(NA), refers to the fabulist by name only once. Given the way that Aelian’s anecdotes 
frequently verge on fable, this is an especially striking omission. Moreover, the only 
direct reference to Aesop comes merely as a quote from Aristophanes’ Birds,153 framed 
by Aelian’s discussion of the Hoopoe. Unmarked allusions to Aesopic fables are 
nevertheless present in Aelian’s NA, and it is what appears to be the deliberate omission 
of Aesop in these instances that is the focus for the following discussion.  
Smith discusses the opening sections of the NA, and highlights some important 
features of Aelian’s own justification in composing the work. First, Aelian claims to be 
interested in the animal world on account of animals’ wisdom and justice, despite the 
frequent denial of λόγος to the animal world by humans (Ael. NA. Prologue). Yet as 
Smith notes, while such defences of animal wisdom are found in a number of classical 
and imperial authors, such perceptions largely align with the Platonist outlook, in direct 
opposition to the Stoic position.154 It is striking, in this light, that Aelian’s philosophical 
alignment is predominantly Stoic, and while this affiliation indeed presents itself 
throughout the NA, the questioning of human superiority over animals “push[es] 
traditional Stoic language to its limits.”155 The work, due to his merely nominal 
                                               
153 “The Athenians too tell some such wondrous tale in a myth regarding the Lark, which Aristophaes, 
the writer of comedies appears to be to have followed in his Birds” (Av. 471-5; Aelian, On the 
Characteristics of Animals Volume III. Edited and translated by A.F. Schofield. Loeb Classical Library 
449 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959) 267)  
154 S. D. Smith, Man and Animal in Severan Rome: The Literary Imagination of Claudius Aelianus 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 12. See too, S. Newmeyer, Animals in Greek and 
Roman Thought: A Sourcebook (London and New York: Routledge, 2011) 1-26; R. Sorabji, Animal 
Minds and Human Morals, 78-96; I.S. Gilhuis, Animals, Gods and Humans, 37-52 and S Newmeyer, 
Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics (London and New York: Routledge, 
2006)10-47.  
155 S. D. Smith Man and Animal in Severan Rome, 119. 
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adherence to Stoic doctrines, comes to adhere less to the strict rules of dialectic that 
Stoicism espouses, but instead “indulges in sheer wonderment at the world of 
animals.”156 
However, this is not to say that Aelian does not consider the work to be of 
historical and philosophical value. As Smith notes, he distances himself from the 
pseudo-philosophers who are merely interested in money, stating that he has no desire 
for fame, but merely wishes to undertake a Socratic philosophical investigation. 
Crucially, Aelian prefers to be numbered among the ‘wise poets’ (ποιηταὶ σοφοί, Ael. 
Epilogue), those interested in investigating the secrets of nature and historians – 
embracing the features of these genres to create a literary work that both reflects and 
critiques the third century AD.157  
With these two features of Aelian in mind, it is possible to consider his 
particular use of the fable in the NA. While Aesop does not appear as someone to whom 
the fable is attributed, it is nevertheless significant that Aelian includes the fable genre 
throughout. However, given Aelian’s desire to present his work as a scientific inquiry, 
the inclusion of the fable is problematic, as it can call into question the credibility of 
his text, making it appear a mere compilation of folk tales. Through consideration of 
the particular fables found in Aelian’s NA, it is possible to identify these two features, 
and consider them as an important development of the fable genre. 
 
The first of Aelian’s retellings of fables comes in Book Two, in discussing the crows 
that reside in Libya. Aelian praises the intellect of these animals, by telling of the way 
in which the crows gather stones to place in a water vessel, encouraging the water to 
rise and allowing them to drink (NA. 2.48). This anecdote is a direct retelling of The 
Crow and the Water Jar (Perry 390), yet there is no mention of Aesop or the tale’s fable 
nature.  
Aelian also recounts the anecdote of the Beaver and his Testicles (Perry 118), 
which relates that the Beaver, when being chased by hunting dogs, chooses to bite off 
his testicles as he is aware that he is being hunted precisely on account of their 
medicinal powers. Once again, Aelian (NA. 6.34) gives no indication that this tale 
derives from the world of fable, removing the detail of hunting dogs but nevertheless 
                                               
156 S. D. Smith, Man and Animal in Severan Rome, 120. 
157 S.D. Smith, Man and Animal in Severan Rome, 14-16. 
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retaining the self-castration of the beaver as a form of self-preservation. In these two 
fables, it is clear that the notion of animal wisdom is forefront. However there is 
nevertheless a strict scientific inquiry behind the two; the observation of the Crow in 
the Water Jar, while fable-like in nature, has since been proven to be a capability of 
crows, 158 and the fable of the beaver relates the useful nature of the beaver’s testicles 
to humankind. However in Aelian’s account there is merely the hint of the beaver’s 
medicinal properties, as he states only that the beaver is aware of the hunter’s intention 
in hunting him. While the fable reflects Aelian’s scientific inquiry, it simultaneously 
reflects an engagement with Hellenic tradition, presuming common knowledge from 
his audience.  
The third recounting of the fable in Aelian is framed around the wisdom of 
Thales, who managed to outsmart a donkey. The donkey, states Aelian, accidentally 
dissolved his load of salt by slipping in the water, and realised that this was an effective 
way to lighten his load. His owner appealed to Thales, who suggested putting sponges 
in the load, causing the donkey to make his load heavier (NA. 7.42). The inclusion of 
Thales in this tale is significant, as he does not feature in the original fable. Rather, the 
fable of the Merchant, the Donkey and the Salt (Perry 180) merely suggests that the 
donkey’s owner outsmarted the donkey himself, and not through the aid of the sage 
Thales. Aelian’s Hellenic knowledge is emphasised through his retelling, through the 
inclusion of Thales. Yet this is no mere Greek philosopher, but one who represents the 
epitome of Hellenic wisdom about the nature of things, and thus once again it is possible 
to view the scientific inquiry that Aelian wishes to emphasise.  
Finally, Aelian constructs what Gibbs titles an “elaborate version”159 of the 
Snake, the Eagle and the Farmer (Perry 395), in which he relates a story about an Eagle 
being grateful for aid from a human. In Aelian’s version, an eagle is rescued from the 
grips of a snake by a farmer, on account of the Eagle being an animal sacred to Zeus. 
Following his act, the snake plots against the man and places poison in his drink, which 
the Eagle topples over as a show of gratitude to the man for previously saving his life. 
Misinterpreting on account of his thirst, he is angry at the eagle, until an intervention 
from Zeus allows the man to see the truth (NA. 17.37). In the fable, however, there is 
                                               
158 It should not be ignored that the fable of the crow and the water vessel has since been proven to be 
an accurate occurrence (H. Leggett, ‘Clever Crows Prove Aesop’s Fable Is More Than Fiction’ Wired: 
6th August, 2009. https://www.wired.com/2009/08/aesopscrows/). 
159 L. Gibbs, Aesop’s Fables, 39. 
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no mention of Zeus (since the fable resides in the Golden Age of Kronos), and once 
again, Aelian makes no mention of the story being derived from fable, again modifying 
details so as to engage covertly with the Hellenic roots of the story without disrupting 
the veracity of his inquiry. 
 
In Aelian’s De natura animalium, the Aesopic fables provide anecdotal information for 
Aelian to draw upon in creating his portrait of the animal kingdom and animals’ 
characteristics. However the absence of Aesop’s name in these retellings creates a 
curious tension regarding Aelian’s intention. The fables, rather than being treated as 
Golden Age stories aimed to teach morals, are instead treated as factual information 
about the animals he speaks of, thereby distancing these stories from the world of fable. 
The context in which one would expect fables to be prevalent in fact reveals little desire 
on the part of Aelian to acknowledge the fable tradition, suggesting a concerted attempt 
to add validity to his work. Aelian does not shy away from attributing anecdotes to their 
sources in general, but rather engages with those authors whom he considers to be 
representative of scientific inquiry.160 There is the suggestion, through Aelian’s 
omission of the fable from his work, that he wishes to distance himself from the more 
popular nature of the fable, encouraging his audience to view him as an elite author. 
Yet the fable cannot be altogether absent, as Aelian wishes to maintain the distance of 
his inherent Roman-ness from the work, and prove his Hellenic prowess in language 
and culture. In this respect, the Roman elite culture remains distant in a similar manner 
to the fable itself, positioning Aelian in the interspace between the elite and non-elite. 
In the context of fable, the NA is thus a crucial example of the treatment of fable during 
the Imperial period. As we will see, Lucian’s treatment differs greatly. The satirist, by 
engaging directly with Aesop, utilises the characteristics of animals derived from fable 
in his critique of contemporary philosophers, and embraces the dual audience that the 
hybridity of his work may offer.  
 
Philostratus161  
                                               
160 Both Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia and Aristotle’s Historia Animalium  in particular are 
frequently a source of information for Aelian. For a comparison of these works in the context of animal 
communication, see T. Fögen, ‘Pliny the Elder’s Animals: Some Remarks on the Narrative Structure of 
Nat. Hist. 8-11’ Hermes 135 (2007): 184-198.  
161 Although translations of Philostratus’ Lives of the Sophists and the Life of Apollonius have received 
recent amendments by Stefec and Jones respectively, it is worth noting that for my purposes, the 
translations by Wright and Conybeare offer a sufficient basis for analysis.  
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Finally, it is worth moving forward in time to Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius, as it is 
one of the fuller accounts from antiquity (excluding the Life of Aesop itself) regarding 
the figure of Aesop and the fable tradition.162 The early chapters of Book Five detail 
the journey of Apollonius through Hispania. After passing and detailing various points 
in Roman History, Apollonius arrives at the foot of the volcano Mt. Etna, prompting a 
discussion with his companions about philosophy and mythos, and subsequently about 
Aesop. His companions, on being asked their thoughts on the fabulist, state that “he is 
a mythologist and writer of fables and no more.” However Apollonius vehemently 
disagrees, stating that the fables of Aesop are more useful for providing wisdom than 
the poets, on account of both his distance from the fables and the manipulation of small 
incidents to show great things, framed around the conception of the story as 
conspicuously false (VA. 14) What follows is Apollonius’ recounting of a story, aiming 
to add validity to the wisdom found in fables; he states that when Hermes was 
dispensing the gifts from the house of wisdom, he accidentally left Aesop out, 
eventually providing him with the only item left: µυθολογία (VA. 15).163  
 The Aesopic µῦθος derives from precisely the same place as philosophy and 
rhetoric, revealing the importance of Aesop and the fable to the intellectual tradition. 
However as Apollonius himself notes, the fables belong to the realm of childhood 
stories (VA. 14), coming only in adulthood to influence human opinions of particular 
animals. The Philostratean treatment of fable reveals its inextricable link with the figure 
of Aesop and validates the fable genre as a source of wisdom. Like the authors previous, 
Philostratus also includes a re-telling of fable, situated in the context of a discussion 
between Apollonius and Damis, suggesting that taming a lion holds similarities to 
taming a tyrant (VA. 4.36-40). Damis is inspired by the comparison to tell the fable of 
The Fox, the Lion and The Footprints (Perry 142), wherein the fox is described as being 
wise on account of his decision not to visit the ill lion due to a threat of being eaten. 
                                               
162 The following discussion of Aesop in relation to Philostratus is limited to the treatment in the Vita 
Apollonii. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Aesop too features in his Imagines, with 
Philostratus’ ekphrasis of a painting of Aesop reflecting the role of animal characters, moral lessons, 
and importantly the role of the slave in the fable tradition (Phil. Im. 1.3).  
163 As Miles and Demoen note, this fable regarding the distribution of skills is a Philostratean allusion 
to Plato’s Protagoras (Pl. Prot. 320c-322d; G. Miles and K. Demoen, ‘In Praise of the Fable’ 32-33). 
See too G. Anderson, 'Folklore versus Fakelore: Some Problems in the Life of Apollonius’ in Theios 
Sophistes, edited by K. Demoen and D. Praet, (Leiden: Brill, 2008) 211-224 and G.-J. van Dijk Ainoi, 
Mythoi, Logoi: Fables in Archaic, Classical and Hellenistic Greek Literature (Leiden: Brill, 1997) 
Leiden, 450-1.  
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Apollonius disagrees, stating the fox would have appeared more clever to him if he had 
visited the ill lion, but managed to avoid being eaten.  
The re-telling of this fable, in the context of a discussion of tyrants acts as 
evidence for the use of fable as a tool to comment upon social truths through a fictional 
medium.164 As will be shown, Lucian likewise utilises the fable to a similar effect, 
embracing the inextricable nature of Aesop and the fable, and offering a means not to 
control tyrants, but contemporary philosophers.  
 
However the significance of Philostratus to the Aesopic tradition, and to the Lucianic 
treatment, arguably extends beyond the mere retelling of fable and inclusion of Aesop 
as a source of wisdom. Unlike the authors discussed above, Philostratus’ treatment of 
Aesop engages with the Cynic associations that are most extensively drawn out in the 
Life of Aesop. While Philostratus predominantly presents the Aesopic tradition as a 
source of philosophical insight, such wisdom becomes entwined with Cynic 
philosophy, encouraging a reflection upon the position of Aesop during the Second 
Sophistic period. 
The association of Aesop with Cynic philosophical wisdom is argued by both 
Jedrkiewicz and Adrados,165 with whom I concur that much of the depiction of Aesop, 
and the content of the fables, reflect upon the teachings of Cynic philosophy, as 
discussed above. Throughout Adrados’ History of the Graeco-Latin Fable, he reflects 
upon the assimilation of fable to the doctrine of Cynicism, which is especially evident 
in the Life of Aesop.166 What is significant for the current discussion is the way in which 
the motifs of Cynicism come to be expressed through the fable, becoming a part of the 
tradition more broadly. Adrados notes that certain ‘types’ of fables were perhaps more 
suited to the infusion of Cynic themes, allowing the core tenets of the Cynic Doctrine 
to be portrayed.167 
In the context of Philostratus’ VA however, this association arguably becomes 
all the more overt, not through the representation of Cynic concerns disguised through 
                                               
164 For a detailed discussion of the role of fable as a social tool in the context of the early empire, see J. 
Henderson, Telling Tales on Caesar: Roman Stories from Phaedrus (Ocfrod: Oxford University Press, 
2001) and T. Hawkins, Iambic Poetics in the Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014) 109-111 
165 S. Jedrkiewicz, ‘Il covitato sullo sgabello’; F.R. Adrados, History of the Graeco-Latin Fable, 659-
83.  
166 F.R. Adrados, History of the Graeco-Roman Fable (Brill: 1999) Leiden, 604. See too 646-683. 
167 F.R. Adrados, History of the Graeco-Roman Fable, 610ff. 
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fable,168 but through the appearance of the Cynic philosophers Demetrius and 
Menippus. Miles and Demoen discuss the representation of Menippus in the VA, who 
is identified as the student of the Cynic Demetrius. What is significant about the 
inclusion of the Menippus character is his shift towards the teachings of Apollonius 
himself, following a revealing encounter with a lamia (VA. 4.25). As Miles and Demoen 
outline, this lamia encounter not only allows for a distancing from the opinions of 
Menippus, but also sets up themes of appearances being not what they seem.169 
This introductory information regarding Menippus becomes all the more 
significant when he returns to be educated by Apollonius regarding the philosophical 
opportunities that fable may afford. Menippus, the Cynic, acts as an important feature 
of the use of fable in Philostratus’ VA. While he primarily allows for the narrative to 
reveal Apollonius’ views on the fable genre, his inclusion reminds the audience of the 
inherently Cynic nature of the fable and the Aesopic as a whole. In what follows, This 
Cynic association with the fable becomes crucial. The association, in Philostratus, of 
Menippus and Cynicism with fable and the Aesopic exhibits the inherent hybridity of 
both traditions. As has been outlined, the figure and character of Menippus170 in Lucian 
and the wider literary tradition provides a hybrid precedent that Lucian may utilise in 
critiquing contemporary philosophy. As will be argued in Chapters 4 and 5, Menippus 
becomes a figure that is inherently hybridised, for his capacity to transgress spatial 
boundaries. Yet unlike the hybridity of the philosopher-sophists, this capacity to occupy 
different spheres does not act as a corrupting force, but rather, remedies the effect of 
the philosopher-sophists upon the divine realm.  
 
This overview of select authors of the Imperial period and their use of fable aims to set 
up the following discussion of Lucian’s particular use of the fable tradition. As had 
been evidenced, elements of Cynic philosophy continue to be an inherent part of the 
fable and Aesopic tradition, and the animal fable continues to be used as a source of 
critique of philosophy and false professions of wisdom. What is additionally crucial is 
the role of Aesop as a pseudo-historical figure within this tradition. Aesop shows an 
unlikely intellect that belies his appearance, and in the process demonstrates the use of 
                                               
168 G. Miles and K. Demoen, ‘In Praise of the Fable: The Philostratean Aesop,’ 38-9. 
169 G. Miles and K. Demoen, ‘In Praise of the Fable,’ 29. 
170 It should be noted that the Philostratean Menippus, while certainly inspired by the historical Cynic 
that Lucian includes in his satires, is a distinctly different Menippus. 
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fable as a rhetorical tool. However as will be evidenced, it is Lucian’s use of fable that 
embraces more thoroughly the Cynic, serio-comic opportunities afforded by the fable, 
and in doing so, retains the rhetorical power of the fable, while simultaneously 
maintaining a broader affinity with popular culture. Lucian’s ability to utilise fable as 
a means to address a hybrid audience allows for the formulation of additional hybrid 
elements. The following dissertation addresses these elements, underpinning them as a 
Lucianic manipulation of the hybrid form. 
 
Lucian and the Fable 
 
References to Aesop and the fable appear throughout the works of Lucian. While 
Aesop’s ethnic background and tendency towards the comical are only referred to once 
in passing (Luc. VH. 2.18.3) the fables in particular are alluded to nine times throughout 
his extant corpus, which is a notably high figure for authors in antiquity.171 In what 
follows, I will identify and critique the instances of the fable in Lucian, and 
subsequently utilise these instances to reveal the broader use of the Aesopic tradition 
in his works. The following overview reveals that Lucian expresses an explicit 
knowledge of the Aesopic fable, through the overt references to the fable culture. 
Having identified the presence of the fable behind the writings of Lucian, it will be 
possible to see that the Aesopic and the fable not only pervades the work through 
explicit reference, but also implicitly through an interaction with high and low culture 
that permeates the genre of the fable.  
 
Primary among the fables references in Lucian is the fable of the Donkey and the Lion’s 
Skin which features in the corpus three separate times. The fable tells of the donkey 
who, despite being dressed in a lion skin, fails to disguise his true nature, due to the 
sound of his voice (distinctively donkey-esque).172 In these three references, Lucian 
frames the fable around critique of human characters, focused upon critique of the 
pretentions of contemporary sophists. In Fugitivi, Lucian follows on from his 
                                               
171 Lucianic references to Aesop and the fable are littered throughout his dialogues; Luc. Fug. 13; Luc. 
Pseud. 3; Pseud. 5; Luc. Pisc. 32; Pisc. 36; Icar. 10; Herm. 84; D. Meretr. 14; Ind. 4; Ind. 30. These 
are discussed in full below. Compare Aristophanes, wherein direct references to Aesop and the fable 
(rather than proverbial allusions) are constrained primarily to the Birds and the Wasps: Av. 471ff.; Av. 
652-3; Vesp. 1401ff.; Vesp. 1427ff.; Vesp. 1435ff.; Vesp. 1448;  Lys. 695; Peace. 127-134. 
172 L. Floridi, ‘Âne (et braiment) / Donkey (and braying)’ in Dictionnaire des images metapoétique, 1-
5. 
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characterisation of sophists as a disgrace, “a motley Centaur breed,” (Fug. 10) stating 
that their appearance reminds him vividly of the donkey of fable, as their disguise is 
similarly disclosed the moment they speak (Luc. Fug. 13). Similarly the fable appears 
again in the Pseudologista, which attacks a critic of Lucian, who has deprecated the 
satirist’s grasp of the Attic Language. Lucian states to the mistaken sophist that “there 
is no need of anyone to strip away your lion’s skin that you may be revealed a donkey,” 
as his appearance is enough, not even requiring the critic to speak in an uneducated 
tongue (Luc. Pseud. 3). Finally, the fable is found in Lucian’s Fisherman dialogue, 
wherein he defends his intentions behind the companion dialogue, the Sale of Lives. 
Once again, the pseudo-philosophers, the centaur-like sophists, are “emulators of the 
ass at Cyme,” yet cannot fool the stranger. This stranger has knowledge of the physique 
and make up of the lion and the donkey respectively (Luc. Pisc. 32), heightening true 
wisdom in direct contrast to the false philosophers.  
 In these three instances of the fable in Lucian, it is clear that the tale is being 
utilised by the author in order to apply the ‘moral’ of the fable to contemporary 
philosophers. The sophists are as easily uncovered in their disguise as the donkey of 
fable – despite “cloaking themselves in the high-sounding name of Virtue” (Icar. 29; 
περιθέµενοι),173 as soon as they speak, it is clear that they are ordinary individuals, 
merely disguised as philosophers. Significantly, the fable serves to emphasise the 
hybrid nature of the sophists, portraying them as some kind of combination of a donkey 
and a lion. This hybrid, as the fable shows, not only fails to enhance the success of its 
disparate parts, but is shown to be a complete failure on account of its incapacity to 
meld the two separate animals. The fable of the donkey and the lion’s skin exemplifies 
the Lucianic use of hybridity, for the way in which Lucian’s hybrid genre and the hybrid 
philosopher-sophists are presented simultaneously at either end of the spectrum. Where 
the philosopher-sophists are displayed as unsuccessful hybrids, the Lucianic genre has 
expertly melded the spheres of popular culture and the elite.  
 
Associated with this theme of revealing the true nature of contemporary philosophers, 
Lucian also relates the fable of the Monkeys and the Pyrrhic Dance (Perry 463; Pisc. 
36), wherein monkeys that have been taught to imitate human behaviour revert back to 
                                               
173 This notion of ‘cloaking’ or ‘covering oneself’ encapsulates the primary concern of Lucian’s 
critique of philosophy, and the act of merely appearing to be a source of wisdom. 
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their primate form at the sight of nuts. The use of this fable, found in the Fisherman, 
acts as commentary on the greed of his sham philosophers – their disguise as ‘humans’ 
is revealed the moment they catch sight of gold (Pisc. 36).  
The theme also appears a second time in the Pseudologista, embracing this 
similar theme. Here, the subject of Lucian’s tirade, the one who speaks of himself as a 
sophist, is said to have arrived in Olympia and given a speech. This speech, however, 
is characterised by Lucian as being “after the pattern of Aesop’s jackdaw, cobbled out 
of motley feathers of others” (Pseud. 5). The statement is modelled on another well-
known fable from the Aesopic tradition, wherein the jackdaw attempts to make himself 
more appealing by using the feathers of other birds. Unsurprisingly, the wise owl 
notices her own feathers, and she and the other birds strip the jackdaw naked, revealing 
his true appearance (Perry 101).174 
 
Towards the closing paragraphs of Hermotimus, Lycinus succeeds in convincing his 
interlocutor that the pursuit of philosophy, particularly Stoicism, is largely worthless. 
Despite the years of study that are involved in taking the path of the Stoa, one can never 
be sure that the chosen philosophy is the correct one, and Lycinus’ proof of this causes 
the devoted Hermotimus to despair. Lycinus consoles his interlocutor, recounting the 
fable of the Fox and the Man Counting the Waves (Perry 429; Herm. 84). The fable 
teaches the man not to be vexed at having lost count of the waves, only to start counting 
again. Lyncinus suggests to his interlocutor, rather than crying over spilled milk (see, 
Stoicism), that he should act as he suggest: “better reconcile yourself now to living like 
an ordinary man; you will give up your extravagant haughty hopes and put yourself on 
a level with the commonalty; if you are sensible, you will not be ashamed to unlearn in 
your old age, and change your course for a better” (Herm. 84). 
While this fable does not strictly act as a means to strip the sophist of his 
pretentions to wisdom, it nevertheless is used for a particular satirical means. The fox, 
speaking to the man in the fable, comes to be revealed as wiser as the man himself, 
teaching a philosophical lesson. Undoubtedly, such a mantle is likewise placed upon 
the character Lycinus (and thus Lucian himself), lowering the value of the Stoic 
philosopher below their external pretentions to virtue and wisdom.  
                                               
174 A retelling of this fable also appears in Aelius Aristides in his Roman Oration  (Ael. Arist. 
XXVI.57). 
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The Ignorant Book Collector features two fables to note, both of which confirm 
Lucian’s use of fable to critique false professions of wisdom. In the opening sections 
of the essay, Lucian likens the book collector to the donkey in the Donkey and the Lyre 
fable (Perry 542; Ind. 4175). The fable, in its form in Phaedrus, features a donkey who 
wishes to play a lyre but cannot, due to a lack of talent. However in Lucian this fable is 
utilised to even greater extent against the book collector, who is not only compared to 
the untalented donkey, but also adds the detail of portrayed the donkey as pretending 
to be able to hear the tones of the lyre, yet is ultimately unable due to the lack of 
wisdom.  
Finally, The Dog in the Manger fable (Perry 702; Ind. 30) is also featured in 
Lucian’s Ignorant Book Collector, in his final critique against the unlearned scholar. 
The fable tells of a dog who refuses to allow others anything to eat, despite him not 
wanting it himself; the cattle are prevented from eating hay, even though the dog does 
not wish to eat it himself. Lucian likens the book collector to this hoggish dog, stating 
that it is simply useless him owning such a collection of educated works, as he does not 
have the wisdom to read them himself. What’s more, the dog refuses to even share the 
books with others who may benefit. Once again, Lucian utilises the fable to critique 
philosophic pretentions, as the book-collector comes to represent pompous nature of 
the sophists. His false knowledge, facilitated only by his external appearance is revealed 
but Lucian to simply be a farce.176  
 
In these instances of fables recounted by Lucian, it is clear that one of his primary goals 
in utilising the fable is to critique contemporary philosophy and sophistry through the 
fictional medium. What is crucial is that by simply identifying the fable, it is possible 
to view the dual audience in his works. The elite, pretentious sophists are the subject of 
elite satirical material, but by framing them around the Aesopic, Lucian offers his 
                                               
175 See too Lucian’s Dialogues of the Courtesans, which makes a reference to a donkey playing a lyre 
(D. Meretr. 14). 
176 Two additional fables do feature in the works of Lucian. In Icaromenippus, Menippus is able to 
justify his ascent to the heavens by using the wings of birds due to the precedent that Aesop and his 
fable have set. Menippus states that from the fables, it appears that “Heaven is accessible to eagles, 
beetles, and sometimes camels” (Icar. 10). This statement refers to two fables from the Aesopic corpus; 
the main one is of course the story of the Eagle and the Dungbeetle (Perry 3) while the mention of 
camels evokes a fable wherein a camel meets with Zeus in the heavens (Perry 117). A more detailed 
discussion of this mention of the Aesopic is found in chapter 4, for the dialogue’s relationship to 
philosophical ignorance. 
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critique to an audience of the popular classes. This dual audience, as will be shown, is 
utilised to great effect throughout the works, engaging with the features of the fable and 
Aesopic tradition beyond the fables themselves.  
 
The above fables in Lucian consistently reflect the overall goal of his satire. These 
references, either presented as an offhand comment or recounted more fully, act as 
evidence of Lucian’s familiarity with the genre. In addition to these explicit references 
to the fable, there are further, less obvious engagements with the tradition, in which 
Lucian exploits the forms and motifs of fable in order to critique the sophists through 
his own fictional disguise. The Aesopic tradition that is exemplified in the Life of Aesop 
offers a point of comparison with Lucian’s use of fable in his intellectual polemic. 
Lucian’s engagement with the fable reveals themes and dynamics similar to those of 
the Aesopic tradition more broadly, especially the parts of that tradition more overtly 
related to the Cynic doctrine. Lucian’s use of fable goes beyond a simple philosophical 
critique, as it acts to bridge the divide between elite and non-elite culture. The fable 
assists Lucian in moving between high and low, in critiquing philosophy and sophistry 
simultaneously from inside and outside, and in writing for a dual, hybrid audience. 
 
Lucian’s dual, hybrid audience is a core concern for the following discussion.  As has 
been shown, Lucian frequently engages with the fable, the Aesopic tradition, and 
importantly, its relationship to Cynicism. The hybridity of form that is evoked through 
the fable becomes enhanced through Lucian’s particular use of it; by framing his satire 
around Aesop and the fable, Lucian is able to engage with the Golden Age tradition 
that underpins the fable, and utilise this for his own means. By using Aesop as a 
framework for discussion, it is possible to further understand the means by which 
Lucian constructs his satires, and attempt to discern a clearer picture of the Second 
Sophistic period, and its associated literature. As a satirist, it is not surprising that 
Lucian critiques contemporary philosophy, however it is argued that he achieves this 
critique through a particular means. A recognition of the Aesopic tradition preceding 
him complements his commentary upon hybridity, opening the reader to many and 
varied interpretations of the so-called corrupted hybrid. Hybridity, for Lucian, comes 
in many forms, and throughout the following discussion, these forms come to be further 
emphasised through the Aesopic. The fable’s capacity to evoke a dual audience is a 
core concern for Lucian, and allows for him to embrace a type of literary hybridity in 
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his works. The animal fable too, allows for an exploration of the animal hybrid; the 
talking animal of the Golden Age is a hybrid in and of itself, and it is possible to see 
this reflection upon the Golden Age throughout the satires. However these hybrids must 
be contrasted with the hybridity, and corruption that consumes and costumes the 
contemporary philosophers. They evoke the pinnacle of the antagonist of the animal 
fable, exemplifying the opposite of the ideal. They represent wanton greed, false 
appearances, trickery, deception, vanity – all of that which the Cynic fable aims to 
reject. In assessing Lucian’s dialogues in the context of the fable genre and of Aesop, 
it is possible to not only identify the use of Aesop as a means to speak truth through 
fiction, but as a Lucianic commentary upon what becomes of the corrupted hybrid 
philosopher, and does so right under the educated elite’s noses.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Centaurs and Fishy Philosophers 
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They are of mixed race, at least they seem so now, when I can just 
see them. For many of them are like lions and centaurs, and other 
fierce creatures, and very many are like satyrs and the weak and 
cunning beasts; and they make quick exchanges of forms and 
qualities with one another. 
 
            (Pl. Polit. 291a) 
 
 
For the stranger in Plato’s Politicus, politicians are a race of hybrid animals, a cunning 
changeable lot. These ones are distinct from the philosophically admirable statesman, 
an unpredictable sub-category of the sophist.177 For Lucian, the philosopher-sophist 
adopts the mantel of hybrid, representing the disharmonious nature that defined Plato’s 
politician. Philosophy herself, in Lucian’s Fugitivi, deems the philosopher-sophist to 
be not unlike the Hippocentaur - a hybrid creature, incapable of being wholly dedicated 
to philosophy or to ignorance (Luc. Fug. 10). This motif of the hybrid animal plays a 
particular role throughout the works of Lucian, which the following discussion aims to 
explore, and the means by which it serves to enhance Lucian’s critique of contemporary 
philosophy. In what follows, it becomes clear that the hybrid animal is a means by 
which Lucian is able to denigrate the philosopher-sophists of the Second Century AD. 
Yet as is shown, the explicit use of the hybrid animal as a metaphor for the sophists 
takes on a broader role in the satires, through the contrast between this disharmonious 
hybrid and that which can be considered the successful hybrid. Here, it is possible to 
further expand upon Lucian’s use of the Aesopic tradition, as it is argued that the 
continued use of hybridity throughout the works taps into the Aesopic interplay 
between the elite and non-elite culture. The hybrid serves as a tool for Lucian to expand 
                                               
177 As distinct from the Statesman, politicians are the “chief wizards among all the sophists, the chief 
pundits of the deceivers art.” (For a detailed and comprehensive commentary on the text, See J.B. 
Skemp, Plato: Statesman (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 2002). 
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upon the fable tradition, drawing on the very distinctly Aesopic trope of undermining 
the elite in favour of promoting the real wisdom that may be found through non-elite 
ideals. Lucian himself acts as a hybrid not unlike the figure of Aesop; where Aesop 
traverses the interspace between a slave and philosopher, Lucian explores hybridity in 
a range of forms, most overtly through the merging of dialogue and comedy. The 
purpose of the following chapter however, is to outline Lucian’s use of the hybrid to 
denigrate the philosopher-sophists in order to promote true wisdom and reject 
deception. In so doing, the hybrid emerges as a complex literary tool with which Lucian 
may construct and disseminate his satire.   
 
In what follows, I will first discuss the broader definition of the philosopher-sophist, as 
reflected in Plato’s own Sophist, so as to construct a comparison between Classical and 
Second Sophistic perceptions of the rhetorically inclined philosopher. With such a 
definition in mind, it is possible to turn to some of Lucian’s dialogues more directly 
concerned with philosophy, namely the Sale of Lives and The Fisherman, so as to gain 
an understanding of the primary concerns that Lucian’s satires aim to reflect upon. In 
these two dialogues, it becomes clear that the anxieties of the Cynic fable continue 
through to the time of Lucian; rather than living in accordance with nature, the 
contemporary philosophers are concerned more with wealth and greed.  
The mock economic value ascribed to philosophy and philosophers in these two 
dialogues reveals a contrast with the presentation of the slave in Aesopic texts. It is this 
emphasis upon monetary value that is important for the following discussion, as money 
is one of the dominant factors that corrupts contemporary philosophy. Rather than being 
dedicated to wisdom and philosophical learning, the hybrid philosopher-sophists are 
concerned only with appearing to be wise, and using such appearances in order to boost 
their reputation and wealth. As Möllendorff outlines, successful Lucianic hybrids must 
consist of a “reduction of their typical characteristics to a measure compatible with 
combination,”178 and the contemporaneous sophists have not achieved such measure. 
The following discussion assesses the corruption of the philosopher-sophists in both 
the Platonic dialogues and in the second century AD, and then view such corruption 
through the lens of the hybrid centaur. Lucian creates an inversion of societal 
                                               
178 P. von Möllendorff, ‘Camels, Celts and Centaurs: Lucian’s Aesthetic Concept – The Charis of the 
Hybrid’ in Desultoria Scientia: Genre in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses and Related Texts edited by R. R. 
Nauta (Belgium: Peeters, 2005) 83. 
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perceptions, coming to (negatively) portray the philosopher-sophists as centaur-like in 
nature. They no longer desire to seek the truth, but are immoderate in their desire for 
wealth, and their arrogance makes them a hybrid that is incapable of forming a 
successful whole. 
 
Catching Sophists  
 
Distinguishing between the philosopher and the sophist was a common argumentative 
move in antiquity,179 and the notion of one ‘corrupting’ the other is a focus for the 
following discussion. Such an exercise is found in Philostratus’ Lives of the Sophists, 
as he differentiates those who are sophists in reputation (but pursue philosophy) and 
those who should be considered ‘proper’ (κύριος) sophists (VS. 479; 484; 492).180 
Philostratus’ idealised notion of the ‘true’ sophist is, however, somewhat problematised 
in reference to Philostratus’ own letter to the Empress Julia Domna. As Penella argues, 
the suggestion that Plato imitates the sophistry of Gorgias demonstrates Philostratus’ 
perception that philosophy and sophistry are well-matched, despite Plato’s overt 
distaste towards the race of sophists.181  Similarly in the context of Philostratus, Billault 
has identified the distinction between philosopher and rhetorician in his biography of 
Apollonius of Tyana. Apollonius is characterised as largely rejecting rhetoric in favour 
of philosophy, but through his status as a divine man, he is granted rhetorical authority, 
and utilises this authority to espouse the philosophical search for truth.182  
                                               
179 In addition to Plato, Synesius in the late 4th Century AD also discusses the importance of a 
distinction, however focusses his definition solely around Dio Chrysostom (Syn. 1.59). 
180 It should not be ignored that despite being credited with defining the Second Sophistic itself, 
Philostratus is nevertheless biased in his definition of the sophist. As Eshleman discusses, the ‘good’ 
sophist often happens to be associated with Herodes Atticus and his followers, coming to impart a 
favourable reputation upon Philostratus himself. Those included under the title of ‘sophist’ (as opposed 
to those whom Philostratus omits) need not have demonstrated “rhetorical excellence” per se, as their 
acquisition of the title relates to their relationship to Herodes, and significantly, their reputation as 
sophists among Philostratus’ sophistic circle. K. Eshleman, ‘Defining the Circle of Sophists: 
Philostratus and the Construction of the Second Sophistic,’ Classical Philology 103 (2008): 401; 405. 
181 R.J. Penella, ‘Philostratus’ Letter to Julia Domna’ Hermes 107:2 (1979): 161-168, esp. 167-8). Such 
an examination of this merging of sophistry and philosophy is not restricted to the work of Philostratus; 
as Demoen and Praet highlight, a Plutarchan fragment describes the introduction of sophistry into 
rhetoric to be an ‘illness’ started by Gorgias. K. Demoen and D. Praet, ‘Philostratus, Plutarch, Gorgias 
and the End of Plato’s Phaedrus.’ Classical Quarterly 62.1 (2012): 437. For further analysis of the 
letter to Julia Domna, see J.-J. Flinterman, ‘De sofist, de keizerin & de concubine: Philostratus brief 
aan Julia Domna,’ Lampas 30 (1997): 74-86.  
182 A. Billault, ‘The Rhetoric of a “Divine Man”: Apollonius of Tyana as Critic of Oratory and as 
Orator According to Philostratus,’ Philosophy and Rhetoric 26:3 (1993): 228; 223.  
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These distinctly different, but nevertheless interrelated arguments 
distinguishing between the philosopher, the sophist, and the philosopher-sophist 
suggest the prominence of making this distinction as a rhetorical tool, and criticism 
among and surrounding the ‘Sophistic circle’ often depends upon the choice of 
definition.183 In the discussion that follows, it will emerge that much of Lucian’s satire 
of the sophist derives from the definitions found in Plato, suggesting that rhetoric is a 
‘corruption’ of philosophy in its desire for wealth over truth. Where Philostratus may 
view the influence of philosophy as a corrupting figure for the eminence of sophistry, 
the Platonic dialogues view the hybrid sophist as a corruption of philosophy. It is 
argued, therefore, that Lucian adopts the position of Plato in his dialogues in relation to 
the status of the philosopher-sophist hybrid.184 His so-called sham philosophers become 
the representation of the corrupted mixture, wherein the introduction of sophistry has 
created an imbalance, and taken the reins from the nobility of philosophy.  
In light of this, it is useful to examine the theme of the corrupted hybrid in 
Plato’s Sophist, where the negative characteristics which Lucian would later ascribe to 
contemporary philosophers are already present. Plato’s sophist is a mixture (Pol. 291a), 
but an unnatural, corrupted one. The sophist represents an unbalanced combination of 
rhetoric and philosophy, and is a γόης, one who goes to great lengths to appear to have 
attained an equal balance. It is argued that Lucian utilises the Sale of Lives185 and The 
Fisherman to echo features of the sophist that the Stranger provides, recasting the 
definitions and thus further diminishing the perceived or promoted value of the sophist. 
                                               
183 N. Gachallová, ‘Rhetoric and Philosophy in the Age of the Second Sophistic. Real Conflict or Fight 
for Controversy?, Graeco-Latina Brunensia 20:1 (2015): 19-32)  
184 It is worth noting too, that a similar distinction is made by Dio Chrysostom in his effort to distance 
himself from the sophists. Although initially aligning himself with the sophists, following his exile, 
Dio comes to embody the ideals of a philosopher (E. Berry, ‘Dio Chrysostom the Moral Philosopher’ 
Greece and Rome 30:1 (1983) 70-80). Such a distinction is, of course, also noted by Philostratus in his 
VS, when he includes Dio as one of those “philosophers with the reputation of being a sophist” (VS. 
479ff.) Synesius, writing some centuries after Dio himself, details this ‘conversion’ from sophistry to 
philosophy, verifies such a transformation, framing his perception of the ecucational ideal around Dio’s 
own philosophical period of existence (Syn. Dio). As will be discussed in further detail below, many of 
Dio’s speeches reflect this change in perspective; Moles describes Dio’s “sophist-bashing” as “one of 
his favourite intellectual pastimes” (J. Moles, ‘Fourth Kingship Oration of Dio Chrysostom’ Classical 
Antiquity 2:2 (1983): 271). See too J. Moles, ‘The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom’ The 
Journal of Hellenic Studies 98 (1978): 79-100, for a detailed analysis of Dio’s own recognition of his 
‘conversion’ throughout his works.  
185 For the purposes of clarification, it is worth noting that I concur with Harmon that Lucian is not 
presenting individual philosophers for sale in this dialogue, but rather representatives of a particular 
philosophy. This also aligns with the argument Lucian himself presents in the 'sequel', The Fisherman. 
(Lucian, Volume II, edited by A.M. Harmon, Loeb Classical Library 54 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press: 1915) 449.) 
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The purveyors of imitated knowledge that dominate the Sophist, are evoked in Lucian’s 
depiction of the contemporary philosophers, framing them as a corrupted mixture of 
the sophist and philosopher.  
 
 
Plato’s Sophist 
 
For Plato’s Eleatic Stranger, the sophist is “not the easiest thing in the world to catch 
and define,” and he consequently proposes the hunting of an easier target to facilitate 
catching the sophistic prey (Pl. Sph. 218c-d). The stranger chooses first to catch and 
define the fisherman, serving to set up the process by which he will later define the 
sophist. The mode of definition, used elsewhere in Plato too (namely the Statesman, 
the ‘sequel’ dialogue), divides various arts and concepts into their two primary parts, 
categorising the art increasingly narrowly until reaching the desired target.186 Both the 
sophist (in one of its many definitions) and the fisherman are initially defined as 
products of the acquisitive art, in particular that which hunts living beings in a coercive 
manner. However, where the fisherman specialises in the hunting of water animals, the 
sophist hunts those which reside on the land, specifically the tame animal (human 
beings). The stranger explains that the tame animal is hunted by the sophist through the 
process of private persuasion, coming to name the process under the banner of flattery 
(221c-223b). 
There is a simple parallel to be drawn here, between Plato’s likening of the 
sophist to a fisherman, and Lucian’s own use of the character of a fisherman. As is 
discussed below, the fisherman and the sophist are alike in that they are hunters, which 
is a definition that Lucian manipulates. Lucian’s dialogue the Fisherman features this 
motif of the hunter, yet rather than hunting water animals, Lucian’s fisherman has 
upgraded to catching land animals, the philosopher-sophists. These land animals are 
similarly hunted through the means of private persuasion, being lured however not by 
knowledge, but through the promise of wealth. In both Plato and Lucian’s dialogues, 
the promise of wisdom proves to be useless in catching a philosopher-sophist hybrid. 
                                               
186 “In the opening and concluding passages (I.) an attempt is made to form a definite conception of the 
genus Sophist by the method of dichotomies, i.e. through logical divisions to follow the ramifications 
of the tree of knowledge till the particular branch which supports him is discovered.” (The Sophistes 
and Politicus of Plato, With a Revised Text and English Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1867) xlvii). 
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What’s more, the shift of the hybrid being lured through persuasion is emphasised in 
Lucian, by transforming these false philosophers into fish that merely appear to be in 
the correct guise. 
Returning to Plato, the sophist may also be defined as a purveyor of goods in a 
voluntary manner, through the means of public retail. The Eleatic Stranger explains that 
the soul, when sold through the means of a travelling salesman, may be exchanged 
through either the art of display or the art of trafficking knowledge. The sophist is 
defined by his capacity to sell his goods (in this case, the knowledge of virtue) to the 
consumer, and importantly he does so for a price (223c – 224d). Lucian adopts, but 
manipulates Plato’s definition of the sophist in his satirical dialogues. In his Sale of 
Lives, Lucian’s philosophers are portrayed as sophists on account of their commercial 
sale, and rather than being the purveyors of goods (in the form of knowledge), are made 
into commodities. The relative values placed upon each of these philosophies should 
not be ignored, as it is crucial to consider on what basis these values have been 
determined. The ‘knowledge’ that the philosophies offer is only offered for the right 
price, reflecting the sophistic trait of desiring wealth over any true promise of truth, 
recalling Plato’s criticism of the sophist who treats truth as something to be bought and 
sold.  
The Eleatic Stranger’s third means of ‘catching’ the sophist returns to the coercive art, 
and retains the notion of exchange of goods for wealth.  Rather than pursuing the 
category of hunting, this sophist derives from the act of fighting, specifically that of 
aggression through the means of words. Verbal controversy, states the Stranger, results 
in either the wastage of money through excess chatter or the making of money through 
sophistry (224e-226a). Once again, it is hardly a stretch to see this notion being adopted 
by Lucian. Wisdom is bought and sold, and the value of the wisdom in question is 
determined by the sophists’ ability to commodify their art (or rather, themselves) 
through the power of words. It is possible to see this feature of the sophist materialise 
in the Sale of Lives, as Lucian depicts the philosopher-sophists as doing precisely this. 
Each of the philosophical schools up for sale is given the opportunity to ‘sell’ itself to 
the prospective buyer; the Pythagorean is required to express to his potential buyer 
precisely what he is able to teach, and justify why such teachings are to the buyer’s 
advantage. At the conclusion of the sale of the Pythagorean school, the buyer states 
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aptly that he “appears187 to be a god and not a mortal” (φαίνοµαι; Vit. Auct. 6), 
suggesting that there exists an element of pretence in the Pythagorean’s self-
representation.  
The Pythagorean is not the only philosophical school that makes attempts to ‘sell’ itself 
to the prospective buyer – the Cynic follows suit, detailing the way in which the 
doctrine would benefit the buyer by offering him the shortcut to fame. The 
representative of a doctrine that vehemently disdains the accruing of wealth and luxury, 
uses the coercive art of words in order to twist the buyer into aligning with the 
philosophy – even the lower classes of people, the Cynic states, would be able to evoke 
wonder in those around him, through the power of the philosophical doctrine. (Vit. Auct. 
9ff).188 In these two particular instances, Lucian portrays not only the notion of buying 
wisdom, but also the means by which these pseudo-philosophers may further their 
reputation: through the coercive art.  
In addition, the sophist is defined in relation to the purification of the soul, as a 
figure in need of purification from ignorance through Socratic cross-examination – the 
interrogator being our newly defined Sophist (226c-230b). The sophist, states the 
Stranger, can purify the obstructive opinions that those-who-think-they-know hold – 
the epitome of ignorance (230a-230d). For the remainder of the dialogue, the two 
interlocutors explore the final definition of the hard-to-catch sophist, expanding upon 
the nature of their education. The variety of definitions that the pair have formulated in 
their discussion has revealed not that the sophist is doubly ignorant, as he merely seems 
(once again, φαίνοµαι) to be knowledgeable about many things.  
The sophist, as has been established, ‘hunts’ the tamed animal, exchanging their goods, 
in the form of knowledge, for monetary gain. “Is it possible,” asks the Stranger, “for a 
man to know all things?” (233a) The inquiry is met with a resounding “no”, creating 
something of a predicament for the bold claims of the sophist. The knowledge of the 
sophist (now redefined as ‘opinion’) is not considered true knowledge. The sophist 
becomes an “imitator of realities” and a conjurer, merely presenting an appearance of 
knowledge (235a). The sophist as a conjurer comes to be defined as an “image-maker 
                                               
187 Emphasis added.  
188 The Cynic’s words do prove to be ineffective, as the buyer is not convinced, only begrudgingly 
taking him not for his philosophical benefits, but for his capacity to conduct tasks around the house.  
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of the fantastic,” an individual who conjures up the appearance of being wise, but is in 
fact not at all wise. The sophist undertakes mimesis without knowledge of that which 
he imitates (267b), not replicating scientific inquiry, but merely opinion. Just as the 
popular orator becomes a paltry imitation of the actual statesman, the sophist takes his 
place below the philosopher proper. “We cannot very well call him philosopher, since 
by our hypothesis he is ignorant; but since he is an imitator of the philosopher, he will 
evidently have a name derived from his” (268c). Through these definitions of the 
sophist, the assertion from the Stranger in Plato’s Statesman comes to hold true. The 
sophist is “of mixed race” (291a) in relation to the varying means by which he can be 
categorised. The sophist is neither a philosopher nor a rhetorician, but a combination of 
both; he uses words and argumentation, but in order to make money; he has knowledge 
of all things, but only in appearance.189 The sophist represents a corrupted hybrid, 
wherein the balance of two disparate forms has become mismatched, quite separate 
from the envisaged ideal of the philosopher-rhetorician.190 
Plato, in the Phaedrus, depicts a balanced, natural and uncorrupted hybrid form of 
philosophy-rhetoric, through the metaphor of the charioteer myth. However, as 
espoused in the Gorgias, rhetoric is a danger to the soul on its own. The characteristics 
of rhetoric come to align with the characteristics of the sophist – the rhetorician 
succeeds through the art of flattery, persuading the audience (Plt. Gorg. 452E) with the 
appearance of promoting wisdom and virtue, yet merely promoting a belief in the 
rhetorician himself (Gorg. 455A) The sophist, depicted as the Gorgian rhetorician, is 
result of the base horse taking an increased role over the care for the soul. Socrates 
systematically undermines the supposed virtue of the rhetorician’s art of persuasion, by 
and large asserting that persuasion over learning merely furthers false claims to 
knowledge, both on behalf of the speaker and the audience (Gorg. 160A ff). The noble 
horse can no longer efficiently control the nature of the base horse, and the concerns of 
philosophy are secondary to the appearance of wisdom. The ideal hybrid of the 
philosopher-sophist has been corrupted, and there no longer remains a balance between 
the two arts. This absence of balance reflects precisely the corrupted hybrid that features 
throughout his works. The sophist is like a centaur not only because by definition it is 
                                               
189 In the prologue of Philostratus’ Lives of the Sophists, he justifies the sophistic claim to knowledge 
through by noting the similarities between divine prophecy and the act of sophistry (VS. 1).  
190 It is important to note that this above overview does not claim to be comprehensive, but rather 
intends to outline some of the core features of Plato’s Sophist that Lucian utilises.  
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elusively complex, but also as this complexity serves to neither bolster nor encourage 
a desire for true wisdom. Like Socrates in his critique of Gorgias, Lucian uses the 
inherent hybridity of the sophist to his advantage, systematically pulling apart the false 
claims to wisdom, and uncovering false knowledge behind the sophists persuasive art.  
The sophist, as Plato had stated in the Statesman, is of mixed race, and this 
characteristic arguably continues until Lucian’s time. The sophist, the hybrid, the blend, 
remains corrupted, allowing the base nature to succeed over the noble. As we will see 
in the remainder of the chapter, Lucian embraces the metaphor of the hybrid to great 
effect. The quintessential hybrid (centaur) is an important feature of Lucian’s Zeuxis, 
curiously removed from what may be considered their base nature. However our 
sophists, in Lucian’s similes, are portrayed as the real hybrids, when he likens their 
sympotic celebrations to those of the Lapiths and the Centaurs. Through an engagement 
with the texts of Plato, Lucian utilises the notion of the hybrid animal in order to 
criticise and re-evaluate the contemporary sophists. 
 
 
How much for a philosopher? 
 
In defence of his Sale of Lives, Lucian composed The Dead come to Life, or the 
Fisherman, in which he places himself on trial. Lucian aims to preserve his own literary 
existence in the face of recently revived philosophical representatives of those 
philosophical doctrines he so ‘wrongly’ insulted. Lucian, in his guise as Παρρησιάδης, 
the ‘Outspoken One’, makes a defence of this charge which is enough to make even 
Truth and Virtue blush; it is not these genuine philosophers that are up for sale, but the 
new hybrid philosopher-sophists that give Philosophy herself a bad name. But how are 
these 'sham philosophers' defective? In both of these dialogues, Lucian emphasises the 
diminishing of philosophical learning, attributing this to society’s concentration upon 
monetary value and wealth. Despite their teachings, states Parrhesiades, the 
contemporary philosophers “teach these very doctrines for pay, and worship the rich, 
and are agog after money,” (Pisc. 31) and in the Sale of Lives, each doctrine has its 
price. With this emphasis upon money in mind, it is useful to return to the original Sale 
of Lives, prior to discussing Lucian’s presentation of philosophical doctrine in The 
Fisherman. The pretense of the philosopher-sophist that underpins Plato’s definition of 
the sophist comes to be reflected clearly in these two dialogues, as Lucian dissects the 
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sophists’ self-representation and exposes them as frauds; treating their so-called 
wisdom overtly as a commodity reveals the insincerity of their philosophical position.  
 
Lucian’s Sale of Lives features the systematic auctioning of ten philosophical schools. 
While not all of these doctrines are sold, or even assigned a monetary value, their 
advantages or disadvantages are presented to the buyer in a manner not unlike the 
hawking of a second-hand car. Running the auction are Zeus and Hermes, the latter 
pronouncing that they will offer “philosophies of every shape and all manner of various 
inclinations”  (Vit. Auct. 1). It is significant that Lucian includes the prices that the 
representative of each philosophical school is sold for; as Bragues notes in the context 
of a consumer market, high prices act “as signals of quality and badges of distinction,” 
acting as an indication to the consumer of the 'perceived quality' of the given product.191 
As discussed above, the dialogue also engages with notions of the sophists’ fixation 
upon their own philosophical reputation, going to great lengths to sell themselves to the 
prospective buyer. The association with monetary value and to reputation exemplifies 
the contemporary philosophers’ distance from attaining true wisdom.  
By viewing the Sale of Lives in the context of Lucian’s preoccupation with 
hybridity and the engagement with the Aesopic, the dialogue encourages a reassessment 
of philosophical worth, and proposes something of an inverse scale of value. Aesop, 
being sold for the lowest price in the Life becomes the epitome of true wisdom, 
suggesting that monetary value is not synonymous with intellectual value. Lucian’s 
Sale of Lives adopts a similar inverse scale and displays the philosophical doctrines as 
if they are slaves in the marketplace. The philosopher-sophists have merely the 
appearance of worth, becoming a hybrid creature dedicated neither to wisdom nor to 
ignorance. In what follows, the Lucianic presentation of this hybridity acts as a contrast 
to his own hybridity, through the highlighting the pseudo-philosophers’ inability to 
attain the value of a successful hybrid.  
 
First off the block is the Pythagorean philosophy, which is characterised by the 
prohibition of bean eating, the doctrine of transmigration, Pythagorean silence, the 
golden thigh, and the mathematical theorem of a perfect triangle (Vit. Auct. 3-6). The 
                                               
191 G. Bragues, 'The Market for Philosophers: An Interpretation of Lucian's Satire on Philosophy,' The 
Independent Review 9:2 (2004): 242. See too M. P. F. Pinheiro, ‘Lucian’s Satire or Philosophy on Sale’ 
Archai 15 (2015): 71 -79. 
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Pythagorean philosopher is sold to the man with the south Italian drawl192 for the 
comparatively low price of ten minas.  
Following the sale of Pythagoras, Hermes presents the Cynic doctrine, 
decorated in the customary Cynic garb; he is the dirty one, complete with the Cynic 
wallet and unclothed arms. For a mere two obols, the Cynic offers a free philosophy; 
one unconstrained by wealth, pain, “modesty, decency and moderation” (Vit. Auct. 10). 
In adopting the Cynic lifestyle, the buyer is offered the easy life, “for you will not need 
education and doctrine and drivel, but this road is a short cut to fame” (Vit. Auct. 11). 
If the price of this Cynic philosopher does indeed denote the perceived quality of the 
philosophy for sale, we could deduce from its low price that it is a philosophy of little 
worth.193 This lack of worth attributed to the Cynic philosophy is denoted by the sale 
itself: the buyer does not part with his two obols for the privilege of the philosophy, but 
Cynic will perhaps be an adequate “boatman or gardener.” The buyer only agrees to 
buy the Cynic on the promise of his low price, and for the capacity for the philosopher 
to be utilised in a slave context. The sale of the Cynic acts as something of a 
solidification of the Aesopic connection. While the Cynic philosophy receives its fair 
share of critique from Lucian throughout the satires, it is nevertheless evident that it is 
treated with far less disdain, aligning with the philosophical views of his predecessor, 
Menippus. With the Cynic philosophy not only being sold for a small cost, and the 
emphasis upon its worth as a slave, the philosophy is portrayed as the most likely path 
in which to gain wisdom, based on Lucian’s application of an inverse scale.  
  In a stark contrast, the bedraggled Cynic is followed by a Cyrenaic 
representative, defined by his hedonistic mannerisms and delight in luxury. Despite 
being labelled as both the sweetest and thrice happiest of lives, the Cyrenaic cannot be 
sold - the prospective buyer is not fit (ἐπιτήδειος) to buy such a merry (ἱλαρὸν) life.  
Hermes and Zeus then offer up a two-for-one special, as the Democritean and 
the Heraclitean are to be sold ἅµα...αὐτὼ (Vit. Auct. 13). These two, like the Cyrenaic, 
go unsold; the laughing Democritean is too insolent for the buyer's tastes, while the 
weeping Heraclitean is simply too mad.  
                                               
192 Hermes states that the buyer lives "in the neighbourhood of Croton and Tarentum and the Greek 
settlements in that corner of the world," referring to the area in which there flourished a group 
dedicated to the teachings of Pythagoras (Vit. Auct, 6.21-24. See too Porph. Vit. Pyth. 18). 
193 G. Bragues, ‘The Market for Philosophers,’ 243. 
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Following this brief interlude, the Socratic philosopher is put up on the blocks, 
eventually coming to be the most expensive of the philosophers at two talents. The 
Socratic philosopher claims he is a παιδεραστής, and is wise about ἐρωτικά - a clear 
allusion to Plato's Symposium - yet the buyer is also offered a Platonic manner of life, 
modelled on various arguments throughout The Republic.194 The buyer is convinced by 
the Platonic/Socratic life, and it is revealed that he is the tyrant Dion of Syracuse,195 
student of Plato himself.  
 Following the lengthy sale of the Socratic life, Hermes brings out the Epicurean, 
the µαθητής of the drunkard (Cyrenaic) and the laughing one (Democritus) (Vit. Auct. 
19). The sale of the Epicurean196 follows an unconventional structure; the philosophy 
is bought, and it is after the sale has concluded that the buyer queries his newly-bought 
philosophy and even then only regarding its representative’s favourite foods. 
 Conversely, the antepenultimate philosopher for sale is the Stoic, who receives 
extensive questioning from the buyer. The Stoic, as Schlapbach observes, adopts the 
common presentation of the Stoic philosopher speaking in riddles,197 as he appears 
consistently to baffle the buyer by entangling him in webs of words (Vit. Auct. 22). The 
Stoic is sold for a modest twelve minas, by a group of strong-shouldered men, whom 
Hermes claims to be worthy for the θερίζων (The Reaper).198  
The Peripatetic is next up for sale, sold for twenty minas, and finally, the 
unapprehending Sceptic takes the block, sold for a single mina who in true sceptic style, 
cannot say with any certainty that he has indeed been bought.  
In each of these sales, the representatives of each philosophy are asked to ‘sell’ 
themselves to the prospective buyer. As discussed above, they coerce and persuade the 
buyer to view them as beneficial to their striving to virtue, and as shown in the sequel 
dialogue, this pretense of wisdom turns out to be truly unfounded.  
 
                                               
194 The Socratic philosopher states that he “dwell[s] in a city that I created for myself, using an 
imported constitution and enacting statutes of my own” (Vit. Auct. 17).   
195 The only time we get an identity of the buyer. 
196 For a discussion of Lucian’s relationship to the Epicurean doctrine, see D. Ogden, ‘The Love of 
Wisdom and the Love of Lies: The Philosophers and Philosophical Voices of Lucian's Philopseudes’ in 
Ancient Narrative 10: Philosophical Presences in the Ancient Novel, edited by J. R. Morgan and M. 
Jones (Groningen: Barkuis, 2007) 177-204. 
197 K. Schlapbach, 'The logoi of Philosophers in Lucian of Samosata' Classical Antiquity 29:2 (2010): 
254. 
198 G. Seel, Ammonius and the Seabattle: Texts, Commentary and Essays (Berlin/New York: Peripatoi, 
2001) 22; V. Marko, 'Some Sketchy Notes on the Reaper Argument' Organon 19:3 (2012): 361-387. 
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The dialogue, wherein philosophies are presented as commodities, provides a crucial 
basis from which to assess the presentation of philosophical ideals present in other 
Lucianic works. The relative values placed upon each of these philosophies should not 
be ignored, given the means by which these values have been determined. On opposite 
ends of the market, the Cynic is worth a mere two obols, while the Socratic philosopher 
brings in two talents. The monetary value attributed to these philosophies comes to 
reflect less what their actual worth is, and more what their perceived worth is. The shift 
towards prioritising financial value over philosophical value is precisely the problem 
of contemporary philosophy. The philosopher-sophist is idealised by the masses by 
focusing so much on their own self-representation in favour of attaining genuine 
wisdom, and the masses are persuaded by their skills in rhetoric to hold belief in the 
wisdom that they themselves hold and offer. Lucian’s critique addresses the invalid 
nature of such a perception, revealing in the sequel dialogue that such value is 
unfounded. The Sale of Lives manipulates the old platitude that something is only worth 
what one is willing to pay for it, emphasising the lack of value for money that the 
contemporary philosopher-sophists offer.  
This inverse scale of value that Lucian utilises in the Sale of Lives is similarly 
presented in the Life of Aesop. The seemingly 'worthless' slave, in the guise of Aesop, 
plays the part of the clever slave. He triumphs over his master with true philosophical 
wisdom, while the so-called wise man as evidenced through Xanthos, is shown to 
merely be a sham philosopher, being of no philosophical value and concerned only with 
reputation.199 By manipulating this trope in the context of contemporary philosophers, 
Lucian engages with the social aspects of the Aesopic tradition. The philosophies are 
treated and sold as slaves, and are the embodiment of the contemporary notion of 
providing wisdom in exchange for money. They are portrayed as slaves to their own 
wanton greed, only proclaiming to offer wisdom.  
 
At this point, it is useful to return to our sequel dialogue, The Fisherman, for its 
criticism of using philosophy as a source of income. The contemporary, false 
philosophers “teach these very doctrines for pay” (Pisc. 31), and it is this aspect of the 
philosopher-sophists that comes to reflect the respective prices that each philosophy is 
                                               
199 See S. Jedrkiewicz, 'Targeting the Intellectuals' in Philosophy and the Ancient Novel, edited by 
M.P.F. Pinheiro, S. Montiglio (Eelde: Barkhuis, 2015) 65-80. 
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sold for in Sale of Lives. Consequently, we may be able to view this companion 
dialogue as not only a criticism of the sham philosophers' act of charging for 
philosophical doctrines, but also a criticism of society's acceptance of it.  
 In the Fisherman, the character of Plato states that in response to Lucian's Sale 
of Lives, he, along with Chrysippus, Epicurus, Aristotle, Pythagoras, Diogenes and 
ἅπαντες ὁπόσους διέσυρες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, has returned from Hades so that they might 
get vengeance. The protagonist, in defense of his abuse of philosophy (Pisc. 4), claims 
that he was not maltreating the philosophers of the past, but the contemporary 
philosophers, those who do not seek the truth but merely seek δόξα (Pisc. 29-37). 
The philosophers, not wishing to appear unprofessional200, agree to give 
Parrhesiades a fair trial before condemning him to death. Rather than Plato and his 
“elegance and literary distinction,” Diogenes the Cynic is chosen to speak as prosecutor 
since he is fond of cross-examination and skilled in judicial oratory. Diogenes thus 
proceeds to catalogue the charges the wronged philosophers bring against Parrhesiades; 
his abuse of the philosophers and Philosophy herself and in particular his own meagre 
appointed value. “This most altogether wicked man” (ὁ παµπονηρότατος οὗτος) not 
only treated the philosophers as slaves in an auction room but also had the gall to allow 
the Cynic's sale for only two obols (Pisc. 27).  
With the philosopher's charges put forth, Parrhesiades makes his own defence 
speech, stating that he was not criticising the philosophers, but rather defending their 
honour in light of the new philosopher-sophists who are focussed on appearing the part, 
but are not able to understand true philosophy due to their obsession and preoccupation 
with wealth. The philosophers, along with the personifications of Truth, Philosophy 
and Virtue instantly rescind their argument; this Parrhesiades should be counted a 
φίλος, an εὐεργέτης - no longer a most depraved man.  
 
The remainder of the dialogue serves to prove Parrhesiades’ point: that the 
contemporary philosophers were guided not by the virtues of philosophical doctrines, 
but the pursuit of wealth. These philosopher-sophists are encouraged to congregate 
upon the Acropolis so as to present their defence, and thus Parrhesiades is tasked with 
                                               
200 Parrhesiades cautions Plato's accusations, lest he begins to act in the manner of the contemporary 
philosophers, being "ungrateful and hasty and inconsiderate toward a benefactor" (Pisc. 5). Such a 
sentiment is repeated further in the dialogue; Parrhesiades expresses surprise that such anger (ὀργή) 
erupts from these esteemed philosophers, as, he says condescendingly, it seemed to him that they were 
beyond such things (Pisc. 8). 
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summoning the philosophers in the way that seems best to him, and he thus promises 
to give two minas to all those with a large beard (Pisc. 41).201 As the philosopher-
sophists flock to the Acropolis, the quarrelling of the philosophers is heard, as they 
argue about who among them should receive their prize of two minas first. In a 
reference to Parrhesiades' prior quotation of Homer,202 the Platonist queries where the 
δύο τάλαντα are: the same value that he was sold for during the auction in Sale of Lives.  
 In these two dialogues, philosophical doctrine is given a monetary value. In the 
Sale of Lives, philosophies are sold to willing buyers for a set price, and in The 
Fisherman, the greedy philosophers are bought by the interlocutors to their own demise. 
The philosopher-sophists are subsequently informed by Philosophy of her intention in 
luring them to the Areopagus with the promise of gold; she herself, Virtue and Truth 
will distinguish the false from the genuine, with the false philosophers being promised 
a wretched end to their wretched lives. Unsurprisingly, the sham philosophers flee at 
this proposition. Parrediades’ subsequent actions motivates the text’s title, as he takes 
a fishing rod with gold as the lure, settles down to catch the fleeing hybrids.  
 
Lucian’s use of hybridity in this context becomes clearer through analysis of the last 
half of the dialogue. It has been established that Lucian considers the philosopher-
sophists as being incapable of engaging in philosophical discourse with the correct 
motivations, and this perception derives primarily from their desire to merely appear 
to be philosophers. Lucian draws upon this in order to formulate his critique, presenting 
the philosopher-sophists in their true guise. These hybrid animals are not only caught 
like fish, they are fish,203 representing various characteristics of philosophical schools 
                                               
201 The detail of the beard, one that is repeated throughout Lucian’s dialogues (JTr. 16; Gall. 10; Par. 
50; Tim. 54; Philops. 23; D. Mort. 10), holds especial significance for the following discussion. The 
bearded philosopher, notes Gleason, is representative of the individual’s capacity for teaching 
philosophy, a notion that is challenged in Lucian’s Eunuch. Where Diocles claims that the beard is an 
essential trait for one endeavouring to teach philosophy, the Eunuch (Bagaos) proves his capacity for 
such despite not having the ‘correct’ appearance (M. Gleason, Making Men (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1995) 133-35). See too P. Zanker, The Mask of Socrates: The Image of the 
Intellectual in Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) 198-266. 
202 “And in the midst lay two talents of gold, to be given to him who so among them should utter the 
most righteous judgment” κεῖτο δ’ ἄρ’ ἐν µέσσοισι δύω χρυσοῖο τάλαντα,  
τῷ δόµεν ὃς µετὰ τοῖσι δίκην ἰθύντατα εἴποι. (Pisc. 41; Il. 18.507-8;) 
The lines refer to the contest between Odysseus and Ajax over Achilles' armour. 
203 A. Georgiadou, D.H.J. Larmour, ‘Lucian’s “Verae Historiae” as Philosophical Parody,” Hermes 
126:3 (1998): 318. It is also possible to see here an allusion to Plato’s angler metaphor, as outlined 
above.  
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through particular physical characteristics.204 The Stoics are found in sheer mass, “alike 
in colour, spiny and rough-skinned, harder to grasp than sea-urchins,” (Luc. Pisc. 51) 
while the Aristotelian fish appears with golden stripes along its back.205 The fish that 
looks like a πλατύς of course becomes indicative of the Platonic school,206 and the 
Cynic appears upon the line as, unsurprisingly, a dog-fish.207 On the appearance of 
each, the representatives of the philosophical doctrines question the correct course of 
action; has Parrhesiades caught a genuine philosopher or merely a pretender? Diogenes, 
Plato, Aristotle and Chrysippus are unanimous in their judgement; these fish, caught on 
account of their lust after gold, have nothing in common with them, and thus, they 
should be thrown off the cliff for their shameful pretence.  
It is clear that the philosopher-sophists have not achieved successful hybridity, 
as the of their merging of philosophy and sophistry has not become a superior form to 
the two separate components. By transforming the philosopher-sophists into fish that 
can be lured and caught, Lucian highlights the absurdity of their hybridity as 
philosophers who are only concerned for financial gain. In these two dialogues, the 
philosopher-sophists can be identified as hybrids through recognition of their inherently 
dual nature. As Plato outlined, sophists are not easy to define, as they are both elusive 
and complicated. Their hybridity is reflected in the way in which they have combined 
rhetoric and philosophy, however this is to be viewed as a corrupted form of hybridity 
due to the way in which rhetoric has taken the reigns over wisdom. Lucian aims to 
further this hybridity, turning them into more literal hybrid forms. Given that they 
merely appear to be philosophers, corrupting the mantel of philosophical pursuits, 
Lucian transforms the contemporary philosophers into more overt hybrids; in Sale of 
Lives, the philosopher-sophists are intellectual slaves, and in the Fisherman, we see 
them portrayed as fish, who represent the corrupting capacity of greed. In what follows, 
I will explore one of Lucian’s further engagements with the notion of hybridity. In the 
                                               
204 The many and varied characteristics of fish as being used to represent more human qualities is not 
limited to Lucian. As Kneebone discusses, Oppian in his Halieutica explicitly indicates the 
anthropomorphic manner in which he describes them (E. Kneebone, ‘The Poetics of Knowledge in 
Oppian’s Halieutica’ Ramus 37: 1 and 2 (2008) 34). 
205 Lucian describes the fish as “ποικίλον τὴν χρόαν.” 
206 Aelian lists the mullet as a κέφαλος, and has a ‘sharp snout’ (τοῦ ὀξέος προσώπου) The mullet is 
caught by luring the female – making the male mullets chase after her with lust (1.12). The use of 
ψηττα in Lucian’s description of this fish is often associated with gluttony, as evidenced in Plato’s 
symposium (Symp. 191d) Aelian also describes a ‘harper fish,’ which is flat like a πλατυς, gold with 
black lines or purple with gold lines, a variegated head (11.23). 
207 See Athenaeus, 7.294d and Aelian, 1.55 for other references to the ‘dog-fish’.  
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second half of this chapter, it is shown that Lucian hybridises the philosopher-sophists 
even further. While Plato identified the sophist as being of ‘mixed race,’ in two more 
of Lucian’s dialogues, Zeuxis and Symposium, it is possible to identify the way in which 
Lucian transforms the sophists into very literal hybrids, in this case, as centaurs.  
 
Centaurs at the Symposium208 
 
Philostratus’ Lives of the Sophists, depicts the ‘philosopher-sophist’ to be 
distinguished from the real sophist; they are not explicitly classed as a hybrid of form, 
however are certainly ranked in a different class from the proper sophists (V.S. 1,484).  
This insinuation of hybridity is also a feature of the Life of Apollonius; Billault notes 
that despite Apollonius’ positioning of rhetoric as lesser than philosophy, Philostratus 
nonetheless portrays the ‘divine man’ as a hybrid figure, an intermediary not only 
between divinity and humanity, but also between sophistry and philosophy.209  
In these two instances, the hybrid philosopher-sophist hardly suggests any 
element of corruption. The apparent philosopher-sophist himself however,210 Dio 
Chrysostom, certainly embraces such a notion. In Dio’s Fourth Discourse on Kingship, 
he relates the meeting of Alexander the Great with the Cynic philosopher Diogenes of 
Sinope. Following a lengthy discussion regarding Alexander’s aspirations to be a true 
king, Diogenes outlines the three primary types of ‘lives’ that mankind often lead (D. 
Chrys. 4,83). Of importance for the following discussion is the third ‘life’, ‘spirit᾽, or 
‘character’,211 which Diogenes names the ‘ambitious’ (D. Chrys. 4,116 ff.; φιλότιµον). 
The ambitious spirit, states Diogenes, is concerned first and foremost with their own 
reputation. Those who are imbued with this spirit, he states, should be likened to Ixion, 
the hero who is attributed with being the father of Kentauros (Apoll. E. 1,20), the turning 
of the wheel acting as a metaphor for the ambitious spirit’s proclivity towards flattery 
(D. Chrys. 4,123). The likeness to Ixion goes further, as the ambitious spirit is said to 
                                               
208 An earlier version of this section appeared in Ancient Narrative 15.   
209 A. Billault, ‘The Rhetoric of a “Divine Man”: Apollonius of Tyana as Critic of Oratory and as 
Orator According to Philostratus,’ Philosophy and Rhetoric 26: 3 (1993): 238; 234; Billault, A. ‘Le 
Personnage de Philostrate dans la Vie d’Apollonios de Tyana: Autoportrait de l’Auteur en Biographie,’ 
in L’invention de l’autobiographie d’Hsiode à Saint Augustin, edited by M-F. Baslez, P. Hoffman and 
L. Pernot, (Paris: Presses de l’École Normale Supérieure, 1993), 274. 
210 Philostratus includes Dio of Prusa as one of the aforementioned philosophers with the reputation of 
being a sophist, but not a sophist proper (V.S. 1,485). 
211 J. Moles, ‘The Date and Purpose of the Fourth Kingship Oration of Dio Chrysostom’ Classical 
Antiquity 2: 2 (1983) 258.  
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be completely charmed and blind-sighted by Delusion, not unlike Ixion’s own inability 
to perceive that he had chosen the reputation of believing he had slept with Hera over 
being able to perceive the reality. This act, states Diogenes, of being charmed by 
Delusion, can produce “nothing useful or serviceable…but only strange irrational 
creations that resemble the centaurs” (D. Chrys. 4.131). These strange irrational 
creations he states, are now, not the actual hybrid beasts, but the “political acts of certain 
demagogues and the treatises of sophists” (D. Chrys. 4.131).  
It is hardly a stretch to understand Dio’s oration to be a direct critique of the 
hybrid and unnatural manner of the philosopher-sophists.212 Consequently, it is clear 
that hybridity, in the Second Sophistic more broadly, plays a particular role in acting as 
a metaphor for a corrupted, or unnatural construct. With this in mind, it is useful to turn 
directly to the works of Lucian, as it is here that the metaphor of the hybrid becomes 
more elaborate.  
 
In Lucian’s Fugitivi, the sophist is not unlike the Centaur: a hybrid creature, incapable 
of being wholly dedicated to philosophy or to ignorance, wandering in the interspace 
between an impersonator and a philosopher (Luc. Fug. 10). This motif of the hybrid, 
plays a particular role throughout the works of Lucian. For the purposes of the 
following discussion, however, I consider how Lucian utilises the notion of the hybrid 
animal, in this case, centaurs, to comment upon the nature of contemporaneous 
philosophers. With reference to two dialogues, Zeuxis and the Symposium, it becomes 
clear that Lucian’s works, in addition to using the hybrid as a metaphor for corruption, 
may also stand as a metaphor for an improved and more effective form. The first of 
these presents the hybrid form as something worthy of praise, provided the melding of 
two disparate forms is done in a way that is seamless and aesthetically pleasing.213 The 
successful hybrid is evident in the Zeuxis, wherein Lucian describes a painting of a 
family of centaurs. Yet significantly this stands in direct contrast to the presentation of 
the corrupted hybrid, featured in Lucian’s Symposium. Here, as in the Fisherman, the 
                                               
212 As Moles notes that in this oration, instances of what he terms “sophist-bashing” appear quite 
frequently throughout the text (D. Chrys. 4.27-39; J.L. Moles, ‘Fourth Kingship Oration of Dio 
Chrysostom,’ 271).  
213 P. von Möllendorff, ‘Camels, Celts and Centaurs: Lucian’s Aesthetic Concept – The Charis of the 
Hybrid’, in Desultoria Scientia: Genre in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses and Related Texts edited by R.R. 
Nauta, (Wilsele: Peeters-Leuven, 2006) 63-86. 
 88 
philosopher-sophist is shown to be a corrupted hybrid, responsible for the corruption of 
contemporary philosophy.  
Lucian thus presents two distinct incarnations of the hybrid. In the first instance, 
the hybrid centaur is portrayed in a positive light, representing a source of wisdom 
reminiscent of Chiron.214 In contrast, the supposedly learned philosopher-sophist comes 
to embody the traditional characteristics of the monstrous hybrid: he is uncivilised, 
immoral and corrupted.  
 
 
Lucianic Hybrids  
 
As alluded to above, the hybrid makes an appearance in Lucian’s discussion of his own 
creations, as the combination of dialogue and comedy, he admits, is not unlike the 
Egyptian camel – half black, half white, and wholly monstrous in its hybrid form 
(Prom. Es. 4-5).215 In mixing the two literary genres, he states, he has diminished the 
beauty of each, becoming the epitome of the disharmonious Lucianic hybrid.216 Yet the 
hybrid animal appears in a number of different forms throughout Lucian’s works. In 
his Gallus, the hybrid animal appears not as a centaur, but as a speaking rooster, and 
when Menippus adopts wings so as to fly to the heavens in the Icaromenippus, he too 
becomes a hybrid creature, capable of inhabiting both the human world and the 
heavens. The hybrid animal also makes an appearance in his Verae Historiae, with the 
main character encountering all sorts of hybrid creatures throughout his journey across 
the skies (V.H. 1.11ff.). For the following discussion however, the focus is upon the 
explicit use of the hybrid as a metaphor for corrupted philosophers. As noted above, 
this comparison of the philosopher-sophist to a centaur makes an appearance in his 
Fugitivi (Fug. 10), particularly as an attack again the Cynic doctrine. The Cynics appear 
to be philosophers in “deportment, glance and gait,” (Fug. 4), yet in truth they are 
ignorant and insulting to the name of philosophy. Such a feature of the hybrid 
philosopher-sophist also makes an appearance in Lucian’s Peregrinus. Here, Lucian 
                                               
214 E. Fantham, ‘Chiron: The Best of Teachers’ in Literature, Art, History: Studies on Classical 
Antiquity and Tradition – In Honour of W.J. Henderson edited by A.F. Basson and W.J. Dominik 
(Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2003) 111-122.  
215 For a detailed analysis of Lucian’s use and manipulation of the Promethean tradition, and its 
relationship to the hybrid genre, see K. ní Mheallaigh, Reading Fiction with Lucian, 2-8.  
216 The definition and examination of the ideal Lucianic hybrid is discussed is greater detail below.  
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utilises the metaphor of the hybrid to critique the Cynic-turned-Christian Peregrinus, 
who is not discredited so much for his philosophical doctrine, but the manner in which 
he conducts himself, as he is concerned only with his reputation.217 
 The hybrid in Lucian, therefore, plays and important, but malleable role. It is an 
extremely serviceable literary tool for satire. In order to observe this, I focus upon the 
hybrid centaur, as not only does it represent the epitome of a corrupted mixture, but it 
also comes to represent the pinnacle of hybrid success.  
 
Centaurs  
 
In Lucian’s Symposium, or the Lapiths, the hybrid philosopher-sophists become likened 
to centaurs, with Lucian modelling the dialogue upon the mythological centauromachy. 
Lucian transforms the quarrelsome nature of the philosophers into a very literal 
brawling match, to the extent that ‘you would have said they were Lapiths and 
Centaurs’ (Luc. Symp. 46). This depiction of the philosopher as emulating the violent 
centaur, is curious when taken in consideration of the actual centaurs, found in his 
Zeuxis. Here, the hybrid animal is shown in the context of an idyllic family unit, a stark 
contrast to their philosopher counterparts.  
 
In Lucian’s Zeuxis, the family of centaurs become humanised, with the 
emphasis being upon the civilised aspects of the inherently hybrid creature. However 
this is an unusual depiction of the hybrid creature, which is distinct from the violent, 
savage centaur that is dominant throughout classical literature,218 as is evident in Book 
12 of Ovid’s Metamorphoses. Here, Ovid offers perhaps the most well-known re-telling 
of the famous battle between the Centaurs and the Lapiths. The marriage of Pirithous 
and Hippodame calls for celebration, leading the newlyweds to invite the race of 
centaurs as guests. The centaurs, having grown ‘heated with wine or lust or both of 
them together’ (Ov. Met. 12. 22-23) reveal their wild nature, seizing the female guests 
and thus triggering the battle. Nestor, in his guise as narrator of the battle, reminds the 
reader that the violence takes place during a dinner party: “All utensils meant for 
                                               
217 J. König, Greek Literature in the Roman Empire (London: Bristol Classical Press 2009) 247. 
218 For a detailed discussion of the wild nature of the centaur, see J. Bremmer, ‘Greek Demons of the 
Wildnerness: The Case of the Centaurs’ in Wilderness in Mythology and Religion: Approaching 
Religious Spatialities, Cosmologies, and Ideas of Wild Nature, edited by L. Feldt. (Berlin: DeGruyter, 
2012) 25-54. 
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feasting were used for war and murder” (Ov. Met. 12.243-244). It is this detail, as will 
be shown, which becomes crucial for Lucian’s comparison of this narrative with that 
depicted in his Symposium. Ovid’s Metamorphoses also depicts skulls being crushed 
by tableware, eyes being pierced, boulders being thrown, the bodies of Lapiths and 
Centaurs alike being maimed and mutilated (Ov. Met. 12. 221ff). This violent and 
evocative language, is replicated in Lucian’s account, with the philosophers of the 
Symposium acting as if engaged in a pub brawl.219   
However in addition to this extreme violence, there exists a depiction of the race 
of centaurs that comes to mimic more accurately that which is found in Lucian’s Zeuxis. 
As DeBrohun discusses, in the context of the Metamorphoses, the violent episode is 
interrupted by a short description of a centaur couple, Cyllarus and Hylonome, who, 
upon entering the battle, are almost immediately struck down. Their description is 
dominated by an emphasis upon the beauty of the two centaurs’ forms; the hybrid 
animal is a harmonious combination of horse and man, and he exists as a perfect 
example of such a beast,220 with Nestor’s account praising both the horse and human 
halves of Cyllarus equally (Met. 12.393ff.) There is no indication of the violent 
demeanor that is exhibited by the other centaur guests, and none of the wild savagery 
that would traditionally accompany such an animal.221 Instead, Ovid provides the reader 
with quite a contradictory image of two centaurs in love. 
  
 It is also significant that we are offered a depiction of the female centaur, which 
is strikingly absent from many depictions of centaurs.222 This absence of female 
centaurs is noted by Philostratus in his Imagines, where he states that despite the belief 
that either the ‘race of centaurs sprang from trees and rocks,’ (Phil. Im. 3.3) or that they 
came into being simply from the male centaur, a more plausible explanation would be 
                                               
219 For a discussion of the place of the Centauromachy within the context of both Book 12 and the 
Metamorphoses as a whole, particularly its relationship to the Homeric epics, see N. Zumwalt, ‘Fama 
Subversa: Theme and Structure in Ovid “Metamorphoses”’ 12, California Studies in Classical 
Antiquity 10 (1977): 209-222 and M.W. Musgrove, ‘Nestor’s Centauromachy and the Deceptive Voice 
of Poetic Memory (Ovid Me. 12.182-535) Classical Philology 93 (1998): 223-231.  
220 J.B. DeBrohun, ‘Centaurs in Love and War’ 426-427. 
221 J.B. DeBrohun, ‘Centaurs in Love and War’ 430. 
222 Lucretius (Lucr. 5,922), as DeBrohun notes, does not even deign to give mention of female 
centaurs, as even male centaurs are unfathomable (DeBrohun 2004, ‘Centaurs in Love and War,’ 445). 
This is not to say that the impression of a female centaur is unique to Ovid; as will be discussed, it is 
the presence of the female centaur in Lucian’s Zeuxis and in the Metamorphoses that encourages a 
reading of Lucian’s use of centaurs as manipulating the trope of the hybrid.  
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a belief in the existence of female centaurs. The female centaur, as we will also see in 
Lucian, is inherently distinct from the traditional portrayal of the male centaur. For 
Philostratus, the female is elegant in form when merged with the horse, and likened to 
the appearance of the Amazons (and if one were to remove the horse part, Naïads) (Phil. 
Im. 3.3). This is quite different from the non-human violence exhibited during the 
centauromachy. Similarly for Ovid, while the female centaur is described as being 
among the race of hybrids, (semiferos; Ov. Met. 12. 406), it is her human qualities that 
are the focus. As DeBrohun outlines, there is a likeness between the actions of the 
female centaur and the instructions offered women in Ovid’s own Ars Amatoria, to the 
extent that her equine features are barely mentioned, and if they are, it is as evidence of 
feminine, human, preening.223 The female centaur in particular, as she appears in Ovid 
and Philostratus, is herself a more humanised ‘version’ of the traditionally savage 
centaur. As will be shown through Lucian’s Zeuxis, such humanising can also occur in 
similar measure for the male counterpart.  
 
This tension between the savage and the civilised centaur is particularly 
important for the following argument, as it is possible to view a similar tension between 
Lucian’s two works. Chiron, the famously just and moral centaur, exemplifies the 
connection between civilised behavior and paideia. As the teacher of Achilles, he 
stands in direct contrast to the philosophers of Lucian’s Symposium. Unlike 
contemporary philosophers, the idealised, civilised centaur can embody an ideal of 
philosophical education.  
Consequently, the hybrid animal becomes significant for understanding the role 
of philosophy in Lucian’s works, for as will be shown, it is the philosophers who come 
to take on the traditional role of the non-human centaur. The philosophers in Lucian’s 
Symposium are evaluated against the precedent set in Plato’s Symposium, as the 
juxtaposition of the ideal philosopher against the corrupted sophist reveals Lucian’s 
particular use of this familiar literary tradition to evoke hybridity of form and function.  
For Lucian, it is the centaur-like sophists who are savage and violent, while the centaur 
retains its humanity.  
 
                                               
223 J.B. DeBrohun, ‘Centaurs in Love and War’ 435-438. ‘And she was dainty, if such creatures could 
be, combing her hair, or mane, twining her locks with rosemary, or violets, or roses, or sometimes 
white lilies’ (Ov. Met. 12,407-410). Emphasis added.  
 92 
Zeuxis: Framing the Centaur 
  
Lucian’s Zeuxis presents a humanised, even civilised centaur, like that which appeared 
more briefly in Ovid’s Metamorphoses. Lucian’s monologue consists of two parts, both 
addressing the notion of receiving praise that does not identify the real strengths of a 
work of art. The first part portrays the painter Zeuxis as scornful of his artwork being 
applauded for its novelty rather than its skilful composition, and it is this section that 
will be the focus for the following discussion, as the painting of Zeuxis depicts a family 
of centaurs. These centaurs, not unlike those depicted in the middle of Ovid’s 
Centauromachy, are detached from their traditional nature. They are removed from the 
savage centauromachy, and instead are situated in an idyllic, bucolic setting.  
   In this painting of a family of centaurs, the female feeds her two young, while 
the male stoops over (ἐπικύπτει) the mother and her foals, dangling a lion cub above 
the children and playfully scaring them. Despite his laughter, states the narrator, the 
male centaur is entirely beast-like, savage, and wild. However the centaurs, as will be 
discussed, embody features of both the human and the horse equally, creating a hybrid 
pleasing to the eye. Despite the inherent savagery of the centaur, the depiction 
epitomises the successful hybrid creature. 
 
von Möllendorff, in his discussion of the hybrid animal in Lucian’s works, identifies 
the features of the successful hybrid. A combination, he states, of two καλοί does not 
guarantee a beautiful hybrid, but rather the successful Lucianic hybrid must offer:  
 
The artful presentation of natural liveliness and movement, the avoidance 
of abrupt contrasts and exaggerated and undifferentiated uniformity, the 
creation of colourful variety and at the same time the skillful achievement 
of the effects of symmetry, well-balanced structure and disposition, an 
impression of serenity and placid buoyancy instead of distorted effects, but 
at the same time the attempt to join together that which is disparate.224  
 
The successful hybrid must appear to be natural, as indicated in Lucian’s Prometheus. 
It should not be some kind of monstrosity like the half-black, half-white man (Prom. 
                                               
224 P. von. Möllendorff, ‘Camels, Celts and Centaurs,’ 72. Emphasis added.  
 93 
Es. 4),225 who represents the way in which a melding of two disparate things can achieve 
nothing of this ‘well-balanced structure and disposition.’226 Curiously, in Lucian’s 
Prometheus, it is in fact the centaurs that become the epitome of the disharmonious 
hybrid, as they are represented in paintings as drunks and murderers (Prom. Es. 5). This 
is, however, the precise opposite of our narrator’s description of Zeuxis’ piece, in three 
primary ways.  
 First, the centaurs of Zeuxis do, in fact, align with the Lucianic perception of a 
successful hybrid. The artist has displayed:  
 
Precision of line, and accuracy in the blending of colours, well-suited 
application of the paint, correct use of shadow, good perspective, 
proportion, and symmetry (Zeux. 5).  
 
Additionally, the female centaur is described as having the human and equine parts of 
her joined perfectly – there is no ‘abrupt transition’, nor is it obvious to the viewer that 
there has been a joining of two separate halves (Zeux. 6). Lucian’s commentary upon 
Zeuxis’ skill in composing the painting is, in and of itself, a unique aspect of his 
ekphrasis. As Pretzler notes, ekphrases throughout ancient literature tend to focus far 
more emphatically upon the content of a work of art, rather than the composition.227 
This choice to focus upon the τέχνη of the painting, she argues, accentuates that the 
artist has managed to make the unnatural natural,228 becoming representative of the 
true, uncorrupted hybrid animal.229 
Secondly, there is nothing of the savagery that is exhibited in the Prometheus.  
Unlike Ovid, Lucian does not avoid the female centaur’s equine features, but both the 
horse and the human aspects are treated in an equal and balanced manner. The human 
features act in a human way, while the equine half of her is treated as though a horse, 
with the two coexisting harmoniously. This is perhaps most evident when she is 
described as feeding her foals:  
                                               
225 The half-black, half-white human appears too in Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius, though to a 
different purpose (Phil. V.A. 3.3).  
226 P. von. Möllendorff, ‘Camels, Celts and Centaurs,’ 75. 
227 M. Pretzler, ‘Form Over Substance? Deconstructing Ecphrasis in Lucian’s Zeuxis and Eikones,’ in 
A Lucian for Our Times, edited by A. Barkley (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2009) 160-61. 
228 M. Pretzler, ‘Form over Substance?’ 167. 
229 This is true too, of Lucian’s own use of the centaur as a metaphor for his own hybrid literary 
creation in his Prometheus (K. ní Mheallaigh Reading Fiction with Lucian, 3-5).  
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She holds one of her offspring aloft in her arms, giving it the breast 
in human fashion; the other the suckles in a horse-like manner  
                              (Zeux.  4). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Additionally, both parts are things of beauty; the equine part of her is καλλίστη, not 
unlike the horses of Thessaly, and her human half is likened to a very beautiful woman, 
despite having the ears of a satyr.230 The foals themselves are not entirely free from 
potential savagery; their childhood is described as wild and fearsome, but they are 
nevertheless quite harmless.  
Finally, it should not be ignored that the wild nature of the male centaur is not 
wholly suppressed, as he is described as being ‘completely frightening and absolutely 
wild’ (Zeux. 5) with a beast-like (θηριώδης) glance. However as von Möllendorff notes, 
the horse half of the centaur is quite literally hidden from view, as he is ‘not completely 
visible, but only to a point halfway down his horse body’ (Zeux. 4).231 While he retains 
the inherent savagery of the centaur, this is not indicated through his equine features, 
but through his human form.232 Nevertheless, it is clear that he frightens his young with 
the lion cub in jest, as is indicated by his laughter at the introduction and the conclusion 
of his description (Zeux. 4; 5).233 This potentially wild creature is softened through his 
interaction with his family,234 and while the savagery is not entirely removed from the 
male centaur, he is nevertheless humanised. 
                                               
230 Here, we can recall Philostratus’ description of the female centaur, which also identifies particular 
features that contribute to the appearance of the centaur (Phil. Im. 3.3). 
231 P. von Möllendorff, ‘Camels, Celts and Centaurs,’ 77. 
232 M. Pretzler, ‘Form over Substance?’ 167. 
233 P. von Möllendorff, ‘Camels, Celts and Centaurs,’ 77. 
234 The depiction of the male centaur in this dialogue refelects upon the naturalness of parental love for 
offspring. Lucretius proposes that parental love is a natural response, arguing from clear animal 
examples: the mother of a sacrificial calf presents symptoms of bereavement, and the nurturing of 
offspring is a natural phenomenon due to the requirement of milk for the young (Lucr. De Rerum 
Natura 2,349ff.) There has been some discussion in recent scholarship of the philosophical 
implications of attributing the capacity for parental love to animals. McConnell notes that Lucretius’ 
position is curiously contradictory to Epicurus. McConnell argues that Lucretius’ manipulation of 
Epicurean doctrine allows for humans and animals to be attributed parental love by nature, as it is in 
the context of civilised and domesticated existence (S. McConnell, ‘Lucretius on parental love’ 
conference presentation, The Australasian Society for Classical Studies 37th Annual Meeting, 
Melbourne University, 4th February 2016). If the civilised human experiences natural parental love, the 
attribution of parental love to a traditionally uncivilised hybrid arguably further humanises the figure of 
the centaur. For additional instances of parental love as natural to all animals, see Philostratus’ VA. 
2,14. 
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 There indeed exists a similarity between the depiction in Zeuxis and that found 
in the midst of Ovid’s re-telling of the battle between the centaurs and the Lapiths. Not 
only is there a diminishing of the traditional centaur-like savagery, but there is in both 
instances a humanising element. The centaurs, for Ovid, fall in love just as the Lapith 
bride and bridegroom do, and in Zeuxis, there is the depiction of a close-knit, human-
like family unit.  
The centaurs of Lucian’s Zeuxis and Ovid’s Metamorphoses are of course not 
unique in being made civilised. Famously Chiron, as the teacher of Achilles, adopts the 
epithet ‘most just of the centaurs’ throughout the literary tradition (esp. Il. 11.832; 
δικαιότατος Κενταύρων), and as Fantham notes, Ovid’s Fasti humanises this civilised 
centaur in a similar manner to the depiction in the Metamorphoses, through an omission 
of any equine features.235 Chiron, as a humanised centaur, is a figure who represents a 
learned hybrid and acts as a contrast to the traditional depiction of the centaur. Chiron 
is predominantly characterised by his morality and role as pedagogue,236 yet he is also 
inherently a character with a dual literary function, having a savage and uncivilised 
appearance which belies his real nature. This is significant when juxtaposed with 
Lucian’s depiction of both centaurs and philosophers, as the centaurs of Zeuxis may be 
viewed as being humanised. In direct contrast, the so-called civilised philosophers are 
shown to adopt the characteristics of the uncivilised centaur, an inferior incarnation of 
the ‘most just’ Chiron.  
The ekphrastic description of the family of centaurs stands in a stark contrast to 
the usual image of the violent, savage creature. By composing a work that in essence 
humanises the hybrid, Lucian portrays the means by which hybridity, when done 
skillfully, can indeed become a thing of beauty. It is not unreasonable to interpret such 
a position as being in some ways self-reflexive, inciting a reconsideration of his 
assertions that his works are centaur-like in their mixing. ní Mheallaigh rightly notes 
that this dual depiction, in both Prometheus and Zeuxis, of centaurs and their hybridity 
enforces the admiration of the skill and novelty of his own hybrid genre.237 However 
for the following discussion, the focus is not on the means by which the hybrid is an 
exercise in reflexivity, but rather as a tool to critique the unsuccessful, and corrupted 
                                               
235 E. Fantham, ‘Chiron: The Best of Teachers’ 116-117.  
236 M. Gisley-Huwiler, ‘Cheiron’ in: L. Kahil, Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae III: 1 
(LIMC) (Zürich-München: Artemis Verlag, 1986) 237. 
237 K. ní Mheallaigh, Reading Fiction with Lucian,’ 3 
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hybrid. In viewing the centaurs of the Zeuxis as a positive representation of hybridity, 
it is thus important to consider the hybrid form in the context of more negative 
depictions of centaurs. Keeping the imagery of Ovid’s Centauromachy in mind, the 
‘centaurs’ of Lucian’ Symposium can be contextualised in this framework.  
 
Symposium  
 
Lucian’s Symposium, or the Lapiths, is composed as a reworking of his Cynic alter-ego 
Menippus’ dialogue (Ath. 14.629F). While Menippus’ work is now lost, Lucian’s 
dialogue consists of a re-telling of a wedding feast celebrating the marriage of Cleanthis 
and Chaereas. Lycinus recalls the various guests at the dinner, namely ‘philosophers 
and literary men’ (Symp. 6), and the reader is introduced to representatives from various 
philosophical schools: a pair of Stoics (Zenothemis and Diphilus) a Peripatetic 
(Cleodemus), an Epicurean (Hermon), and a Platonist (Ion).238 As soon as the guests 
take their seats, the opposing philosophical schools begin to quarrel, bickering amongst 
themselves and talking behind each other’s backs (Symp. 9-12). In the midst of the 
dinner, an additional philosopher appears, a Cynic, by the name of Alcidamas, who 
causes a stir among the guests, then reclines with a drink, ‘just as Herakles in the cave 
of Pholus is represented by the painters’ (Symp. 14). 
 This mythic allusion, in addition to the dialogue’s subtitle and setting, 
encourages readers to see these philosophers as centaur-like. The myth of Heracles and 
Pholus, relates that the centaur was hosting the hero during his search for the 
Erymanthian boar. However, when the wine jar was opened at Herakles’ request, a 
number of other centaurs rushed to Pholus’ cave, so wild and savage that in Herakles’ 
defence of himself, the centaurs fled to the cave of Chiron, resulting in Chiron’s 
eventual death (Apoll. 2.83-87). Lycinus’ likening of Alcidamas to Herakles in a cave 
of centaurs acts as a clear allusion to events that will follow: as the wine is passed 
throughout the wedding feast, the philosophers become enraged, not unlike the centaurs 
of myth.  
                                               
238 See too Lucian’s Philopseudes: those present at the house of Eucrates are Cleodemus the 
Peripatetic, Deinomachus the Stoic and Ion, representing Plato, which suggests that the names hold 
some significance (Philops. 6). The dialogue also mimics the Symposium in a similar way to the 
Lapiths – instead of Alcibiades/Alcidamas, Philopseudes features Arignotus as the late arrival (Philops. 
29; I. Männlein ‘What Can Go Wrong at a Dinner Party: The Unmasking of False Philosophers in 
Lucian’s Symposium or the Lapiths,’ in , Double Standards in the Ancient and Medieval World, edited 
by K. Pollmann (Göttingen: Duehrkohp und Radicke, 2000) 248). 
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It is necessary too, to explore the other namesake of the dialogue: Plato’s Symposium. 
Lucian’s Symposium structures itself in a similar manner to Plato’s, by setting up the 
dialogue as a re-telling of the sympotic event. The attendees of Plato’s Symposium are 
likewise made up of philosophers, however unlike Lucian’s fictional guests, Plato takes 
his characters from contemporary figures; those present at the dinner include Agathon, 
Aristophanes, Pausanias, Alcibiades and, of course, Socrates. Lucian also utilises the 
trope of a late arrival,239 which appears in Plato’s Symposium in the drunken arrival of 
Alcibiades (Pl. Symp. 212D). Yet for Lucian, this trope is expressed in three separate 
instances: not only is there Alcidamas’ arrival (12), but there is also the arrival of the 
doctor, Dionicus, and the arrival of the Stoic Hetoemocles’ slave. It is this last arrival 
that incites the commotion, with the slave giving a public address on behalf of his 
master. The address primarily attacks the host Aristenaetus for not inviting 
Hetoemocles, and praises the Stoic life over the opposing philosophical schools. 
Unsurprisingly, such a claim provokes a retort from Cleodemus (the Peripatetic), 
inciting the verbal argument that leads to the fighting. Enraged by the address, 
Cleodemus unmasks the famous Stoic founders, Chrysippus, Cleanthes and Zeno, as 
frauds, stating that they “make wretched little phrases and interrogations, philosophers 
in form, but most of them are like Hetoemocles” (Symp. 30). 
 These Stoic philosophers are not, according to Cleodemus, real philosophers, 
and by striking the instigators of the philosophical doctrine, Cleodemus simultaneously 
ambushes other members of the school. Zenothemis defends his philosophical leaders, 
hurling insults back at the Peripatetic and the Epicurean until finally, boiling with rage, 
he overturns his cup of wine onto his opponents, inciting a brawl.  
 It is here that we receive a brief digression by the narrator, who comments upon 
his thoughts as he was watching the brawl take place. Lycinus expresses confusion as 
to the benefits of education, stating that these supposedly educated men are caught up 
in their own teachings, having regard for nothing else (Symp. 34). He is amazed that: 
 
                                               
239 D.E. Smith, From Symposium to Eucharist: The Banquet in the Early Christian World 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 280; I. Männlein, ‘What Can Go Wrong at a Dinner-Party, 248). 
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Though so many philosophers were present, there really was not one to be 
seen who was devoid of fault, but some acted disgracefully and some talked 
still more disgracefully (Symp. 34). 
 
These philosophers, in both their words and actions, have become a source of disrepute 
for the race of philosophers more broadly. These learned men abuse each other, gorge 
themselves and brawl, while the so-called ‘unlettered folk’ laugh and observe. It is in 
this context that it is possible to view the particular hybridity of the dinner party that is 
facilitated by the elite and non-elite environment of Imperial Rome. ní Mheallaigh notes 
the way in which Lucianic hybridity frequently draws upon the distinctions between 
low and high cultures, allowing for a literary hybrid between the elite and non-elite.240 
In the context of the Symposium, a similar hybridity is also expressed, and in particular 
the distinction between the elite and the non-elite cultures may be identified through 
the overt mentions of wealth and reputation. The elitism of the symposium is shown 
even prior to retelling the violent feast, as the narrator Lycinus notes that the groom of 
the marriage is not only studying philosophy, but he is also descended from a very 
wealthy family (Symp. 5). While his wealth does not prevent the groom from being a 
student of philosophy,241 there is nevertheless an immediate tension between guests and 
the wedding party in terms of this elite and non-elite dichotomy. What is more, as the 
guests begin to seat themselves at the feast, Lycinus also relates that there exists a clear 
hierarchy between them, with each entering the symposium according to their 
reputation (Symp. 9). Over the course of the party, their hybridity comes to show itself 
in more overt forms; while this is mainly represented through their devolution into 
centaur-like behaviour, prior to this, the educated elite, namely the grammarian, is 
shown to be combining the verses of various poets, arguably standing as an allusion to 
Lucian’s own literary hybrid, and its position within such an environment (Symp. 17). 
The intention here is to frame the remainder of the dialogue around this notion of 
hybridity. The hybridity that exudes itself in this mixture of elite and non-elite cultures 
and genres allows to solidify the critique of the philosopher sophists. Our hybrid 
narrator, himself situated between the elite and the popular cultures of the Symposium 
(Symp. 9), serves to reflect upon the two types of hybridity that may present themselves 
                                               
240 K. ní Mheallaigh, Reading Fiction with Lucian, 17-18. 
241 There is much to be said about the relationship of this dialogue, and others of Lucian, to the doctrine 
of Cynicism, however discussion of this relationship and its implication is not treated here.  
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in such an environment. Where the narrator, Lycinus, remains separate from the 
‘philosophers and literary men’, the philosopher-sophist hybrids, through their 
pretensions towards wisdom, are cast as corrupted hybrids, diminishing any of their 
claims to philosophical learning.  
Lycinus, the narrator of Lucian’s Symposium, expresses surprise that the 
sympotic environment no longer offers its participants philosophical wisdom, as it did 
in the Symposium of Plato. Lucian utilises the circumstances of Plato’s Symposium to 
deliberately comment upon the absence of philosophical wisdom in contemporary 
symposia. The symby creating a stark contrast between the two sympotic texts so as to 
highlight the failure of philosophical education in Lucian’s time.  
 
There are a number of other striking differences between Lucian’s and Plato’s sympotic 
dialogues. First, the Symposium of Plato minimises the presence of both drinking and 
sympotic entertainment (Pl. Symp. 176a ff.), while drinking in the Lapiths remains 
prominent. Shortly after the arrival of Alcidamas, Lycinus relates that by then the kylix 
had been passed around the circle constantly (15). Alcidamas, soon after, was drunk 
(ἐπεπώκω 16), and shortly before the evening’s entertainment arrived, Lycinus 
observes that the rest of the guests were also drunk (17).  
Secondly, where Plato’s guests dismiss the dancing flute-girls to be entertained 
instead by simple conversation, the entertainment of Lucian’s Symposium is not only 
present (in the form of a clown), but strikes blows with the drunken Cynic (19). 
Similarly, the act of eating during the symposium is brought to excess and greed in 
Lucian’s interpretation. Lycinus relates the range of dishes available to the guests (11), 
Alcidamas’ rage is shown to be quelled by the sight of an enormous cake (16), and the 
second episode of brawling comes as a result of some guests receiving a smaller portion 
of dinner (43). These features of the symposium are taken by Lucian to the farthest 
extreme. König states that the ‘transgressive potential of eating and drinking, as bodily 
practices, can undermine elite pretentions,’242 and such a transgression is quite 
                                               
242 J. König, Saints and Symposiasts: The Literature of Food and the Symposium in Greco- Roman and 
Early Christian Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 233-234. Such a sentiment is 
similarly found in Bakhtin’s discussion of the banquet, wherein he discusses the sympotic setting and 
its association with eating and drinking as a place where truth may be freely spoken, suggesting a 
transgressive element to the banquet environment. What’s more, he states, ‘the grotesque symposium 
does not have to respect hierarchical distinctions; it freely blends the profane and the sacred, the lower 
and the higher, the spiritual and the material’ (M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, Translated by 
Hélène Iswolsky, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968) 285-286). 
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deliberately implemented by Lucian as a means to denigrate the characters of the 
symposium. Lucian’s overt depiction of this transgression, sets up a contrast between 
the two symposia and evokes the inherent hybridity of the sympotic environment. There 
exists this tension between the act of philosophical discussion and the act of revelry, 
suggesting that the space in and of itself stands as a hybrid. This hybridity of the 
symposium is reflected in Xenophanes’ description of a symposium, wherein there is 
the explanation of how to correctly conducting oneself at the symposium, only to then 
describe the kind of drinking and festivities that should follow as the evening continues 
(Xen. Fr. 1). Nevertheless, there is also the suggestion that excess, in any form becomes 
counterintuitive to the overall virtue of the symposium, to the extent that even speaking 
of such topics such as the centauromachy should be avoided (Xen. Fr. 1).243 The 
hybridity of the symposium that is outlined in Xenophanes’ text is echoed in Lucian’s 
depiction, yet is naturally taken to the farthest extremes. This depiction of excess 
beyond what could be considered a successfully hybrid symposium presents precisely 
Lucian’s concerns with contemporary philosophy, and those who practice it.  
 
The contrast with Lucian’s Symposium and the supposed norm or ideal of the sympotic 
environment is similarly reflected in Plutarch’s Quaestiones Conviviales. It is argued 
by the character Crato that to remove philosophical conversation from the sympotic 
environment is both foolish and unheard of, to which Plutarch himself adds that it 
entirely depends on who those present happen to be. If, he states, the guests are fond of 
learning, then philosophical conversation is expected, however if the company is made 
up of those who appreciate bird song and music, it is likely to end in disagreement (Plu. 
Quaes. Conv. 613d-f). The appropriateness of the forum for philosophical discussion 
must be determined by the configuration of the guests: pretensions of sophistic 
discussion in the context of a drinking-party are entirely unsuitable (Plu. Quaes. Conv. 
614e ff.). It is precisely this notion of a sham philosophical symposium that Lucian 
draws upon in his satirical dialogue. Rather than positioning the ‘philosopher-guests’ 
in a sympotic environment that educates them and improves their lives through 
philosophical and learned discussion,244 Lucian’s “untrustworthy caricatures of real 
                                               
243 For a more comprehensive discussion of this fragment of Xenophanes, see M. Marovich, 
‘Xenophanes on Drinking-Parties and Olympic Games,’ Illinois Classical Studies 3 (1978) 1-26 and 
C.M. Bowra, ‘Xenophanes, Fragment 1’ Classical Philology 33:4 (1938) 353-367.  
244 J. König, Saints and Symposiasts, 30-59; W. Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, (Oxford: 
 101 
philosophers”245 undertake the activity more appropriate for those who entirely dismiss 
philosophy from the sympotic table. Rather than undertaking what may be understood 
as ‘civilised’ conversation, the guests of Lucian’s Symposium not only eat and drink to 
excess, but find their entertainment in disputing the validity of their opposition’s 
philosophical doctrines. These philosophers, as Männlein argues, become mere 
imitators of the philosophical founders whose doctrines they espouse,246 emulating 
neither a philosopher nor a rhetorician, but the hybrid sophist, wholly dedicated neither 
to philosophy nor to ignorance.  
 
Centaurs at the Symposium  
 
As Lucian’s Symposium dialogue approaches the final conflict among the warring 
philosophers, the reader is exposed to the true nature of each philosophical school. The 
Cynic has not a single ounce of regard for his environment, the Stoics are portrayed as 
driven by greed, and as each doctrine finally chooses its ‘side’, the violence and 
savagery that is quintessential to Ovid’s centauromachy is revealed. Lucian’s 
Symposium depicts similar violence to that outlined above: eyes are gouged from their 
sockets, jaws are broken, women are screaming and crying as the battles rages on. The 
banquet room is now literally described as a space for two armies to meet (µεταίχµιον), 
and Lucian even employs an Iliadic quotation as a small bowl is thrown across the 
room, narrowly missing its target (Symp. 44).247 In the narrator’s near-closing remarks, 
he states that: 
 
You would have said they were Lapiths and Centaurs, to see tables going 
over, blood flowing and cups flying (Symp. 45). 
 
The philosophers, already proven to be excessive in their eating and drinking, are 
depicted as uncivilised in their sympotic behaviour and utterly uneducated in 
philosophy, re-enacting as they do the famous battle of hybrid animals. The correct 
manner of conducting oneself during a symposium, as outlined by Plato and Plutarch, 
                                               
Basil Blackwell, 1945) 213-262. 
245 I. Männlein, ‘What Can Go Wrong at a Dinner Party?’ 248. 
246 I. Männlein, ‘What Can Go Wrong at a Dinner Party?’ 253. 
247 Agamemnon is battling the Trojan Iphidamas, when his spear misses his opponent (Il. 11,233). 
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has fallen by the wayside, and it has become clear that the claims to wisdom of 
contemporary philosophy are false.  
 Through the depiction of contemporary philosophers as centaur-like, Lucian’s 
interpretation of the sympotic environment manipulates the notion of philosophy as 
paideia through a recasting of contemporary philosophical conversation as failing to 
offer its participants’ true education. Lucian’s sympotic interpretation of the famous 
centauromachy exhibits a de-humanising, as the philosophers become like the 
traditional hybrid centaur, exhibiting their bestial nature over any human 
characteristics.  
 
These two dialogues of Lucian, the Zeuxis and the Symposium, present the motif of the 
centaur in two distinctly separate contexts. In the first instance, the nature of the hybrid 
animal is considered, while in the second Lucian comments upon the failings of 
contemporary philosophy. The supposedly educated and wise philosophers are cast as 
savage, hybrid centaurs, while the hybrid animal itself comes to exhibit civilised 
behaviour. The philosopher as some kind of hybrid animal is not a notion restricted to 
this particular dialogue, nor to Lucian, but its development here contributes powerfully 
to Lucian’s ongoing satirical polemic against philosophers. The philosophical hybrid, 
when contrasted with overtly humanised centaurs in the Zeuxis, offers a striking role 
reversal: the centaur approaches a human character, rather than a class of humans being 
bestialised by taking on the extremes of centaur behaviour. The savagery and the 
wildness that so defines the centaur breed is all but removed in Zeuxis, and instead the 
reader is left with the impression that the hybrid may not be the abhorrent and repulsive 
thing that permeates popular understanding. Rather, through the deftness of Zeuxis’ 
skill, the hybrid animal is portrayed as a thing of (almost) human beauty.  
 These two dialogues, when viewed side-by-side, reflect a Lucianic concern with 
the nature of the contemporary philosopher. While the Zeuxis on its own stands as a 
more considered evaluation of Lucian’s own works and their value as a hybrid genre, 
the work also acts as a consideration of the dichotomy between the elite and the popular. 
By recognising the disjunct between the perception of the artwork and the artist’s 
intention, notions of perceived value can be understood as being emphasised in this 
dialogue. The suggestions that the hybrid has value on the basis of novelty offers a 
reflection upon the way in which elite and non-elite values are proliferated in society – 
and the way in which such values may be painted simultaneously. With this element of 
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the Zeuxis in mind, it is possible to consider the motif of the centaur in this work as 
having a more forceful relationship with the centaurs of Lucian’s Symposium. Here, the 
value of the philosopher has sunk so low that their elevated position is no longer 
justified, a clear reflection upon the notions of perceived value that is considered in the 
Zeuxis. Despite their supposed education, they act disgracefully. Additionally, where 
the philosopher in the Symposium is symbolically removed from humanity, the hybrid 
centaur in Zeuxis has its humanity emphasised. For Lucian, a successful hybrid 
‘attempt[s] to join together that which is disparate,’ on the proviso that the balance is 
not disrupted. The philosopher-sophists, for their false professions of wisdom and 
education, have damaged this balance through their greed, overtaking the centaur as the 
epitome of the unsuccessful hybrid, while the ‘uneducated’ simply laugh and pass 
judgment on those whom they used to admire. 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that Lucian further engages with the notion of the hybrid, 
as a means to critique contemporary philosophers. In Chapter One, it was argued that 
Lucian engages with the Aesopic tradition so as to ensure his works are able to reach a 
dual audience. In the above discussion, it is possible to see how this dual audience 
reaches its full potential, for the way in which Lucian consistently characterises the 
philosopher-sophists as both hybrid in genre and hybrid in form. Consequently, it is 
possible to see that Lucian engages with similar concerns to the Aesopic tradition – the 
works are able to embrace this dual audience that so defines the fable, and the question 
of the distinct ‘values’ of the elite and the popular audiences are presented. The 
presence of the Aesopic tradition in the dialogues discussed is evidenced through the 
concerted effort to display the tension between elite and non-elite cultures. Lucian 
reflects upon the ideals and essence of the Aesopic tradition by engaging with the 
distinctions between low and high culture, and it is through this distinction that it is 
possible to view the Lucianic critique of the philosopher-sophists on the basis of their 
pretentions of elite culture.  
In the first half of the chapter, I showed that the philosopher-sophists 
represented a corrupted hybrid, and earned the disdain of even the fathers of their 
respective doctrines. In so doing, Lucian effectively sets up the basis for his further 
critique, placing the philosopher-sophists upon an inverse scale of value, and 
diminishing their worth on account of the corrupted hybridity. In the second half, I 
showed that such a notion is expanded upon, as not only are the philosopher-sophists 
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literal hybrids, but they are cast as even more degraded than the most well-known 
human-animal hybrid, the centaur. The framing of the philosopher in these four 
dialogues creates a powerful and far-reaching effect, which resonates through a number 
of other Lucianic dialogues. In Sale of Lives and the Fisherman, our hybrid 
philosopher-sophists are portrayed as non-elite, and non-human. They are concerned 
primarily with their reputation (and will go to great lengths to maintain this), and their 
single-minded desire for money over any genuine or valuable wisdom serves to create 
a distinct divide between them and the real philosophers present. For the Zeuxis and the 
Symposium, this notion of the philosopher-sophists being non-elite and non-human 
once again presents itself, although in this instance it is through a direct association 
with the traditionally savage centaur. The Symposium in particular, serves to drive home 
this critique, as we are offered what is portrayed as a real, unadulterated insight into the 
donkey beneath the lion’s skin. The philosopher-sophists have not truly earned the title 
of philosopher, and they are indeed a hybrid like the centaur: uneducated, uncivilised, 
and importantly, unable to slip past Lucian’s discerning gaze.  
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Indeed, my education in this regard began from the moment I was first put 
on display. A small group of visitors approached my wagon and after a 
moment began speaking to me. I was astounded. At the zoo, visitors had 
talked to one another – never to us. 
 
  Daniel Quinn, Ishamael: An Adventure of the Mind and Spirit 
       
 
From antiquity to the modern day, the trope of the speaking animal has been 
used for a number of different literary purposes.248 In the context of modern 
texts, Lewis Carroll’s 1865 classic Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 
demonstrates the use of speaking animals to indicate an exploration of a world 
separate from ours, while George Orwell’s Animal Farm utilises speaking 
animals as an oblique commentary upon the concerns with contemporary 
communism. More recently, the speaking animal may be used as a 
philosophical teacher, as is evident in Daniel Quinn’s Ishmael, wherein the 
gorilla employs his understanding of human language to educate his human 
interlocutor about the true nature of the universe. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that this trope exists throughout antiquity, and that then too the 
speaking animal held a number of functions. As discussed in Chapter One, the 
speaking animal is a core and established feature of the Aesopic fable, and it 
is the fable’s relationship to Golden Age ideals that will similarly be discussed 
in this chapter. Lucian’s dialogue Gallus directly engages with the idealised 
Golden Age through its use of a speaking animal, serving to further his critique 
of contemporary philosophers through a direct contrast of contemporary and 
past practice. In Gallus, a philosophically-inclined, talking rooster, talks sense 
into his interlocutor Micyllus, showing to him that greed and desire for wealth 
and reputation do not equate to a happy, virtuous existence. In what follows, I 
will first outline in detail the trope of animal speech in antiquity, in both its 
literary and ‘scientific’ incarnations. Having established the presence and 
                                               
248 For an outline of the trope throughout literature (entitled Type B21) see S. Thompson, The Folktale 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946) 489; esp. 279; 276.   
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malleability of animal speech in antiquity, I will then turn to the use of this 
trope in Lucian’s work. 
 
Beyond the fable, one of the more well-known instances of a speaking animal 
is found in Homer’s Iliad, wherein Achilles’ horses Balius and Xanthus are 
granted the power of speech by Hera, in order to reveal their master’s fate (Il. 
9.404).249 As alluded to earlier, the Aesopic fable primarily presents animals 
capable of human speech, largely as a reminder of the Greek Golden Age of 
animal speech.250 In the realms of ancient comedy, Aristophanes’ Birds, 
Wasps and Frogs in particular feature animals capable of speech, primarily as 
members of the animal chorus, as a deliberate blurring of the human and 
animal in an attempt to construct a commentary upon nature and civilisation.251 
This feature of the speaking animal as representative of hybridity is a core 
concern for the following discussion, for the means by which Lucian explores 
the presence of successful, or well-proportioned hybrids.  
 However while the speaking animal in fiction is a frequent feature in 
both children’s and other contemporary literature,252 the following chapter 
concentrates on antiquity’s concern with animal speech as presented through 
philosophical discourse. The concern, for many authors, rests upon either 
determining a justification for imbuing animals with speech or depriving them 
of the capacity. In the case of the former, the justification relies upon the 
animal as having previously been a human, and in the latter, there exists an 
impetus to deny animals speech as evidence of lack of reason.   
                                               
249 Heath does note that the horses are promptly silenced, as Achilles already knows his fate, and thus it 
is not necessary for the animals to speak such things (J. Heath, The Talking Greeks (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) 16. 
250 Speech in the Aesopic fable will be returned to later in the chapter, especially in regards to 
philosophical criticisms of the contemporary age.  
251 K. S. Rothwell Jr., Nature, Culture and the Origins of Greek Comedy: A Study of Animal Choruses, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 184. Rothwell also discusses the sympotic 
associations of the animal chorus, in particular the drunken revelry that would accompany the 
conclusion of a symposium. The komos, Rothwell argues, can be viewed as a precursor to the animal 
chorus evidenced in Greek comedy, as it embodies many similar features: Dionysus, animals and 
satyrs, and the act of costuming oneself in order to partake in the komos (K.S. Rothwell Jnr, Nature, 
Culture and the Origins of Greek Comedy, 6ff). See too Sifakis’ discussion of the potential purpose of 
animal choruses (G.M. Sifakis. Parabasis and Animal Choruses: A Contribution to the History of Attic 
Comedy .(London: Athlone Press, 1971) 78ff.). 
252 C. Dovey, Only the Animals (Camberwell: Penguin Books, 2014). C. Elick, Talking Animals in 
Children’s Fiction: A Critical Stud (Jefferson: McFarland and Company Inc., 2015). 
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In the following chapter, it will be explored how Lucian utilises the 
motif of the speaking animal in his Gallus. To do so, it is necessary first to 
explore the philosophical and literary significance of the speaking animal, in 
particular birds, so as to understand Lucian’s particular use of a speaking 
rooster in his dialogue. As noted above, animals are denied a capacity for 
speech as evidence for their lack of reason. In the first section of this chapter, 
it is necessary to trace the development and use of animal speech for literary 
and philosophical sources. It is shown that Lucian’s rooster continues the 
criticism of the sophists precisely through an engagement with the tradition of 
animal speech. The rooster in Gallus is the reincarnated form of Pythagoras, 
who teaches his interlocutor not to desire wealth and gold. By imbuing an 
animal with speech, and positioning this speaking animal as a source of 
wisdom to the human character, the dialogue places an emphasis upon the 
distinction between real and false philosophy. In the world of Gallus, 
philosophical teaching has been reduced to being conducted by the sham 
philosophers, and it is only through an engagement with a real philosopher (in 
the guise of an animal) that the truth may be attained.  
 
 
Speech 
 
It is also important to consider the nature of speech more broadly, as it 
becomes clear that determining intellect on the basis of speech does not apply 
only to the human-animal divide. A frequent concern of Greek authors is this 
notion of determining the nature of the other, often intending to de-humanise 
others on the basis of non-Greek characteristics. As was shown in the previous 
chapter, Lucian embraced this notion by utilising the hybrid centaur as a means 
to show the philosophical other in the context of the fraudulent philosopher 
sophists. Yet this literary technique far precedes Lucian; Homer’s Odyssey 
famously depicts the de-humanised other in Book 9 and its depiction of the of 
the Cyclopes. They are lawless, and as the particular interaction with 
Polyphemus aims to show, they hold no regard for the civilised behaviour 
expected of a proper Greek (Od. 9. 105ff). Yet in what follows, the focus is 
upon how language is used as means of differentiating real Greeks from the 
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other.253 Anson explores this role of language in the contexts of defining 
ethnicity, drawing upon the work of Hall and Bologna, and argues that 
language throughout the Greek world plays a crucial role in defining one’s 
personal identity.254 Speech, he notes, can be divided into various regional 
categories, though these dialects, he argues, appear not to be a hindrance to 
understanding among the Greek-speaking communities.255 Significantly, in his 
discussion of the role of Greek language, he notes that Herodotus maintains 
that Greek-ness is so entrenched in the capacity for language that it was 
possible to relinquish one’s foreignness through the adoption of language.256 
Given the way in which culture is linked to language, attributing Greek-ness 
to one who is able to engage with the Greek language is hardly a foolish 
undertaking, however in the context of the following discussion, it becomes 
clear that writers of antiquity nevertheless took great lengths to deny language 
to those considered foreign. The process of defining something as ‘other’ on 
the basis of their capacity for language is crucial for this discussion of Lucian’s 
use of hybridity.257 The centaur, as shown in the previous chapter, exemplifies 
the uncivilised other, however it is argued that speech and, importantly one’s 
mastery over speech, similarly serve to undermine or strengthen one’s 
particular inclusive quality. In this context, however, rather than determining 
                                               
253 Heath states that “The Other can and should be treated as somethings less than full persons, it has 
often been argued, because they are in fact more irrational, infantile, “soulless” and uncivilised than we 
are,” with language being one of the primary means of distinguishing humans from animals (J. Heath, 
The Talking Greeks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 315-18).  
254 E. M. Anson, ‘Greek Ethnicity and the Greek Language,’ Glotta 85 (2009): 5-30. See too, E. Hall, 
Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
2004) 5; C. Bologna, ‘Il linguaggio del silenzio: L’ alterità  linguistica nelle religioni del mondo 
classico’ Studi Storico Religiosi 2 (1978): 305-342; L. Kim, ‘The Literary Heritage as Language: 
Atticism and the Second Sophistic’ in A Companion to the Ancient Greek Language, edited by E. J. 
Bakker (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell: 2010) 368-482. 
255 E. M. Anson, ‘Greek Ethnicity and the Greek Language,’ 9. This feature of Greek language, as 
history shows, has the capacity to play out it a number of ways; while the unification of the Greek 
language allowed a defeat of the Persians, the distinctively different features of each regions also 
contributed to the divide during the Peloponnesian War, as reflected in Herodotus and Thucydides 
(Her. 7; Thuc. 7; E.M. Anson, ‘Greek Ethnicity and the Greek Language,’ 12-16).  
256 E. M. Anson, ‘Greek Ethnicity and the Greek Language,’ 16. Herodotus speaks of the assimilation 
of the Pelagasians with the Athenian language (Her. 57.2ff). 
257 Goldhill discusses the notion of appearance in the context of Lucian’s work, and notes that an 
important aspect of ‘becoming’ Greek relates directly to language. If an inability to correctly look 
Greek evokes scorn from onlookers, the act of speaking poor Greek in the context of oratory is nothing 
short of an embarrassment (S. Goldhill, Who Needs Greek?: Contexts in the Cultural History of 
Hellenism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 84; 89ff.) 
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‘Greek-ness,’ it is focussed instead upon determining true and valid claims to 
wisdom.258  
Determining Greek-ness through speech has, of course, especial 
significance in the context of the following discussion. Lucian’s own Syrian 
heritage, and his atticising throughout the majority of his works exemplifies 
the use of speech and language to enhance a particular perception. The 
question of Lucian’s true ethnicity has long been the subject of conjecture and 
debate, and the following makes no attempt to weigh in on this discussion, 
short of concurring with Richter that Lucian is in many ways a cultural 
hybrid.259 The concerted attempts by scholars such as Wieland to characterise 
Lucian as among the ranks of the pure Greek philosophers is based wholly on 
the nature and perhaps quality of Lucian’s writings, arguing that many of 
Lucian’s works must have been written in Athens, ultimately “Hellenizing the 
texts by planting them…in Greek soil.”260 Despite being Syrian, culturally 
positioned at the “farthest boundary of Greek culture,”261 the language of 
Lucian’s works ultimately serve to remove him from this foreign exclusion,262 
and become considered not as the other, but as representative of Greek ideals 
and culture.  
                                               
258 It is worth mentioning here briefly that the use of speech as a form of cultural definition within the 
Greek speaking world often presents itself through the particular modes and terminologies of speech 
that are applied to women. Given the limited scope of this dissertation, it is not possible to discuss such 
a distinction in full. However, it is certainly important to note that there exists an inherent hierarchy in 
language. For more on women’s speech, see J. Mossman, ‘Women's Speech in Greek Tragedy: The 
Case of Electra and Clytemnestra in Euripides' "Electra”’ The Classical Quarterly 51:2 (2001): 374-
384. 
259 D. Richter, ‘Lives and Afterlives of Lucian of Samosata,’ Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the 
Classics 13:1 (2005): 93.  
260 D. Richter, ‘Lives and Afterlives of Lucian of Samosata’ 83; C.M. Wieland, Lucians von Samosata 
Sämtliche Werke aus dem Griechischen übersetzt und mit Anmerkungen und Erläuterungen. (Leipzig: 
Weidmanns Erben und Reich, 1788).  Elsner too notes the cultural hybridity of Lucian himself, 
particularly in the context of his de dea Syria, wherein we are offered an insight into a cultural 
amalgamation of the Greek and Syrian pantheon of Gods. Elsner states: “He writes about Syria as if he 
were an insider – addressing his Greek-speaking audience as if they were outsides; but he writes in 
Greek as an insider to the culture of his audience, presenting them with what is in many aspects, a 
typical (‘Herodotean’) ethnography of the foreign and the marvellous” (J. Elsner, ‘Describing Self in 
the Language of the Other: Pseudo(?) Lucian at the Temple of Hieropolis’ in Being Greek Under 
Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and Development of Empire, edited by S. Goldhill. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 128. 123-153). 
261 August Pauly, Lucians Werke (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1827), 5: "Sein Geburtsort war Samosata, 
eine unfern des Euphrat's an den aussersten Grenzen griechischer Kultur gelegen Syrische Stadt, an 
deren Stelle heut zu Tage ein gänzlich unbedeutender Ort, Semisat, befindlich seyn soll.” 
262 For an analysis of Lucian’s Greek and its atticisms, see W. Schmid, Der Atticismus in seinem 
Hauptvertretern von Dionysus von Halikarnass bis auf den zweiten Philostratus. (Stuttgart: W 
Kohlhammer, 1887). 
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 Speech and language, therefore, are an important defining quality in 
both Lucian and antiquity more broadly. In the examples outlined above, 
language may act as a cultural and ethnic divide, however it may also serve to 
include an individual or culture within a much broader group. This quality of 
language is particularly important in the context of the following chapter, as 
the notion of animal speech is assessed. Animals, throughout antiquity, are 
frequently denied any capacity for speech on account of their lack of reason, 
undergoing a similar language distinction to that between the Greek and the 
other. However as will be shown, Lucian not only engages with this idea of 
animal speech, but manipulates it in such a way to offer a reflection of the 
broader function of speech in the ancient world. This is not unlike the 
manipulation of speech evidenced in the Life of Aesop; the character of Aesop 
manipulates the words and speech of his so-called philosopher master as a 
means to prove his own worth. We see a form of this in Lucian’s Gallus 
dialogue, twisting the perceptions of speech as an indicator of worth. The 
rooster, being provided with reasoned and comprehensible speech, offers an 
alternative perspective upon human and animal philosophical capacity. Our 
hybrid rooster wholly outwits his human interlocutor, and encourages a 
reflection upon the nature of speech as rhetorical tool. As will be shown, 
positioning the hybrid, speaking, rooster as a source of wisdom serves to 
undermine the authority of the contemporary philosopher-sophists, as they are 
shown up to be little more than imitators of speech.  
 
 
Animal Speech 
 
Human incomprehension of animal speech, according to Porphyry, is an insufficient 
basis upon which to deny rationality to animals. Foreign dialects and languages are 
understood by those to whom the speech is accustomed, despite the inability of 
outsiders to understand them. The same may be said of animal speech: 
“Understanding,” states Porphyry, “comes to them in a way which is peculiar to each 
species, but we can hear only noise deficient in meaning, because no one who had been 
taught our language has taught us to translate it into what is said by animals.” (Porph. 
Abst. 3.3.5) While Porphyry’s work specifically considers the notion of animal speech 
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in the context of vegetarianism and the rational animal, his assertions on animal 
language nevertheless provide a framework from which to structure the following 
discussion.263 As has been discussed above, the notion of speech, and the capacity for 
speech is an important consideration throughout antiquity, and denying or attributing 
speech to beings reveals much about both the author and their subject. Lucian’s Gallus 
features a bird with a human voice, who reflects upon and disparages the human desire 
for wealth and glory. In doing so, it is argued that Lucian evokes the Golden Age of 
speaking animals and the Aesopic tradition to further facilitate his critique. In 
positioning the dialogue during the Aesopic Golden Age, there comes to exist a 
reflection upon contemporary human-animal interaction. More importantly, in this 
particular context, it is also possible to identify a tension between the high and low 
culture of philosophical discourse; the rooster does not only criticise human desires, 
but convinces his human interlocutor of his folly through professions of true wisdom. 
The lowly rooster is shown in these instances to possess reason, inciting a consideration 
of this particular dichotomy of low and high in Lucian’s time. The members of the low, 
popular culture are in fact imbued with wisdom, however the supposed learned and elite 
individuals are shown to be wholly reliant on their reputation, and not their capacity for 
wisdom.  
 
Porphyry’s line of argument follows upon (but is by no means the conclusion of) a 
long-standing attempt to determine the nature and implications of animal speech, and 
the way in which this comes to affect human perception of animals more broadly. 
Xenophon succinctly encapsulates the human-animal divide in his Memorabilia, where 
humans are portrayed as distinct from animals on the basis of both their physical 
capacity and mental comprehension. In the context of speech, he states that humans 
alone are endowed with the capacity to “articulate the voice”264 (ἀρθροῦν τὴν φωνὴν 
X. Mem. 1.4.12) and furthermore, “in comparison with the other animals, men live like 
gods” for their superiority of physical form and mental capacity (X. Mem. 1.4.14)265. 
                                               
263 For a fuller discussion of Porphyry’s work, see R. Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, 182ff and Porphyre, De l’abstinence, Edited and translated by J. 
Bouffartigue. (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1977).  
264 E.C. Marchant, Xenophon: Memorabilia and Oeconomicus (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1923) 61. 
265 The hierarchy of animals, humans and gods is a relatively frequent trait throughout antiquity. Such a 
notion is presented in Plato’s Hippias Major, wherein Heraclitus is attributed with levelling the relative 
values of wisdom attributed to these three categories. While in comparison with monkeys (even the 
most beautiful!), he states, humans are wiser and even more beautiful, however in comparison to the 
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Xenophon is of course not unique in viewing animals as inferior to humans on the basis 
of speech; denying them the capacity for language or speech becomes synonymous with 
denying them reason. The division between humans and animals is also reflected in the 
Greek language itself; as Kleczkowska outlines, from the 5th Century BC, ancient 
authors actively distinguish between man from the other animals, suggesting a distinct 
shift in human perceptions and relations with animals.266 In what follows, I will briefly 
explore the way in which animals are systematically distinguished from humans, and 
portrayed as wholly inferior beings. Their inability to speak as humans do serves to 
solidify and justify human superiority over animals, becoming a powerful rhetorical 
tool in the ancient world.267 Having established the means by which speech and 
language are utilised in this context, it is possible to assess the context in which 
Lucian’s own satire is constructed. While the absence of animal speech in Lucian’s 
contemporary world is rationalised through the mythical deprivation following the era 
of the Golden Age, there is nevertheless a continued attempt to determine the animal’s 
potential capacity to speak and understand human language, and the implications this 
may have for the broader capacity for reason.268 Lucian’s inclusion of a reasoned, 
                                               
gods, the humans are to be likened to monkeys (Hipp. Maj. 289a ff). This notion of ‘hierarchy’ is an 
important consideration for the overall discussion. Given the relationship of Lucian’s satires to 
dismantling the strict divisions of high and low culture in Second Sophistic society, it becomes 
extremely useful to view his treatment of this divide in the context of the divine and human spheres. 
This is treated in extensive detail in chapters 4 and 5, however it is nevertheless important to address 
this hierarchy here, given the representation of animals as being the ‘lower’ class.  
266 K. Kleczkowska, ‘Those Who Cannot Speak: Animals as Others in Ancient Greek Thought’ Maska 
24 (2014): 98.  
267 Kleczkowska discusses the relationship between human superiority and rhetoric in relation to 
Isocrates, who portrays the capacity for speech as the foundational means by which humans have been 
able to achieve and progress (Isoc. Nicocles of the Cyprians 3.5-6; K. Kleczkowska, ‘Those Who 
Cannot Speak,’ 102). Speech and language serve to identify both the civilised and, consequently, the 
uncivilised. 
268 It almost goes without saying that such a discussion is also a modern concern, as several studies 
have been conducted that aim to determine precisely an animal’s capacity for speech. While the focus 
for many of these studies are chimpanzees (R.A. Gardener and B. T. Gardener, ‘Teaching Sign 
Language to a Chimpanzee: A standardized system of gestures provides a means of two-way 
communication with a chimpanzee,’ Science 165: 3894 (1969): 664-672; D. Premack, ‘Language in a 
Chimpanzee?’ Science 172: 3985 (1971): 808-822) and using these animals as a means to understand 
more about human language and communication (M. Frölich; P. Kuchenbuch; G. Müller; B. Fruth; T. 
Furuichi; R. M. Wittig; S. Pika ‘Unpeeling the layers of language: Bonobos and chimpanzees engage in 
cooperative turn-taking sequences’ Scientific Reports 6: 255887 (2016) 
https://www.nature.com/articles/srep25887; A. S. Pollick and F. B. M. de Waal ‘Ape Gestures and 
Language Evolution’ PNAS 104: 19 (2007): 8184-8189), it is nevertheless clear that there exists among 
humans a desire to communicate (in some way) with animals.   
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speaking rooster, wittily challenges this notion, and manipulates the nature of speech 
to frame contemporary philosophical practice as uncivilised.269 
 
Rejection of Animal Speech 
 
It is important to provide an overview of the rejection of animal language in antiquity, 
for as will be shown, even if the proponents of animal irrationality at all believed in a 
bestial capacity for speech in the Golden Age, this capacity was most certainly no 
longer possible. The Golden Age of fable, of animal speech, is portrayed as being in 
the distant past, and their deprivation of speech in the current era is a core concern for 
those who wish to deny animals the capacity for reason.270 Nevertheless, it is useful to 
return briefly to the work of Hesiod, as his depiction of the Golden Age offers an insight 
into early perspectives upon animal speech. While he does not explicitly reject the idea 
of animals being able to speak to humans, he nevertheless asserts human intellectual 
superiority271 over animals in his present day; most famously, Hesiod asserts that 
animals, in contrast to men, do not possess δίκη (Hes. OP. 274). Yet Hesiod does, of 
course, include talking animals in his narrative by recounting a fable272 of a hawk and 
a nightingale, (Hes. OP. 202-13) defining the tale as an αἶνος so as to position it well 
within the world of the mythic past. Lefkowitz’s analysis of the short passage provides 
an important basis from which to consider later positions on animal speech. The 
nightingale, he argues, sings like human poets in an attempt to be released from the 
clutches of the hawk. However, the hawk ignores these cries, and the nightingale’s 
“anthropomorphic utterances are thrown back at her as irrelevant animal noises in the 
                                               
269 This connection between comprehensible speech and the civilised is alluded to in Lucian’s 
Icaromenippus, wherein Menippus explains to his interlocutor how the philosophers merely quarrelled 
amongst themselves, speaking about things that caused him even more confusion (ἀπορία; Icar. 5). 
270 Of the philosophical doctrines, the Stoics are the more vocal about denying animals the capacity for 
reason. For a detailed analysis of the Stoic perspective, see R. Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human 
Morals and S. Rubarth, ‘Animal Perception in Early Stoicism: A Response to Richard Sorabji’ The 
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter 456 (1999): 1-9. 
271 Newmyer specifies that Hesiod does not suggest explicitly that humans are superior to animals, but 
certainly suggests an intellectual superiority on the basis of human faculty for justice. (S. T. Newmyer, 
‘Being the One and Becoming the Other’ 509.) 
272 The Hesiodic fable is discussed at length in Chapter One, however Lefkowitz’s discussion of the 
difficulties in terming Hesiod’s αἶνος as a fable should nevertheless be noted. While Hesiod’s specific 
use of the term was undoubtedly intended to refer to animal fables, Lefkowitz emphasises that the 
translation does not express the layers of meaning that the word may refer. (J.B. Lefkowitz, ‘Aesop and 
Animal Fable’ in Animals in Classical Thought and Life edited by G.L. Campbell (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014) 8-9.)  
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fable itself”.273 As discussed in Chapter One, Animals, even if they did possess 
language would not be understood on account of the inherently intellectual, and thus 
linguistic, divide.274  
Aristotle’s views of animal speech, in the context of biological inquiry,275 
concede that animals do have a form of speech, although this is indeed distinct from 
human language. He observes that “some emit noise (ψοφητίκα), some are mute 
(ἄφωνα); some have a voice (φωνήεντα) and of the latter, some are articulate 
(διάλεκτος) and others inarticulate (ἀγράµµατος)” (H.A. 1.1.488a.33). Speech 
(διάλεκτος), sound and voice are for Aristotle distinct concepts (H.A. 4.9.535a.29) yet 
even if an animal has the physical capacity for these, they are nevertheless excluded 
from employing human language (λόγος),276 as a consequence of their lack of human 
reason. What is crucial is that while the sound produced by animals may be in some 
ways meaningful,277 it is nevertheless inferior to human language.278  
This denial of animal speech also features in the context of studies not dedicated 
to understanding the characteristics of animals, namely rhetoric and political speeches. 
Denying animals the capacity for speech (and by proxy, the capacity for persuasion 
through rhetoric) acts a means to enhance the power of rhetoric itself. An animal’s lack 
of language or speech is also famously illustrated in Aristotle’s Politics, stating that 
man is the only one of the animals who possesses speech (λόγος, Pol. 1.1.9; 1.1253a), 
given that the voice of animals merely derives from instinct, and not through a capacity 
                                               
273 J.B. Lefkowitz, ‘Aesop and Animal Fable’, 10. 
274 The relastionship of the fable to Hesiod is discussed in full in Chapter One.  
275 S.T. Newmyer, ‘Being the One and Becoming the Other: Animals in Ancient Philosophical 
Schools’ in Animals in Classical Thought and Life, edited by G.L. Campbell, 507-534. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014, 520; R. Sorabji, Animals Minds and Human Morals, 2. 
276 T. Fögen, ‘Animal Communication’ in G. L. Campbell, The Oxford Handbook of Animals in 
Classical Thought and Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 220. 
277 R. Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals, 80-81. 
278 It is useful to compare this Aristotelian view with the Stoic doctrine. Animals, according to the 
Stoics, are unable to develop their part of the soul that drives behaviour, and thus actions are described 
as impulses, removed from rational thought (S.T. Newmyer, ‘Speaking of Beasts: The Stoics and 
Plutarch on Animal Reason and the Modern Case Against Animals’ in Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura 
Classica 63:3 (1999): 102.). These impulses are said to be responsible for the sound that animals make, 
thus distinguishing animal utterances from human language (R. Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human 
Morals, 81). Diogenes Laertius states in his Life of Zeno on the Stoic theory of speech that “while the 
voice or cry of an animal is just a percussion of air brought about by natural impulse, man’s voice in 
articulate and, as Diogenes puts it, an utterance of reason, having the quality of coming to maturity at 
the age of fourteen.” (D.L. 7.55). For the Stoics, animals do not make any meaningful sounds, which is 
attributed to their intellectual inferiority. The authoritative part of the soul in animals is not as well 
developed as in humans, and thus human language, despite their physical capacity for speech, cannot 
be attained (T. Fögen, ‘Animal Communication’, 222). 
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to distinguish right from wrong. In a similar context, Cicero also proclaims humans’ 
superiority over animals wholly on account of their capacity for speech, simultaneously 
emphasising that those who are able to speak well, are also superior to other humans 
(De. Inv. 1.4). The distinct divide here, constructed around a human-animal divide 
complicates the traditional animal-human-divine hierarchy. As Hawkins’ aptly 
summarises:  
 
Animals, since they lack altogether the capacity for language, demarcate 
one end of a spectrum that leads toward the masters of persuasive speech, 
and marginal figures like children, women, foreigners, the uneducated, and 
those with communicative disabilities are mapped somewhere between 
these extremes. Verbal animals, therefore, represent a category crisis that 
demands explanation (Fögen 2003, 2007), and by situating speaking 
animals in the wider range of classical attitudes we can hear a paradoxically 
eloquent alogia.279 
 
Animals are portrayed as inferior beings on account of their incapacity for speech, 
however this inferiority, according to Cicero, may be applied to other members of the 
human race as well. It is this role of speech that is crucial for the following discussion, 
as the “marginal figures” in the realms of speech in Lucian’s works come to include the 
contemporary philosopher sophists. Given the nature of Lucian’s works, and their 
relationship to rhetoric and the Second Sophistic, the presence of speech as a tool for 
denigration of an ‘other’ becomes a useful means for Lucian himself to discredit the 
false-speaking philosophers.  
 
As may be evidenced by these attitudes towards the existence or non-existence of 
animal speech, the notion of language acts as a defining feature of what may be 
considered human or non-human, as well as distinguishing elite or non-elite. Porphyry 
was, of course, not alone in his defence of animal reason and animal speech, as can be 
seen from the many earlier sources which he is able to cite. Plutarch’s Moralia also 
                                               
279 T. Hawkins, ‘Eloquent Alogia: Animal Narrators in Ancient Greek Literature’ Humanities 6:37 
(2017): 1.  
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asserts the animal capacity for intellectual thought, and the doctrines of transmigration 
and vegetarianism proposed by Pythagoreans and Platonists had a high cultural profile, 
and both philosophies stand in defence of animal reason and speech. Gallus primarily 
acts as a parallel to Plutarch’s own Gryllus dialogue, with the emphasis being on 
dismissing human desires and arrogance through the medium of an animal interlocutor. 
Nevertheless, Lucian’s use of the speaking animal, when viewed in the context of 
Golden Age ideals and contemporary discussions of animal speech, comes to reflect a 
satire of anthropocentrism. The text’s suggestion of philosophical contest through the 
enlightened rooster’s teaching of the ignorant human encourages a reflection upon 
denying speech and rationality to animals, albeit in the context of satire. The Golden 
Age is evoked in Lucian’s Gallus, through its portrayal of the speaking animal who 
returns to the time before this “linguistic break”, and offers “immeasurable happiness” 
to his human interlocutor. The rooster’s capacity for speech is explained through the 
fact that he used to be human, yet by using the motif of animal speech to frame a 
philosophical dialogue, Lucian encourages further reflection on the attribution of 
language. The notion of animals being able to speak in human language is, to say the 
least, controversial among the philosophical schools,280 and its denial serves to 
highlight the superiority of humans over animals. With this in mind, it is possible to 
view the dialogue as criticising the contemporary philosophical symposium by 
manipulating the idea of the philosopher. Micyllus, the rooster’s interlocutor, enters a 
space wherein he must engage with ‘real’ philosophy in order to understand the truth. 
With this ‘real’ philosophy being spoken from the mouth of the rooster, Lucian creates 
a striking re-evaluation of this human-animal divide. The rooster, in this instance, is 
recast as a hybrid figure, having the body of a rooster, but the voice of a human. In 
direct contrast, however, is the foolish and ignorant human. I argue that through this 
dialogue, Lucian continues to manipulate the notion of hybridity as a means to solidify 
his critique of the contemporary, hybrid, philosopher-sophists. By portraying a 
                                               
280 A distinct outlier here is, unsurprisingly, the Cynics. The ‘dog’ philosophy is perhaps most well-
known for their rejection for the subordination of the animal, themselves viewing the life free of human 
greed to be inherently more virtuous (D.L. 6.2.22). For further discussion of the Cynic doctrine, and its 
relationship to Lucian’s own works, see the Introductory chapter.  See also J. Romm, “Dog-Heads and 
Noble Savages: Cynicism before the Cynics?” in The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its 
Legacy edited by R. Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996), 121–35. 
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successful hybrid, once again, the corrupted hybrid is shown to be of little worth, and 
an embarrassment to the true philosophy.  
 
Imitators of Human Speech  
 
In consideration of Lucian’s Gallus, which includes as one of its primary interlocutors 
a talking rooster, it is also useful to outline the presence of talking birds in the 
philosophical and literary texts of antiquity. The choice by Lucian to include a talking 
bird, as will be illuminated, is far from being unprecedented, however the means by 
which he engages with his predecessors deserves consideration. While Lucian’s 
speaking rooster has the power of speech on account of being the reincarnated form of 
Pythagoras, Lucian attributes speech to the rooster beyond a mere imitative capacity, 
reflecting upon the relationship between speech and intellect.  
Stoics were thus among the main opponents of animal reason and consequently 
of animal speech. However it is curious that the philosophical school gives some 
concession to birds, as Chrysippus is credited by Varro as likening the speech of birds 
to the speech of human children. “Ravens, crows, and boys making their first attempts 
to speak” do not truly speak (loqui), but merely quasi-speak (ut loqui) and thus are not 
talking (non loquuntur) (Varro, de Lingua Latina 6.56).281 Similarly, Aristotle 
considers birds to be distinct from other non-human animals in terms of their capacity 
for speech. Following his discussion of the physical requirements for eloquent speech, 
Aristotle states that “birds can utter a voice (φωνήν) and those which have a broad 
tongue can articulate (διάλεκτος) best, so too those that have a thin fine tongue.” (H.A. 
4.9.536a.20) However both Chrysippus and Aristotle agree that the speech of birds is 
not true human language; as Fögen observes, the parrot, despite having a tongue like a 
man “is grouped together with those animals that have a talent for imitation, the so-
called mimetika”282 (H.A. 8.12.597b). Birds’ capacity for speech, therefore, is either no 
more than child-like chatter devoid of meaning, or mere imitation of human language, 
yet they are nevertheless considered somewhat distinct from other non-human 
animals.283  
                                               
281 T. Fögen, ‘Animal Communication’, 221. 
282 T. Fögen, ‘Animal Communication’, 220.  
283 The human perception that birds are perhaps more like humans than other non-human animals is not 
restricted to ancient thought. Lingis aligns birds and humans by their physical stature, both being 
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In the literary sphere, birds appear as imitators of the human tongue in 
Aristophanes’ Birds, wherein the primary characters intend to meet with Tereus in his 
form as the hoopoe, who, despite his avian form, can speak with a human voice (Ar. 
Av. 92ff.). 284 Additionally, Tereus also claims to have taught the other birds language 
(φωνήν), making them no longer like barbarians. (Ar. Av. 200) Mahoney, who discusses 
the prevalence of language throughout the comedy, notes the birds’ linguistic 
characterisation. Significantly, when Peisthetairos convinces the birds to a course of 
action, he uses avian language285 consisting of vocabulary related to wings and flying, 
which is not unlike the bird characters’ imitative use of Greek language. Birds imitating 
human speech are also evidenced in 1st Century AD Latin poetry, largely in relation to 
parrots. Ovid’s Amores contains a eulogy to Corinna’s parrot, which is portrayed within 
the opening lines as imitatrix (Ov. Am. 2.6.1) Her parrot, Ovid states, is characterised 
as cleverly manipulating its voice, being a lover of speaking, and excelling all other 
birds in speaking (Ov. Am. 2.6.2). This prominence of the parrot’s mimicry is likewise 
found in Ovid’s literary successor Statius,286 wherein the dead bird is characterised as 
one who imitated cleverly the speech of humans. (Stat. 1.4.2; humanae sollers 
imitator...linguae) The notion of birds being able to imitate human speech is also a 
common trope in later texts; Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius tells of a young man who 
taught birds to speak like humans (VA. 6.36), Porphyry highlights human understanding 
of bird-speech as evidence of their logos (Porph. Abst. 3.3), Aelian notes that the jay in 
particular is especially proficient at imitating the human voice (Ael. NA. 4.19), and the 
parrot, according to Apuleius, imitates human speech with such precision that if one 
were to hear it, it would be considered human (Apul. Fl. 12). 
It is evident, therefore, that the speaking bird is common throughout the Graeco-
Roman world, and the overview above is by no means comprehensive. Each of these 
                                               
bipeds, yet also emphasises the “feats of intelligence and ingenuity performed by birds” as “of all the 
mammals, only humans are capable of anything remotely like them.” Drawing from modern sources, 
Lingis considers the similarity between birds and humans on the basis of their perception of space and 
self-awareness, and importantly, scientific inquiry’s wariness of deeming birds as intelligent in an 
attempt to steer away from anthropomorphising beasts. (A. Lingis, ‘Understanding Avian Intelligence’ 
in L. Simmon and P. Armstrong (Leiden: Brill, 2007) Leiden, 43-56, esp. 43, 45, 50.)  
284 Many of the bird-characters in the play largely speak Greek on account of narrative necessity. (B. 
Pütz, ‘Good to Laugh With’ in The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life edited 
by G. L. Campbell, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 64.) 
285 A. Mahoney, ‘Key Terms in “Birds”’, The Classical World 100:3 (2007): 274.  
286 Dietrich observes that it is this characterisation of the parrot as an imitator by Statius is a deliberate 
allusion to Ovid’s Amores, who himself is recollecting Catullus’ dead sparrow poem. (3) (J.S. Dietrich, 
‘Dead Parrots Society’ American Journal of Philology 123:1 (2002): 100).   
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authors, including Lucian, is undoubtedly using the speaking bird in the context of their 
own literary agenda. As will be explored, Lucian’s choice to reincarnate Pythagoras in 
the form of a speaking, articulate rooster similarly reflects his particular purposes in 
this dialogue. What is distinctly different in Lucian, however, is the portrayal of the 
speaking rooster as not imitating human language, but being able to speak it fluently 
and eloquently.  
The Philosophical Animal 
 
As evidenced above, speaking birds are largely attested in ancient literary sources as 
having an imitative capacity, and are not attributed with their own rational means to 
articulate speech. In Lucian’s Gallus, however, the bird is portrayed as not only having 
the capacity to speak human language, but this speech is not characterised as mere 
mimicry. The recently reincarnated Pythagoras acts as a plausible medium through 
which Lucian may portray his speaking bird, although it would not be unreasonable for 
an ordinary bird to speak with a human voice. 
Gallus is centred around a philosophical inquiry into the nature of wealth and 
relative happiness in life.287 The cobbler Micyllus wakes from a dream wherein he is 
shown an alternate lifestyle free of poverty, yet his blissful slumber is interrupted by 
the “piercing, full throated crow” (γεγωνὸς ἀναβοήσας Luc. Gall. 1.5) of the rooster. It 
is in this initial introduction that Lucian makes it clear that the crow of the rooster is 
distinct from the usual sound of birds. γεγωνός largely refers to the volume of sound 
that is produced, however it may also indicate how articulate the given sound is. 
Following Micyllus’ lament, however, the rooster replies, speaking Greek. The rooster 
explains that he is merely doing his job; the primary characterisation of the rooster is, 
of course, as a bird which crows in the morning. (Pliny. 10.24) 288 Nevertheless, he 
states that if Micyllus would prefer, he will be “much more mute than a fish”. (Luc. 
Gall. 1. 23-24 πολὺ ἀφωνότερος ...τῶν ἰχθύων) The rooster may choose to be silent, or 
to speak, which grants the bird conscious control over language. In the context of the 
Greek other, Heath notes control of one’s speech is crucial to understanding and 
                                               
287 See too, T. Hawkins, ‘Eloquent Alogia,’ 10, for discussion of Lucian’s Gallus dialogue in relation to 
animal speech.  
288 D. Thompson, ‘Glossary of Greek Birds’ 38. 
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utilising humanity.289 Spartan society, he argues, emphasises silence in comparison to 
Athenian loquaciousness, and the key to ensuring that the humanity of the Spartans 
remains intact rests upon their active restraint over speech, and not that their silence is 
enforced.290 From this basis, the rooster of Gallus is able to both speak and to maintain 
control over speech, imbuing the bird with one of the core features of humanity.  
Unsurprisingly, Micyllus expresses wonder at the rooster’s capacity for human 
speech. There is no suggestion that the rooster merely imitates human speech, only that 
the bird does indeed speak as a human, as indicated by Micyllus’ explicit description 
of his speech being delivered “humanly” (ἀνθρωπίνως). Micyllus’ astonished reaction 
to the speaking bird is met with the rooster’s disdain. Micyllus is characterised by the 
rooster as ἀπαίδευτος (uneducated) for not possessing knowledge of talking animals in 
the Greek past, thus already expressing the ignorance of his human interlocutor. 
Additionally, the rooster states that given the proximity in which the rooster lives to 
men, it would be easy for the bird “to learn the human language” (Gall. 2.25-26 
ἐκµαθήσεσθαι τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φωνήν). The rooster does not require instruction to learn 
human speech, but learns merely from exposure, and it would not be unreasonable for 
the rooster to pick up the odd phrase.  
However despite going to such lengths to justify the rooster’s capacity for 
speech, it is revealed to the audience that the rooster is endowed with speech on account 
of being the reincarnated Pythagoras. The rooster is able to speak (εἰπεῖν) with a 
common language (ὁµοφωνίας Luc. Gall. 4.13; 3.27-8) as he has the mind of a human: 
a far more plausible explanation for the uneducated cobbler. Thus the Lucianic rooster 
is explicitly characterised as having both the mind and voice of humans, but is merely 
lacking a human body. Consequently, if it looks like a rooster and walks like a rooster, 
it could in fact be a philosopher. 
Pythagoras as Rooster  
 
The rooster’s capacity for speech, therefore, is primarily as a result of its Pythagorean 
and importantly human soul, however the rooster’s intrinsic qualities are nevertheless 
shown to enhance the plausibility of the bird’s loquacious nature. Yet despite having 
                                               
289 J. Heath, The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals and the other in Homer, Aeschlyus and Plato, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 32.  
290 J. Heath, The Talking Greeks, 183-4.  
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the mind and voice of the human philosopher Pythagoras, the rooster no longer 
identifies as human. Pythagoras’ identification as first and foremost a rooster raises a 
number of questions about the dialogue itself, and its presentation of philosophical 
discourse. Since alektruo-Pythagoras considers himself to be more alektruo than 
Pythagoras, the audience is arguably exposed more to a speaking animal than a 
reincarnatedpphilosopher.291 
 Having established that Micyllus’ interlocutor is in fact Pythagoras, Micyllus is 
faced with a dilemma. He questions alektruo-Pythagoras’ non-compliance with 
Pythagorean principles, stating that either the figure is in fact not the reincarnated 
Pythagoras, or that he has been exposed more to a speaking animal than a reincarnated 
philosopher, as he longer identifies as human. Yet alektruo-Pythagoras has not 
committed any punishable act. The adoption of bean eating is justified on account of 
his form as a rooster. Pythagoras asserts that he used to be a philosopher (ἐφιλοσόφουν), 
but now that he is in the form of a rooster, he lives in the manner of birds, and thus the 
consumption of beans is no longer forbidden (Gall. 5.3-5). 292  If Pythagoras’ form 
determines the validity of his actions, then as a rooster, new laws apply.293 
 It should briefly be noted that Micyllus also identifies alektruo-Pythagoras’ 
loquaciousness as in defiance of Pythagorean philosophy. Pythagoras, according to 
Micyllus, “recommended silence for five whole years”, and since he is presently “noisy 
and loud voiced” he surely cannot be Pythagoras himself. This contrast of silence and 
speaking, contained not only in a dialogue but in a dialogue concerned with 
unconventional speech, encourages reflection upon Micyllus’ criticism. Alektruo-
Pythagoras does not provide a justification to this supposed violation of Pythagorean 
                                               
291 This insistence by alektruo-Pythagoras on being viewed by his interlocutor as a rooster suggests in 
some ways that the chosen ‘title’ reflects the individual’s chosen ‘way of life’. In embracing aspects of 
the Cynic doctrine, namely the dismissal of wealth (Gall. 15), it is also possible to view Pythagoras as 
not only converting to his rooster life, but also the Cynic lifestyle.  
292 The comparative gravity of these two actions, as Harmon has determined, finds its origins in a 
Pythagorean fragment that likens the eating of beans to eating the heads of your parents. (Gall. 4.31, 
n.2; H. Diels and W. Kranz. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker Volume One, (Dublin and Zürich: 
Weidmann, 1952) 96-105). 
293 It is useful to consider this contrast of human laws and animal laws in the context of Aristophanes’ 
Clouds. Drawing to the conclusion of the play, the rooster is characterised by its inclination to ‘defend’ 
itself, or use force against its father. The characterisation acts as a justification for the actions of 
Pheidippides in the comedy, for since such an action is common to all animals, it is not unjust for him 
to treat his own father, Strepsiades, in such a way (Arist. Nu. 1420ff.). While the Clouds is focussed 
more upon questioning the Socratic ideals, it is on account of Pheidippides’ time in the Thinkery that 
he is able to profess such an argument.  Pythagoras has also encountered a transformation which affects 
his ideals. The most forbidden action, as bad as doing harm to one’s own parents, is of no consequence, 
as he is now exempt from the Pythagorean ruling principles – perhaps even to the extent that he has 
adopted the Cynic lifestyle instead.  
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philosophy, as it was during his life as Pythagoras, that he was silent. Additionally, as 
Pythagorean silence was largely intended as an exercise in self-control,294 alektruo-
Pythagoras’ assertion that he would be mute if Micyllus preferred rather emphasises 
his capacity for such. Thus, alektruo-Pythagoras’ form again determines his actions, 
and arguably, in the context of anthropocentric philosophical discourse, sets up the 
notion of contest through Micyllus’ questioning. 
Pythagoras’ connection to his rooster form is also emphasised towards the end 
of the dialogue. Micyllus does not consistently refer to alektruo-Pythagoras as one or 
the other, but instead switches between his mode of address indiscriminately, until such 
time as he explicitly asks Pythagoras “what he likes best to be called” (Gall. 20.18). 
Pythagoras’ response confirms his self-identification as a rooster, as he states: “You 
had better called me what you now see me to be, a rooster” (Gall. 20.22-23). 
Pythagoras’ preference to be called ‘ἀλεκτρυόν’ encourages a reflection upon 
perceiving the mind of the non-human animal; the rooster, he states, is a bird that 
already seems to be of little value (Gall. 20. 25) and he does not wish to deprive it of 
its capacity to embody many souls, these being the rooster’s previous incarnations. For 
all intents and purposes, alektruo-Pythagoras considers himself to be a rooster, despite 
retaining the memory of his previous existences.  
 
Philosophical truth? 
 
It is alektruo-Pythagoras’ previous lives that is the focus of the remaining narrative. 
Despite identifying as the rooster at this present time, alektruo-Pythagoras nevertheless 
retains memory of his previous incarnations. It is worth digressing briefly to examine 
these various existences, given alektruo-Pythagoras’ identification as all of these forms 
in the physical body of one.  
 Prior to his incarnations as both Pythagoras and a rooster, his soul was first 
embodied in the form of Apollo.295 While his story is apparently both forbidden for him 
                                               
294 See Iamblichus, Vita Pyth. XVII.  
295 The rooster as an oracular bird is not a common association among ancient literary sources, and thus 
the association of the prophetic Apollo with the rooster is likely part of the joke. While Lucian’s own 
de Dea Syria speaks of a sacred rooster utilised during a particular festival, it is not chosen for any 
talents in divination. Pliny makes mention of certain breeds of roosters that give “the most favourable 
omens” (tripudia solistima) by means of eating grain, and states that their crows foretell victories or 
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to tell and would be too long, (Gall. 16) the indirect association of the rooster with 
Apollo is nevertheless a crucial detail of the text. As Marcovich notes, the inclusion of 
the soul’s previous incarnation as Apollo provides a reasoning behind Lucian’s choice 
to figure the soul of Pythagoras in the form of a rooster.296 By utilising already 
established notions of the three figures being associated in one way or another, not only 
do the memories of Pythagoras remain embodied in the rooster, but also the memories 
of Apollo. The rooster, usually a lowly animal, becomes heightened to both a god and 
esteemed philosopher. 
Having originated in Apollo, the soul of alektruo-Pythagoras entered the body 
of Euphorbus, the Trojan hero, who was killed by Menelaus.297 (Gall. 16) Following 
this incarnation, he transmigrated into the form of Pythagoras (Gall. 18), and then the 
courtesan of Miletus, Aspasia (Gall. 19). Afterwards, he was the Cynic Crates, and then 
lists his many and varied forms: a king, a poor man, a satrap, a horse, a jackdaw and a 
frog. It is only recently that he has become a rooster, and it is only recently that he has 
been able to do anything more than crow (Gall. 14). Lucian’s specific choice of a 
rooster as the speaking, reincarnated form of Pythagoras is curious in the context of his 
previous souls. Through the dialogue’s presentation of the rooster’s past lives, the 
audience is presented with an immortal, humbled and educated soul with which 
Micyllus may speak with.  
 
It is now necessary to consider the philosophical implications of presenting an animal, 
albeit in reincarnated form, as a figure who may educate and enlighten a human 
interlocutor in the essence of a Cynic doctrine. Having lived through many forms, 
                                               
losses (Pliny 2.24.49). Cicero, in his de Divinatione however, denies the rooster’s capacity for such 
portents, given the evidently arbitrary nature of the bird’s crows (Cicero, Div. 2.26). The rooster, 
therefore, could hardly be considered a traditionally oracular bird. 
296 As Marcovich has explored, Lucian’s choice to portray the Pythagorean soul in the form of a rooster 
goes beyond being a continuation of the Cynic trope of having an animal as protagonist. He asserts that 
such a choice aims to emphasise the threefold link between the rooster, the philosopher and the divinity 
Apollo and their shared oracular capacities. Marcovich states that the prophetic rooster is indicated in 
two passages of Gallus following his assertion of an Apollonian soul. Here, alektruo-Pythagoras 
reveals his knowledge of Micyllus’ past and future forms (M. Marcovich, ‘Pythagoras as Cock’ The 
American Journal of Philology 97:4 (1976): 331-335; Gall. 16.10; 19.20); Micyllus was once an Indian 
ant, and he will undoubtedly at one point be in the form of a woman. This reference to Indian ants and 
a transitioning into a woman can be viewed in the context of Herodotus respectively, with the ‘ant’s so 
called desire for gold (Hdt. 3.102) reflecting upon Plato’s failure to control emotions in his Timaeus 
(Pl. Tim. 41e3–42d2). 
297 For a discussion of Pythagoras’ reincarnation as Euphorbus, see M. Hendry. ‘Pythagoras’ Previous 
Parents: Why Euphorbos?’, Mnemosyne,vol. 48.2 (1995): 210-211. 
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alektruo-Pythagoras may express first hand to the wealth-hungry Micyllus that it is in 
fact a more pleasant life in poverty. It is shown to Micyllus that those whom he envies 
live in fear of their wealth being taken from them, and despite their wealth are ill-fated 
(κακοδαίµων). In times of war, the poor may flee easily while the rich are burdened 
with responsibilities and possessions (Gall. 21); wealth and power, as alektruo-
Pythagoras has learned first-hand, is filled with “many vexations and torments” (Gall. 
24) while the poor man does not fear his wealth being stolen (Gall. 22).  
The sentiment that poverty is far more desirable than wealth is of course not 
innovative in Lucian’s dialogue. Most famously, Xenophon’s Symposium outlines such 
an idea through the characters of Charmides and Antisthenes, through their respective 
pride in poverty and wealth. The Cynic Antisthenes reveals that he takes pride in wealth 
of the soul through an attitude of sufficiency of wealth. Greed and excess are the 
characteristics that define bad wealth, as a desire for more than is sufficient results in 
an absence of virtue (Xen. Symp. 4.34-44). Conversely, Charmides’ assertion that 
poverty is more worthy of pride rests upon the same concerns addressed by alektruo-
Pythagoras in the Gallus dialogue. Poverty, states Charmides, is free from the fears and 
doubt that come with wealth, and it is only through his new-found life in poverty that 
he has achieved a virtuous existence (4. 29-33). If Xenophon’s Symposium may be 
viewed as a marker of “literary symposium tradition” not unlike Plato’s,298 the 
repetition of such a philosophical point in Lucian’s text deserves further analysis. His 
engagement with the sympotic ideal of Plato’s symposium through the dismissal of 
wealth clearly offers a reflection upon contemporary philosophy, in a not dissimilar 
way to that shown in Lucian’s own Symposium dialogue. Once again, Lucian presents 
the disconnect of contemporary philosophy and acquisition of wisdom through a 
comparison between a hybrid animal and a human character. The dialogue imagines an 
animal hybrid who is superior in wisdom to the human interlocutor, suggesting the low 
point to which humanity has sunk and the possibility that a non-human animal, albeit a 
special one, could perhaps do better. 
 
To return then, to the era of the Golden Age and the Aesopic fable. The rooster appears 
frequently in the fable, however it is one fable in particular that is the focus for the 
following discussion due to its emphasis upon contest. Fable 5 of Babrius (Perry 281) 
                                               
298 J. König, Saints and Symposiasts, 11. 
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relates the story of two fighting roosters of Tanagra. When one was defeated, it hid, 
while the other flapped and crowed victoriously, alerting the attention of a passing eagle 
that swooped it. Here, the rooster’s crow is associated with victory, however it is the 
rooster’s excessive pride that brings its downfall. It is interesting that the roosters of 
Tanagra were known specifically for their skills in fighting, as Pausanias outlines in his 
description of the region (9.22.4), and that it is specifically Tanagran roosters that are 
indicated in Lucian’s Gallus. Micyllus asks of alektruo-Pythagoras the means by which 
he became a rooster instead of a man, specifically defining him as a Tanagriote, from 
which it is not unreasonable to assert that Lucian is evoking the fighting qualities of the 
rooster in the context of dialogue. Such an interpretation is solidified through the 
broader message of the Lucianic dialogue, as the contest between the openly victorious 
rooster and the defeated rooster may be compared to the contest between the rich and 
the poor. 
If it is possible to view the Gallus dialogue as alluding to the Aesopic Golden 
age in terms of animal speech and characteristics, it is worthwhile to turn again to 
Plato’s Golden age, and the immaterial wealth that is to be gained by having the 
capacity to speak with animals. Once Micyllus has seen the way in which the rich live, 
he no longer considers wealth to be desirable. Rather, two obols are a fortune to him, 
and it can be concluded that he now believes alektruo-Pythagoras’ assertion that he 
should consider his lot to be “immeasurably happier” (εὐδαιµονέστερον) than that of 
those with wealth. Micyllus’ now enlightened disposition has come as a result of 
philosophical conversation with the non-human animal, and thus the Gallus dialogue 
proves that indeed, humans may be immeasurably happier by being able to speak with 
animals. The hybrid alektruo-Pythagoras, rather than representing corruption between 
two forms, offers an arguably natural perspective upon human existence. While on the 
surface Micyllus speaks with the reincarnated Pythagoras, alektruo-Pythagoras 
nevertheless embodies a hybrid of forms, and himself identifies as a rooster.  
 
This notion of contest thus becomes one of the core features of the dialogue. Dierauer 
does note that this expression of preference over the less appealing lifestyle acts as 
something of a trope among Cynic authors, with specific reference to Plutarch’s Gryllus 
dialogue.299 The character of Gryllus, a man turned pig, undoubtedly prefers the life of 
                                               
299 U. Dierauer, Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike (Amsterdam: Verlag B.R. Grüner, 1977) 191.  
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an animal to the life of man, at one point expressing that he no longer has any care for 
gold or wealth (Plut. Gryll. 989D).300 While Lucian’s Gallus does not express any 
notion of considering the life of the animal to be superior to the life of man, the 
emphasis is nevertheless upon a simple, Cynic disposition. This emphasis upon the 
simple life over the extravagant has further implications through alektruo-Pythagoras’ 
mythological parallel, representing the turning point in Micyllus’ education. “Some of 
them [humans]” alektruo-Pythagoras says, are like Icarus, in that they have let their 
“ambitions soar high in the air” and will fall downwards into the sea, while others are 
more like Daedalus, who keep their ambitions close to the earth (Gall. 23). It is hardly 
a stretch to see the way in which this notion of ambition becomes a direct parallel to 
the hybridity of the philosopher-sophists, the wealth driven, hybrid Icarus being shown 
to have no true regard to the attainment of wisdom. In direct contrast, the hybrid figure 
of Daedalus represents self-control and temperance. By employing the form of the 
rooster as the hybrid speaking animal, or the Daedalus in this context, the perception of 
intellect becomes a core consideration for the dialogue. A rooster, albeit one that speaks 
as the reincarnated Pythagoras becomes a true source of wisdom, while the seemingly 
capable human, merely wishes to appear of worth, and is in fact, ignorant in his speech 
and actions.  
 
In conclusion, it is useful to return to Porphyry. Animals are said to speak a peculiar 
language, and human incomprehension of their speech is not a result of animals lacking 
language. Micyllus, in Lucian’s Gallus, despite his initial surprise, comes to 
acknowledge the multi-faceted nature of his loquacious rooster. Given that it is also 
noted that alektruo-Pythagoras could not always speak to Micyllus, the audience is 
arguably faced with a philosophical problem, one that mirrors the Porphyrian 
assertions. Although the animal may not speak, it is an insufficient basis from which to 
draw conclusions about its intellectual capacity. While Lucian’s take on the 
philosophical talking animal is, at its heart, a satirical text, it should not be ignored that 
the primary object of this satire is the anthropocentric actions of mankind, and a 
perspective that ignores the position of humans as one type of animal among others. In 
the Golden Age, speech was universal, yet the arrogance of the beasts robbed them of 
                                               
300 Plutarch’s dialogue provides reason to animals, expressly rejecting human superiority, and 
Odysseus’ ability to converse with the transformed pig is also given a ‘rational’ reason: Circe’s magic. 
(985Bff.) 
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their speech. Human arrogance too, threatens to rob them; the wealthy characters of 
Lucian’s Gallus live in constant fear of having their riches stolen. The human 
preoccupation with wealth precisely reflects the actions of the contemporary 
philosopher-sophists. Rather than embracing a simpler life as a means to gain virtue 
and wisdom, they are shown to be unable to detach themselves from human concerns. 
However Lucian’s Gallus offers a comparative perspective upon such an existence, 
showing that through an interaction with the race of animals, in this case a hybrid 
rooster and Pythagoras, it is indeed possible to embrace a more natural and uncorrupted 
existence. The dialogue reflects upon the ideals and possibilities of the Golden Age, 
directly dismissing the contemporary philosophers as having any capacity to reach the 
heights of virtue that was once afforded philosophical inquiry. As with the Aesopic 
fable, the figure of uncontrolled speech (or crowing, in this case) in victory does not 
emerge victorious. The true victor recognises the importance of self-control and the 
dangers of flying too close to the sun as a corrupted hybrid. The true, successful hybrid, 
as will be shown in the following chapter, is once again achievable through a dismissal 
or rejection of human arrogance. Rather than flying too close to the sun, and getting 
burned, the character of Icaromenippus presents a successful hybrid that displaces the 
false knowledge of the corrupted philosopher-sophists.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 129 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four 
 
Viewing from Above with Icaromenippus and 
Charon  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 130 
I'm tired of this Earth, these people. I'm tired of being caught in the tangle 
of their lives. 
We gaze continually at the world and it grows dull in our perceptions. Yet 
seen from another's vantage point, as if new, it may still take the breath 
away. 
Dr. Manhattan, Alan Moore’s Watchmen  
  
 
Hadot, in his essay entitled ‘The View From Above’, contemplates the philosophical 
and literary trope of positioning a character from a higher vantage point. Crucially, he 
observes that in addition to showing us a vision of the world as harmonious, “the view 
from above can also be directed pitilessly upon mankind’s weaknesses and 
shortcomings.”301 This characteristic of viewing from above is the focus of the 
following discussion, as it is argued that Lucian utilises the trope as literary tool to 
underpin both the weaknesses of mankind, and of the philosopher-sophists.  In his 
essay, Hadot includes two Lucianic dialogues, these being Icaromenippus and Charon. 
Both of these, he argues, epitomise the relationship that viewing from above has with 
the Cynic doctrine, due to the focus upon humanity’s “earthly existence.”302 These two, 
along with Lucian’s True Histories, position the primary narrator high above the human 
sphere, allowing the narrator (and the audience) to look down upon the entirety of 
humanity. In Lucian’s two dialogues, his characters reach a vantage point through what 
may be termed ‘non-philosophical methods,’ presenting them as literally moving 
upwards rather than a simple philosophical ascent. Consequently, it becomes clear that 
the philosopher-sophists have quite literally blinded both themselves and humanity 
through their false professions of wisdom, as their philosophical methods are no longer 
effective, nor are they needed. The view from above reveals a new perspective on the 
hybridity of sophists. By positioning his characters upon an elevated point, Lucian’s 
commentary upon sophistic untruths is projected on a more expansive scale, allowing 
his characters to see with complete clarity the false professions of wisdom that the 
philosopher-sophists espouse. Moreover, the characters who view the world from 
above take on the characteristics of creatures who more normally inhabit the higher 
regions, becoming in this regard hybrids themselves. Once again, Lucian uses the theme 
                                               
301 P. Hadot and M. Chase (tr.), Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to 
Foucault (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) 245.  
302 P. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 246. 
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of the hybrid in varying ways so as to formulate and construct his critique. In 
Icaromenippus, the figure of Menippus ascends to the heavens, and Charon journeys to 
the human sphere from the underworld. In travelling to these places, the characters in 
question are shown to modify themselves or to enlist the aid of external forces, 
becoming a mixture of human, animal and god through the acquisition of divine or 
bestial abilities. Through such a vantage point, the day-to-day existence of humanity 
and their widespread concern with reputation may be viewed with clarity, and once 
again we return to the theme of greed, wealth and the corrupting forces of the 
philosopher-sophists (Icar. 21). In the following chapter, it is shown how Lucian 
utilises hybridity and its many functions to further his critique of the philosopher-
sophists, although this time by literally looking down upon them.303  
 
In what follows, Lucian’s use of Platonic allusion in these two dialogues will also be 
discussed, as it aids in identifying his inclusion of animals in these texts as a means of 
commenting on the corrupted nature of the philosopher-sophists. Notions of the ascent 
of the soul are found throughout the Platonic corpus, especially in the Phaedrus and 
Republic. The notion of the soul’s ascent is not limited to Platonic thought,304 though 
due to the prevalence of Platonic modes of thought during Lucian’s time it is useful to 
consider this trope of ascent in such a context. With such an approach in mind, it is 
possible to view Lucian’s use of Platonic modes of thought being reflected here. As has 
been shown in Chapter Two the Platonic model of distinguishing between the 
philosopher and the sophist serves well to highlight the notions of corruption that 
Lucian presents in his dialogues. It is thus argued that a similar model is utilised through 
the act of positioning his characters as ascending to the skies, wholly with the intent to 
highlight the failings of these false philosophers. With this in mind, it will be useful to 
re-consider notions of reincarnation and the passage of the soul that were discussed in 
the previous chapter. The ascent of the soul, in the Platonic doctrine, is not dissimilar 
to the conception of the soul as travelling through various reincarnations, aligning 
somewhat the Platonic ascent with Stoic and Epicurean philosophical principles. 
                                               
303 Due to space constraints, a discussion of the two companion dialogues, The Downward Journey and 
Nekyomanteia are not considered here. In these dialogues, Lucian position his characters below the 
earth, however the effect is not dissimilar. Here, as in Dialogues of the Dead, the sheer futility of 
humanity’s concern for wealth is once again discussed, and particularly in the context of the 
Nekyomanteia this comes as a result of philosophical corruption. 
304 P. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 242.  
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Lucian’s dialogues utilise the traditional tenets of various philosophical schools 
through the theme of ascent, directing his criticism towards the contemporary 
philosophers. By being able to view the truths of humanity from above, he questions 
how it is that these sophists, with their false proclamations of knowledge, are able to 
ascend, if they have not yet learned to fly.  
 
Ascent as a Literary Trope 
 
The charioteer myth in Plato’s Phaedrus describes the the nature of the soul, and its 
journey towards ascent. When the soul is “perfect and fully winged,” states Socrates, 
“the soul mounts upwards and governs the whole world” (Pl. Phdr. 246B.7-C.1-2). In 
order to ascend, the wings of the soul must be nurtured by becoming fine, wise and 
good (246B.1-2), and must reach the peak of embodied existence by becoming a 
philosopher. The soul, in Phaedrus, is comprised of a charioteer and two horses, and 
while the souls of the gods are led by two good horses, the souls of both daimones and 
humans have both a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ horse, the bad having the capacity to bring the 
soul down from the heavens305 (247C ff.). While composed with a slightly different 
philosophical agenda, themes of ascent can also be found in The Republic, wherein the 
dialogue discussing the Cave analogy explores the necessity for ascent and descent to 
produce an adequate governing ruler. (Pl. R. 514ff.) In a similar manner to the 
Phaedrus, the philosopher-ruler must ascend to gain the truth, only to imprison the 
enlightened soul in the human world again for the greater benefit of the citizens.  Plato’s 
suggestion that truth and wisdom exist above the human (or present) sphere pervades 
well into the philosophical discourse of the Roman Empire; Socrates, states Cicero in 
his Tusculan Disputations, “was the first to call philosophy down from the heavens and 
set her in the cities of men” (Cic. Tusc. 4.12ff.), largely aligning with the procedure 
prescribed to rulers in accordance with the Platonic ideal. 
 
Ascent to the heavens as a means to gain wisdom, or as result of the highest attainment 
of virtue and wisdom,306 was clearly a pervasive and common trope for the Platonic 
doctrine and its adherents. In the context of Platonic dialogues, there is little doubt 
                                               
305 D.D. McGibbon, ‘The Fall of the Soul in Plato’s Phaedrus’, Classical Quarterly 14:1 (1964): 56. 
306 J. M. Armstrong, ‘After the Ascent: Plato on Becoming Like God,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy 26 (2004): 171-183.  
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among scholars that Lucian was inspired by both the style and subject matter of the 
Platonic dialogues in his construction of his satirical works.307 At the forefront of many 
of these discussions are Lucian’s Symposium, or the Lapiths, which has been 
extensively discussed in Chapter Two. However the Platonic influence has been shown 
to present itself in a number308 of other Lucianic dialogues, namely Philopseudes and 
the Verae Historiae. Given the prevalence of Platonic allusions in Lucian’s works, it is 
not unreasonable to consider that the notion of ascent to the heavens found in Plato’s 
Phaedrus and Republic is employed by Lucian in his two satirical dialogues 
Icaromenippus and Charon. With the Platonic model in mind, it is thus possible to 
engage with the philosophical contest that Lucian obliquely presents in the two 
dialogues.  Philosophers and their opposing doctrines are criticised throughout the 
Lucianic corpus, including Icaromenippus and Charon. Menippus and Charon 
respectively are portrayed as characters who ascend beyond their traditional realm so 
as to gain a greater knowledge of truth. However in contrast to the Platonic model, their 
ascent is carried out not by the enlightened soul, but in a physical body, implicitly 
questioning the Platonic belief of ascent being restricted to the souls of philosophers. 
Lucian revises the Platonic grading of souls, proposing that philosophers are not the 
pinnacle of knowledge and enlightenment. The elitism and superiority of the 
philosopher-sophists is shown to be entirely unfounded, and the corruption that 
permeates the hybrid philosopher is revealed to have similarly corrupted non-elites 
alike.  
 
Icaromenippus and Charon 
 
Lucian’s two dialogues, Icaromenippus and Charon, transport their primary characters 
from the human world and the Underworld respectively, and offer a perspective upon 
                                               
307 R.B. Branham, Unruly Eloquence: Lucian and the Comedy of Traditions (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1989); A. Laird, ‘Fiction as a Discourse of Philosophy in Lucian’s Verae Historiae’ 
in The Ancient Novel and Beyond, edited by S. Panayotakis, M. Zimmerman, W. Keulen (Leiden: Brill, 
2003) Leiden, 115-128; K. ní Mheallaigh ‘Plato was not alone there…: Platonic presences in Lucian’ 
Hermathena 179 (2005): 89-103.  
308 For further discussion on the Platonic allusions in Lucian, and the broader consideration of Lucian’s 
use of the Platonic/Menippean genres, see K. ní Mheallaigh, ‘Lucien et l’astropoétique: le voyage à 
travers les genres’ (tr. A. Billault), in E. Marquis and A. Billault (eds.) Mixis: le mélange des genres 
chez Lucien de Samosate (Paris: Demopolis, 2018) 49-69 and W.H. Tackaberry, ‘Lucian’s Relation to 
Plato and the Post-Aristotelian Philosophers’, University of Toronto Studies, Philological Series 9 
(1930).  
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the world from above. In the following section, it will be argued that the means and 
motivations of their ascent are crucial features of these satirical dialogues. 
Dissatisfaction with the current state of philosophy encourages the two primary 
characters in each text to seek out wisdom without the aid of the so-called philosophers, 
and to instead utilise elements of the natural world in order to see the world clearly, in 
this case, from above. This interaction with nature, as will be shown, is constructed in 
direct opposition to the wholly unnatural desires of the human race, which are 
attributed to the corrupting force of contemporary philosophy. Once again, Lucian 
interacts with the Aesopic tradition and the implications of such a tradition upon 
perceptions on elite and non-elite culture, positioning his characters in the midst of this 
literary and social divide. Lucian addresses this divide and creates characters who are 
positioned in a hybrid space. The Lucianic hybrids, quite literally occupying the 
interspace between the high and the low, are shown to be wiser than the philosopher-
sophists, and despite traversing beyond their proper boundaries, are portrayed as neither 
corrupt, nor representative of claims to false wisdom. 
Lucian’s Icaromenippus features the Cynic Menippus, who “found that all 
human things were amusing, weak and fickle” and sought out the philosophers so as to 
understand the meaning of the universe (Icar. 4ff.). However Menippus discovers that 
the philosophers, despite their professions of wisdom, were no less ignorant than 
himself and what’s more, their “statements were contradictory and inconsistent” (Icar. 
5). 309 Menippus thus resolves to fly to the Heavens himself, as the human sphere has 
failed to provide him with any truth (Icar. 10). Menippus, over the course of his journey 
is able to see the life of humanity in full detail from above, and comes to understand 
the extent of human greed and their concern with reputation. Similarly, Charon opens 
with the Ferryman of the Underworld himself who, travels to the human world to “see 
what it is like in life” in order to understand why it is that they grieve upon joining him 
in the underworld (Char. 1). Charon wishes to be shown all of that which resides above 
Hades, and implores Hermes to act as his guide to the human world. Hermes suggests 
that they find a high vantage point from which to view the world below. The dialogue 
                                               
309 The notion that ‘those with a reputation for wisdom’, (τινα τῶν δοκούτων σοφῶν εἶναι, Pl. Ap. 
21.B11) in all their professions of wisdom, are in fact not wise on the basis that they falsely think 
themselves to have knowledge is a core theme of Plato’s Apology. As has been shown in previous 
chapters, this concern with distinguishing between those with a reputation for philosophy, and those 
who should be considered a ‘proper’ philosopher was not an uncommon trope for authors of the 
Second Sophistic.   
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acts as a commentary upon the nature of human existence, and the way in which, when 
viewed from above, the actions and beliefs of men are entirely foolish, given that one’s 
wealth and status while living do not have any influence in death.  
The two texts therefore are undoubtedly concerned with presenting an external 
view of humanity and human desires. Moreover, close analysis of the two texts suggests 
that the link between them goes beyond their similar overarching theme. The two 
characters both recognise that knowledge and wisdom are reliant upon a form of ascent, 
and the need to ascend above their realm implies the absence of wisdom in the mortal 
realm. The two primary characters do not achieve their enlightenment through what 
may be considered ‘traditional’ means – by engaging with philosophers. The use of 
animals and the natural world in the texts brings into question the role of Lucian’s 
contemporary philosophers, and enhances their inherent ineffectiveness. Once again, 
this interaction with the natural world evokes the era of Aesop and the Golden Age, 
allowing for Lucian to reflect upon the starkly dissimilar capacity for knowledge that 
is offered during his time. The perceived superiority of human knowledge310 does not 
reflect reality, but rather serves to highlight the inferiority of the contemporary 
philosopher-sophists.   
 
 
Means of Ascent and Sharp-Sight 
 
In the two dialogues discussed, it is important to consider the means by which the 
respective characters are able to ascend. Given the dismissal of the philosopher-sophists 
as a source of wisdom, it is pivotal that the protagonists of these dialogues instead 
choose to interact with the natural world and literary precedent in order to ascend to 
inhuman heights, engaging with Golden Age idealism in favour of contemporary 
reality. In the context of Icaromenippus, Menippus is inspired by the works of Aesop, 
                                               
310 A. Georgiadou and D.H.J Larmour note that Icaromenippus is one of many Lucianic works that 
deals with the notion of ascending towards knowledge. They highlight the passage in Astrology 
wherein Lucian takes note of those who sought knowledge from the world above (Astrol. 13-19); The 
Dream, wherein Lucian himself flies about the world in a winged vehicle (Somn. 13-15) and notably 
the instance in the VH where the travellers visit the moon and are met by Endymion. (VH. 1.11) The 
implication of philosophical parody that they note in these works (see also Hermotimus) and others 
arguably solidifies the following proposal that Icaromenippus and Charon are texts that reject 
philosophical superiority. (A. Georgiadou, D.H.J Larmour, ‘Lucian’s “Verae Historiae” as 
Philosophical Parody’ Hermes 126:3 (1998): 315-317, n.18) See too A. Billault, ‘L’optique de Lucien,’ 
Bulletin de l’Association Guillaume Budé 1 (2018) 72-88. 
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as he deduces that acquiring animal wings would be the means to get to the Heavens 
on the basis that “he [Aesop] makes Heaven accessible to eagles and beetles and now 
and then even to camels” (Icar. 10; Perry 135; 117).311 Yet where the Icaromenippus 
motivates the character’s ascent to the heavens on the basis of dissatisfaction with 
philosophers, Charon is based more on notions of curiosity. The motivation for 
Charon’s ascent derives from Charon’s own confusion regarding the superficial desires 
of humankind, and the recognition of a lack of wisdom in the world below becomes 
clear only following the ascent. The consideration that the two dialogues engage with 
notions of inhuman ascent is nevertheless crucial in considering the overall goals of the 
dialogues.  Charon, in a similar fashion to Menippus, gains the required vantage point 
based on precedent set out in the poetry of Homer, as the sons of Aloeus, Otus and 
Ephialtes, are presented as proving that the mountains can be stacked on top of one 
another to reach the Heavens’ vantage point (Cont. 3 ff; Od. 11.305 ff). These two 
particular means of ascent engage heavily with the literary tradition, and provide a 
believable process by which the characters are able to see the world from above. It is 
also significant, however, that both dialogues deal with the question of how to see from 
above, with the characters’ capacity for sight being insufficient to see clearly from such 
heights. Once again, this is rectified by reference to literary tradition and by means of 
the natural world; Menippus is taught to use his newly acquired wings in order to obtain 
the excellence in sight that is attributed to the eagle (Icar. 14ff.), and Charon once again 
uses the verses of Homer to “lift the veil” from his eyes (Cont. 7; Il. 5.127). This use of 
the natural world and literary precedent serves to further solidify Lucian’s critique of 
the pseudo-philosophers. In exceeding their traditional boundaries as a means to gain 
wisdom, the two characters take on something of a hybrid function, not only through 
their capacity to exist in two distinctly different spheres, but also through their adoption 
of inhuman or otherworldly characteristics in order to facilitate such movement. Their 
enlightened position following their respective excursions to the world above serves to 
present them as successful Lucianic hybrids, becoming something improved through 
the joining of two halves. In direct contrast, once again, the hybrid philosopher-sophist 
is positioned metaphorically and literally below the successfully hybridised characters. 
                                               
311 Lucian here is referring to two extant Aesopic fables. The first, The Eagle and the Dung-Beetle 
details a disagreement between the Eagle and the Dung-Beetle, wherein the two animals are able to go 
to the Heavens and speak to Zeus himself in order to find a solution. (Perry, 3) The second involves the 
Camel going to Zeus to protest his lack of physical defences in comparison to other animals, and is 
punished for his ungratefulness by being forever endowed with small ears (Perry 117). 
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As will be shown in both this and the following chapter, the hybridity of the world 
below comes to have a direct effect upon the world above, with Lucian proposing that 
the philosopher-sophists have even corrupted the heavens.  
 
Icaromenippus  
 
In Lucian’s Icaromenippus, the title character of Menippus makes his ascent to the 
heavens by attaching to himself a wing of an eagle, and a wing of a vulture.312 The main 
function of the eagle in the dialogue is to facilitate Menippus’ ascent, and subsequently 
grant him clear vision. The eagle, states Aelian, is the ὀρνίθων ὀξυωπέστατος, and may 
be used by men to improve their own eyesight. This is achieved, states Aelian, by 
creating a mixture of an eagle’s gall and honey (Ael. NA. 1.42). The bird is thus a clear 
choice for Lucian’s Menippus, on the basis of his own acquisition of sharp sight later 
in the text, which is attributed to his use of the eagle wing (Icar. 14). In the context of 
the choice to combine the eagle and the vulture, it should be noted that it is not unheard 
of to have eagles and vultures paired in the same narrative, to the extent that ἀετός could 
be used to denote the vulture.313 While vultures appear in a number of Homeric 
instances with reference to devoted parenthood, Heath notes that vultures and eagles 
                                               
312 In the surviving corpus of Aesop’s fables, the eagle appears frequently, often as a peripheral 
character representing strength and contest (Perry 22; 51; 507). These particular Aesopic fables reflect 
upon the notion of the inferior party defeating the supposedly superior party (Perry 135; 1), with the 
eagle often taking the role of the superior. One fable is of note here, as it features the crow deceiving 
the unsuspecting eagle through its capacity for trickery and deception (The Eagle and the Crow, Perry 
490).  This notion of the crow representing the trickster is repeated elsewhere in the fable collection, as 
in Perry 453, The Crow, the Eagle and the Feathers, a re-telling of the familiar Jackdaw fable (Perry 
101) discussed in Chapter One. However in this fable, the crow’s tricks are revealed, and despite 
attempting to deceive the other birds with his appearance, he is instead humiliated. The likeness of the 
crow’s failed deception to the hybrid philosopher-sophists has been discussed previously, however in 
this context with the eagle being included as a protagonist, this likeness is further enhanced. Despite 
the crow being the traditional trickster, in Lucian’s dialogue it is shown that the eagle, in the form of 
Menippus, proves far superior to the deceptive philosopher-sophists. The use of the vulture wing as 
well, holds a number of Aesopic connotations. Unlike the eagle, the vulture appears in few Aesopic 
fables, and even then this is often interchangeable with the raven. In these fables, the vulture is 
depicted (unsurprisingly) as a scavenger, having little shame in stealing the food from others, or 
inflicting misfortune upon other birds. One fable that diverges from this pattern is The Dog and the 
Treasure, wherein the vulture is shown to disparage his canine interlocutor for his greed (Perry 483). 
However the vulture in Aelian receives what may be considered a more varied role. There are three 
dedicated entries, the first of these characterising the vulture primarily by its role as a carrion animal, 
haunting battlegrounds and the enemy of νέκροι, not dissimilar to that found in the Aesopic tradition 
(Ael. NA. 2.46). Aelian states later in his work that not only is the vulture considered to be sacred by 
the Vaccaei, but it was also held in high regard during the founding of Rome (Ael. NA. 10.22), with 
Aelian also observing that the Egyptians consider the vulture to be sacred to Hera (Ael. NA. 10.22.12).  
Short of the vulture’s capacity for flight, the significance of the vulture wing in Icaromenippus is 
difficult to determine, but it is nevertheless largely held in high regard, according to Aelian’s accounts.  
313 D.W. Thompson, A Glossary of Greek Birds (London: Oxford, 1895) 5. 
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are both used in Homeric similes as ‘swooping’ birds, who prey on smaller birds,314 
aligning the two birds by their predatory function. Yet it should not be ignored that the 
use of both a vulture wing and an eagle wing in facilitating Menippus’ ascent is 
primarily a comic tool. The two birds are frequently used interchangeably; In the myth 
of Prometheus, classical sources use both ἀετός (Hes. Th. 523; Aesch. Prom. 1022, 
Apoll. Rh. 2.1254; Luc. Prom. 2, 4, 20.)  and γύψ (Val. Fl. Argon. 7.357; Luc. D. Deor. 
1; Luc. Prom. 20.) to denote the bird responsible for eternally eating his liver.315 The 
association of both the vulture and the eagle with the liver (eating or otherwise) was 
common enough that Lucian’s own use of both of these birds is not remarkable, but 
rather another means to humiliate the philosopher-sophists. As mentioned above, the 
liver of the eagle may be used medicinally to gain enhanced sight, and although the 
same is true of the vulture,316 however, the text of Icaromenippus quite explicitly 
excludes the vulture from aiding the sharpness of sight, as Empedocles explains, “the 
other eye [on the vulture wing side] cannot possibly help being duller, as it is on the 
inferior side” (Icar. 14). As the text progresses, the symbolism of taking two different 
wings becomes clear, as Menippus himself recognises that the has become a hybrid. 
Menippus, on discovering the power of the eagle’s wing, regrets his choice to take a 
wing from each bird. He is half-finished, he states, considering himself a cross-breed 
(νόθοις, Icar. 14). Empedocles,317 however, disagrees. If he maintains control over the 
vulture wing, and flaps only the eagle wing, he will most certainly have sharpness of 
sight in the corresponding eye. With this, Menippus rationalises what he previously 
thought was a foolish error on his part. Carpenters, states Empedocles, in order to gain 
focus, often use a single eye to complete their work with accuracy, so thus it would not 
be unreasonable to suggest that he too, could utilise well his one superior eye (Icar. 14).  
 Despite Menippus’ explicit assertion that his adoption of the two different wings 
have made him a hybrid, his initial consideration that he is a corrupted form is swiftly 
dismissed. Recognising his own hybrid faults, Menippus makes no pretence in respect 
to his inferior vulture wing, but rather embraces his hybridity and utilises it in such a 
                                               
314 J. Heath, ‘The Serpent and the Sparrows: Homer and the Parodos of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon’ 
Classical Quarterly 49:2 (1999): 398. 
315 Aelian also makes mention of a certain type of vulture, aegypius, which is “ἐν µεθορίῳ γυπῶν … 
καὶ ἀετῶν” (NA. 2.46.13-14). This eagle-vulture also makes an appearance in Aristotle’s Historia 
Animalium (8.609B.9ff.).  
316 Pliny states in his Natural History that mixing the gall of the vulture with leek-juice and a bit of 
honey provides a remedy for poor vision (Plin. NH. 29.38.50-52). 
317 The significance and role of Empedocles in this text is discussed further below.  
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manner to present a successful hybrid; in only having one eye to view clearly through, 
he is able to better focus his sight and see more accurately than he could if he did have 
two eagle-eyes to view from. The vulture and the eagle have a rich symbolic tradition 
throughout Greek and Latin literature.318 Their medicinal properties clearly relate to 
their capacity in providing clarity of vision to a patient, and while their role as predators 
is certainly prominent, this is not the main symbolic function in the context of Lucian. 
Rather, the use of these animals becomes symbolic of the qualities unavailable to the 
human, or contemporary philosophical world. While the eagle assists the protagonist 
by granting him non-human capacities such as flight and sharp sight, the vulture may 
allow Menippus to accurately view the truth of the human world; the apparently inferior 
side providing a comparative focus from which to understand philosophical truths.  
 Georgiadou and Larmour attribute the use of a vulture and an eagle in 
Icaromenippus to the birds’ association with Zeus, with reference to two other Lucianic 
texts, however emphasising the frequency with which Lucian utilises the bird to denote 
“philosophers disguised as animals,”319 However, with these biological traditions in 
mind, I would rather argue that the symbolism of the vulture and the eagle (in this text) 
represent the qualities that the philosophers lack: explicitly the capacity for flight and 
clarity of vision, but symbolically, their lack of ability to have true wisdom and 
understanding of the human world. What’s more, with Lucian positioning his characters 
in a literal interspace between the high and the low, the text reflects upon the very nature 
of his satire. It is a hybrid, to be sure, but it exists as a hybrid that may improve the very 
base nature of each animal to create an enhanced form that is better than the two halves; 
a successful and importantly, uncorrupted hybrid.  
 
 
Empedocles 
 
In Icaromenippus, as mentioned above, the eagle and the vulture play a role in 
providing Menippus with the ocular means to view the earth. Having ascended above 
the human realm, Menippus states that he sat himself upon the moon and was able to 
see the life of humanity in its entirety (Icar. 12). Menippus explains to his interlocutor 
                                               
318 A. Georgiadou, D.H.J Larmour, ‘Lucian’s “Verae Historiae” as Philosophical Parody’, 321. 
319 A. Georgiadou, D.H.J Larmour, ‘Lucian’s “Verae Historiae” as Philosophical Parody’ 321. 
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that this clarity of sight, however, was not innate. Menippus relates that he spoke with 
the philosopher Empedocles,320 and requests of Empedocles to take away the fog 
(ἀχλύν; Icar. 14) from his eyes.321 Empedocles reveals to him that the power of sharp 
sight may be achieved by flapping the wing of the eagle that is attached to him. Now 
being ‘sharp-sighted’ (ὀξυδερκής; Icar. 13) like the eagle, Menippus may truly view 
that which lies below him, a faculty that was denied him as human.322   
While the interaction is only brief, the use of Empedocles in particular is 
significant for Lucian’s overall narrative. In addition to the treatment in Icaromenippus, 
Empedocles features as a character in three other Lucianic works: True Histories, The 
Fisherman and Dialogues of the Dead.323 In these three texts, the focus is on 
Empedocles’ famous death by leaping into the crater of Mount Etna (VH. 2.21; Pisc. 
2.13; D. Mort. 6.4).  Diogenes Laertius relates the philosophical significance of this 
mythological death, with each re-telling denoting an aspect of Empedocles’ theoretical 
or actual ascent (D.L. 8.69-72). The ascension of Empedocles is also reflected in the 
extant fragments of what have been accepted by secondary scholars to be two 
philosophical works, Purifications and On Nature.324  While the first of these, ‘On 
Nature’ is predominantly concerned with physics and the cosmic cycle, the 
‘Purifications’ provides a Pythagorean poem on reincarnation and vegetarianism. The 
former work underpins his doctrines of natural philosophy, through the external 
perception of the earth from the position of the sun, and the suggestion that mankind 
develops into an elevated creature from the parts of animals.325 From this point of 
reference, it is possible to reflect upon Lucian’s use of the natural philosopher. While 
in the majority of his works Empedocles features as a passing comment about his death-
by-volcano, the context of these comments encourages consideration of the satirist’s 
                                               
320 The use of Empedocles can be attributed to the theme of philosophical parody that is evident in a 
number of Lucianic works. (A. Georgiadou and D.H.J Larmour, ‘Lucian’s “Verae Historiae”’ 316.  
321 A clear reference to Athena removing the fog (ἀχλύς) from Diomedes’ eyes in the Iliad (Il. 5.127-
8). 
322 With his sharp-sight being granted to him, Menippus observes that the population as viewed from 
above are like ands (µυρµήκων, Icar. 19.4ff), a largely laughable sight. The theme of humans as ants 
also appears in Lucian’s Hermotimus, wherein Hermotimus, the Stoic, explains his desire to ascend 
towards virtue (Ἀρετή) and this, to find happiness, a correlation that is explored in greater detail below.   
323 Empedocles also appears in Peregrinus, with his death being likened to that of Peregrinus (Peregr. 
1.8) and in The Runaways, wherein again, the reference is related to the fact that the two characters 
died by fire (Fug. 2.4). 
324 P. Kingsley ‘Empedocles’ Two Poems’ Hermes 124:1 (1996): 108, working from the argument put 
forward by D. Sedley and H. Diels. 
325 J. Pollack, O. Primavesi and F. Pressler, ‘Empedocles’ in Brill’s New Pauly, Antiquity volumes 
edited by H. Cancik and H. Schneider (2006) (http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e329950). 
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purpose. Consequently, the symbolism of Empedocles as a guide to viewing the world 
above in Icaromenippus may be further understood.  
First, in Dialogues of the Dead, the now-dead Menippus is being offered a 
guided tour of the famous souls found in the Underworld. Empedocles appears 
following an appearance from his predecessor, Pythagoras, entirely burnt to ashes. He 
is accused of lying when claiming melancholia drove him to jump into the crater, with 
Menippus claiming it was in fact his vanity (Dia. Mort. 20). Conversely, in The 
Fisherman, the act of jumping into the crater is viewed as a punishment for the 
outspoken Parrhesiades, with Empedocles concurring with his fellow philosophers that 
he had brought harm to the reputation of philosophy (Pisc. 2). Finally, in the True 
Histories, Empedocles once again appears as burned, however he is characterised as 
being ostracised from the community of famous figures that live upon the idyllic island 
(VH. 2.21). It is implied that the island is where the philosophers who ascend towards 
virtue come to rest, as it is narrated that the Stoics had not arrived, as they continued to 
climb the “steep hill of virtue” (VH. 2.18).  With these three rather different perceptions 
of Empedocles in mind, it is useful to return to Lucian’s Icaromenippus.  
Unsurprisingly, the description of Empedocles being burned remains in 
Icaromenippus. However Empedocles relates to Menippus the circumstances of his 
death, stating that the smoke from the crater launched him upwards, bringing him to 
land upon the moon (Icar. 13). Empedocles has made his philosophical ascent, and may 
now act as a guide to the world above, despite being represented as harmful to 
philosophy in different dialogues. As mentioned earlier, Empedocles teaches Menippus 
that the flapping of his eagle wing will allow Menippus to become sharp-sighted, a 
recognition of Empedocles’ argument that mankind develops from the parts of animals 
(Fr. 21).326 It is only by utilising the natural world, and the parts of animals that 
Menippus has been able to see the truth, suggesting a necessity to reject the 
anthropocentric notions that define the race of philosopher-sophists. Despite the fact 
that Menippus is now presented has a hybrid creature, his hybridity is framed as far 
more useful than that of the hybrids below, who are unable to recognise their own 
human limitations. In addition, unlike the usual representations of Empedocles in the 
                                               
326 The fragment outlines that through the victory of love over strife, the inhabitants of the world, both 
humans and animals were born, through a mixing of various previously separated parts. For a detailed 
discussion of this concept in Empedocles, see G. Campbell, ‘Empedocles’ Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (https://www.iep.utm.edu/empedocl/). 
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Lucianic corpus, in Icaromenippus he becomes almost the epitome of the ideal 
philosopher. He is in touch with the natural world, even defining himself as ὁ φυσικός, 
and is capable of offering wisdom that acknowledges the limitation of the human 
condition. Empedocles, having ‘ascended’ to his position, is a crucial figure who assists 
in Menippus’ own ascent towards wisdom, ensuring that the full potential of his 
hybridised form is utilised.  
This image of an ideal philosopher, a real philosopher, comes to satisfy some 
of the curiosities of the protagonist, a feat that the philosopher-sophists of the human 
world were unable to achieve. This contrast of the real philosopher, Empedocles, and 
the fake philosophers of the human world serves to expose the false professions of 
knowledge of the hybrid philosopher-sophists. This contrast again serves to underpin 
the different ‘kinds’ of hybridity that Lucian utilises throughout his dialogues. The 
Lucianic hybrid, represented by Menippus himself, has already exceeded the capacities 
of the hybrid philosopher-sophists, as a natural and uncorrupted hybrid.  
 
Homer  
 
Having explored the means of ascent and clarity of sight in Icaromenippus, it is 
necessary to turn to Lucian’s Charon. In this dialogue, it is possible to identify similar 
themes involving ascent and sight, from which it can be gleaned that Lucian is once 
again utilising the trope to comment upon the shortcomings of the philosopher-sophists, 
and humans more broadly. In the context of Charon, there is a similar sense of lacking 
in an innate capacity to both ascend and to see clearly, however rather than Charon 
becoming a hybrid of animal and human, he is a hybrid figure in that he is able to 
occupy both the high and low physical spheres. While Charon is not strictly human he 
nevertheless moves beyond his traditional sphere, coming up from the underworld in 
order to observe and understand human want and desire. Hermes states that “one who 
consorts always with the shades” (Cont. 2) would not be permitted in the Heavens and 
thus proposes the manipulation of the natural world as a means to gain the high vantage 
point necessary to truly view the life of man, without completely overstepping his 
boundaries. The two characters thus use the poetry of Homer to stack the highest 
mountains atop each other and climb into the skies.327 However in order to truly view 
                                               
327 Hermes and Charon manipulate the mountains by reciting lines of Homer, ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων.  
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the human world, Charon likewise must gain sharp-sight. From their vantage point, 
Hermes and Charon are able to view the landscape in its entirety, but it is revealed that 
Charon cannot see anything clearly beyond the geological features. Hermes, again with 
the aid of the Homeric epics, makes Charon ‘sharp-sighted’, (ὀξυδερκέστατον Cont. 
7.2) allowing him to see with clarity the world below, and thus to understand the life of 
humanity.  
Recitation of Homeric verses may be found in a number of literary genres, both 
preceding Lucian and following. Collins discusses the trend of the Homeric verse being 
used as a form of incantation, intended to provide a solution to primarily medical 
problems.328 The tradition, by the time of the Second Sophistic, is presumed to derive 
from the philosophers Pythagoras and Empedocles, as attested in Iamblichus’ Life of 
Pythagoras. Pythagoras, he states, utilised music and Homeric verses for the purpose 
of “correcting the soul,” a technique likewise picked up by Empedocles (Iamb. VP. 25). 
As the practice continued throughout antiquity, the magical properties of the context of 
the particular verse began to diminish, however during Lucian’s time of writing, the 
context of the verse still held importance for the effectiveness of the incantation, and 
consideration of this Homeric context within Lucian’s dialogue allows for the broader 
effect to be understood.  
In Charon, Homeric incantation appears in two instances. The first of these, as 
mentioned earlier, allows the protagonist to reach a high vantage point, while the 
second facilitates clarity of sight. In order for the two characters to look down upon the 
world from above, Hermes suggests using the strategy of Aloadae, Otus and Ephialtes, 
who on account of their giant form were able to place the mountains Pelion and Ossa 
atop Olympus. Despite Charon’s protestations, Hermes states that it will be an easy 
task, on account of the work of Homer, for he puts the mountains together as easily as 
a pair of verses (Char. 4).329 Reciting the Homeric verse, (Od. 11.305) Hermes swiftly 
                                               
It is worth noting that Charon, approaching his ascent to the peak of Parnassus, seeks Hermes’ aid in 
climbing the mountain, as the ‘machine’ (µηχανήν) is ‘not small’. This use of µηχανή, and the 
following characterisation of the two interlocutors being ‘fond of spectacles’ (φιλοθεάµονα) implies an 
element of spectatorship in viewing the world below. It should be noted too, that the adjective has both 
negative and positive connotations through its use in Plato’s Republic. The philosopher who is fond of 
spectacles should be wholly distinguished from the philosopher who is fond the spectacle of truth (Rep. 
475c4). Here, Lucian’s own distinctions between the proper philosopher and the hybrid philosopher-
sophist are supported, also shows the way in which the interlocutors of Charon, in viewing the world 
from above, are in this instance not simply fond of the act of viewing, but also the act of viewing truth. 
328 D. Collins, Magic in the Ancient Greek World (Malden: Blackwell, 2008), Malden, 104.  
329 Dio Chrysostom also draws upon such an idea, claiming that Homer’s art, as merely descriptive, 
lends itself to less praise than the capacity to change the shape of stone as Pheidias does (Dio. 12.79).  
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piles Mt. Ossa upon Mt. Pelion. Yet where the twins Otus and Ephialtes were 
unsuccessful in reaching the heavens, Hermes’ invocation of the magical Homeric 
phrase allows them to achieve the task of the giants, and succeed in heightening the pile 
of mountains with Oeta and Parnassus.330 The quotation derives from Odysseus’ 
retelling of his experience in the underworld and his sightings of mythical women, in 
this case he relates seeing Iphimedeia, the mother of the two twins. The passage tells 
of their attempt to storm Olympus, and their defeat at the hands of Apollo while still 
only young (Od.11.305ff). 
The second Homeric incantation in Charon relates to the character’s gaining of 
sharp sight. Once again, Hermes uses the verses to magically improve Charon’s vision, 
quoting the instance in the Iliad wherein Athena removes the fog (ἀχλύς)331 from 
Diomedes’ eyes (Il. 5.127-28), allowing him to see with clarity.332 Similarly, Charon’s 
new-found sight will, throughout the course of the dialogue, allow him to not only see 
the world below, but also view the truth that those below are unable to see.  The esteem 
of the philosopher-sophists and their unsubstantiated professions of wisdom is exposed 
as false through a recognition of the reality of mankind from above.333  
In order to reach, and to see from, the heavens, the two characters of Charon 
require the aid of Homeric verse. The two instances of Homeric recitation chosen are 
significant for their emphasis upon breaching established spheres. The mist that clouds 
Charon’s eyes may only be removed through the aid of the Homeric Athena, who has 
ventured from the heavens to the sphere of humanity. Likewise, the Aloadae aim to 
move beyond their position in the mortal sphere, and it is only through invocation of 
their mythological deeds that Charon and Hermes may attempt to reach the heavens in 
the mortal sphere. The two texts, when viewed as parallel readings of ascent, provoke 
a reflection upon perceptions of hierarchy of humans, animals and the divine in 
                                               
330 While Homer only mentioned Pelion and Ossa as mountains used by the Aloadae, Hyginus does 
note that additional mountains were piled on in addition to the two. (Hyg. Fab. 28) 
331 Such a trope is present too in Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius, namely 7.32.16 and 23. 
332 Icaromenippus too alludes to the aforementioned Homeric passage, however it does so merely with 
use of the word ἀχλύς to denote Menippus’ need for removal of the mist from his eyes on account of 
his presently ‘blurred’ vision. (Icar. 14.1-2). Curiously, Collins demonstrates that following Lucian, the 
narrative context of the Homeric quotation is no longer an indication of the magical or healing 
properties of the passage. Rather, the use of Homeric recitation emphasizes the “attributes or qualities 
generally thought to be relation to the action of healing, protection, or, occasionally harm, that is 
desired.” (D. Collins, ‘The Magic of Homeric Verses,’ 215; 217). 
333 Collins also notes that Proclus uses the same passage: “For Proclus and other Neoplatonists before 
him, the pure light that replaces the scattered mist allegorically refers to souls descended into bodies 
that can no longer directly contemplate reality” (D. Collins, ‘The Magic of Homeric Verses’ 127).  
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antiquity.  As Collins argues, Homeric recitation employed on the basis of the divine 
inspiration that allowed for the poetry to be composed. “If,” he states, “Homeric poetry 
pre-eminently embodies the divinity which also inspired its expression, then select 
verses taken from Homer…still contained divine power.”334 Charon and Hermes may 
only attempt to reach the divine sphere by utilising divine power, allowing Charon to 
breach the boundaries of even the mortal sphere. Charon arguably comes to occupy a 
hybrid space and it is here, like Menippus, that he is able to truly see mankind and its 
greed. It has been shown that in order to truly understand existence, one must be able 
to view from above, and these two dialogues of Lucian interact with this long-standing 
tradition by presenting characters who make a very literal ascent to the hybrid 
interspace between the heavens and the mortal realm.  In the case of Menippus, the 
movement into this space requires a transformation to a hybrid form. 
However this ascent must also be considered with the role of sight, as in both 
of these dialogues the characters are presented with the question of how to view from 
above. The nature of sight (and importantly of blindness) evokes connotations of the 
acquisition or removal of the faculty of sight is crucial for Lucian’s critique of the 
philosopher-sophists. Once again, Lucian utilises the simplicity of contrast to reflect 
upon the inherent blindness of the philosopher-sophists, through their inability to see 
as Menippus and Charon do. This blindness, it is argued, directly translates to a critique 
of their ignorance, and their unwillingness to pursue wisdom through the refinement of 
the hybrid form becomes a reflection upon their shortcomings. The philosopher-
sophists, as corrupted hybrids, no longer aspire to wisdom, but to wealth and reputation, 
yet they nevertheless maintain their role as teachers in society. Both Charon and 
Menippus see human greed from above, showing the widespread and corrupting 
influence of the contemporary philosophers. 
 
Inhuman Sight? 
 
                                               
334 D. Collins, Magic in the Ancient Greek World, 131. The Greek Magical Papyri too, show evidence 
of the verses of Homer maintaining their divine power (PGM IV. 2125-2240). For more on the 
significance of the papyri, see H. D. Betz, ‘The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation, Including the 
Demotic Spells Volume 1’ Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986 and A.D. Nock, ‘Greek 
Magical Papyri’ The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology 15:3/4 (1920) 219-235. The notion of Homer 
acting as an inspiration for divine power and magic in the Neoplatonic conception is also discussed 
extensively by  R Lamberton, Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the 
Growth of the Epic Tradition, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). 
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In Icaromenippus, as in Charon, the word ἀχλύς is used to denote the fog which 
must be removed from mortal eyes to produce sharp sight.. The removal of the fog from 
Diomedes’ eyes in the Iliad is not dissimilar to the fog that had previously clouded the 
sight of Menippus and Charon, and as will be explored, this sharpness of sight is thus 
portrayed as an inhuman quality. 
The use of a high vantage point and the characters’ subsequent gaining of sharp 
sight is a primary means to link these two texts.335 However one further point must be 
considered, that being the explicit mention of Lynceus in both texts and his association 
with viewing outside the human world.336 Lynceus’ primary role in myth is as an 
Argonaut. His enhanced sight is his defining feature in Apollonius of Rhodes’ 
Argonautica (1.153, 4.1466ff) and is also found in Apollodorus’ Library, which states 
that Lynceus’ sharp sight (ὀξυδερκία) was so great that he was able to see underground 
(Apollod. 3.117).337 In Icaromenippus, the hetairos with whom Menippus speaks 
questions his capacity for sight, asking how he has suddenly become a Lynceus, being 
able to view everything on the earth (Icar. 12.21-23). Charon likewise exclaims that in 
comparison to his newly acquired ‘sharp sight’, the mythical Lynceus was blind (Cont. 
7.10). Lynceus, as a point of comparison for the characters of Menippus and Charon is 
clearly employed on the basis of his “piercing eyes” (ὀξέα, Α.R. 4.1466) yet arguably 
also reflects upon the capacity to have such sight in a realm that exists outside of the 
human world.  
Being granted enhanced, inhuman ocular capacity allows for the characters to 
view the world without human bias and to gain a greater understanding of philosophical 
                                               
335 The association of having ‘sharp sight’ and viewing from a vantage point appears elsewhere (and 
often) in the Lucianic corpus. In discussing the customs of the symposium in Saturnalia, the wine 
pourer (ὀξὺ δεδορκέτω ἐκ περιωπῆς; Sat. 18) The Pseudo-Lucianic Philopatris presents a similar 
overall theme to Icaromenippus and Charon, wherein Critias relates his journey to meet with the 
sorcerers in a high tower. Speaking with them, it is revealed that their vantage point looking down 
upon the city imbues them with sharp sight, and they are able to see the reality of human life. 
(Philopatr. 24ff.)  
336 Lynceus can also be found elsewhere in the Lucianic corpus. In Timon, Hermes speaks with the 
personified Riches, who states that even Lynceus would find it difficult to see who among the 
population deserved wealth (Tim. 25). Lynceus is also used to denote Hermotimus’ superior sight in 
relation to viewing the true character of men (Herm. 20.25-26) Lynceus is also presented in strict 
opposition to the figure of the blind Phineus in both Pro Imaginibus and Dialogi Mortuorum. In the 
latter, Menippus states that the eyes of all those now in the Underworld are empty (κενά) and that 
οὐκέτ' ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοις, τίς ὁ Φινεὺς ἦν ἢ τίς ὁ Λυγκεύς (D. Mort. 9.4-5).  
337 His sharp sight is also found twice in Hyginus’ Fabulae, who states that his ability to see beneath 
the earth may be rationalized by his proficiency at gold-mining; the large amount of gold that he was 
able to acquire was thought only to be explained by a supernatural power (Hyg. 14.12) Nevertheless, in 
the passages following, Lynceus is again attributed with sharp sight to the extent he was made 
‘lookout’ upon the Argo. (Hyg. 14.32) 
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truths that are denied them upon the ground. Lucian’s Menippus and Charon represent 
the inherently human incapacity to gain such sight,338 for the characters require the aid 
of external spheres so as to achieve clarity of vision.  
 
Dialogues from Above 
 
The theme of vision (and blindness) that dominates these two texts will be returned to 
later in the chapter, however for the present purposes it is useful to consider the 
concerns of the two protagonists and their interlocutors once they have reached their 
high vantage point. In doing so, it will become clear that the philosopher-sophists that 
populate the world below have constructed around themselves a false reality, and the 
real truths belong to the spheres above.  
Menippus and Charon are only able to view the human world objectively by 
finding a means both to look upon the world from above and to do so with clarity, from 
which a more accurate perception of humanity may be found. From this perspective, 
humans are revealed to be utterly foolish in that which they consider valuable. 
Menippus observes those fighting each other over borders and revelling in their wealth, 
and is able to see the futility of it all (Icar. 18.ff). Charon likewise comments upon 
Croesus’ desire to dedicate offerings of gold to the temple of Apollo, and looks down 
in disbelief at the foolishness of humanity’s honour of gold. “Men are terribly stupid,” 
he states, “since they have such a passion for a yellow, heavy substance” (Cont. 11). 
Charon and Hermes also go on to discuss the fates of men, and the foolishness of their 
concern for a web that has already been spun. The human perception of death and the 
afterlife is, to Charon, nonsensical – the character knows intimately that in death, all 
humans are stripped of their wealth and he fails to understand humanity’s trivial 
concern with such things. These concerns with wealth that the two characters observe 
reflect both the degradation of society and the degradation of philosophy. As was 
established in Chapter One, one of the primary criticisms of the philosopher-sophists is 
their desire for wealth through the purchase of their false philosophies. With the truth 
being hidden from humanity’s view, the populations that both Menippus and Charon 
                                               
338 See also: Luc. Anach. 36.3 (Anacharsis is unable to understand Solon without ὀξὺ δεδορκυίας) Luc. 
Philops. 15.5 (Tychiades, in recounting to his present interlocutor a conversation he had with 
Cleodemus, states that he finds it difficult to believe Cleodemus’ story εἰ µὴ τὰ ὅµοια ὑµῖν ὀξυδορκεῖν 
ἒχω). Cleodemus is also defined as a Peripatetic philosopher (Luc. Philops. 6.11-12, 14.8-9). 
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observe are indeed shown to be foolish, but it is on account of the failure of 
contemporary philosophers to reveal the truth.  
 
The Moon 
 
In Icaromenippus, we are offered the perspectives of two characters who inhabit the 
world above and their misapprehensions regarding the actions of humanity. The first of 
these is the personification of the Moon, who asks Menippus to pass on a message from 
her to Zeus. She speaks of her disdain towards the philosophers, on account of their 
“meddling tongues” (Icar. 21ff.).  However it is first useful at this point to compare the 
concerns of the Moon in Icaromenippus to the journey to the moon in Lucian’s True 
Histories. Not only does the latter text offer another instance of ascent, but through this 
more descriptive journey, it is possible to determine the symbolism of the moon in the 
context of criticism of contemporary philosophical thought.  
 In Lucian’s True Histories, our adventurers are whirled into the air by a 
particularly violent gust of wind, eventually coming to rest at a large, shining sphere 
(later revealed to be the moon). The men are captured by surveying Vulture-Horses 
(Ἱππογύποι), who bring them to the King of the Moon, Endymion (VH. 1.11). With this 
short introduction, the parallels to be drawn with Icaromenippus are clear. The theme 
of ascent is in common, and the presence of the vultures, employed on the basis of their 
ability to spot strangers upon the moon, resembles the use of the vulture to facilitate 
sharpness of sight in the other text. The figure of Endymion and the adventurer’s 
encounter is also not unlike Menippus’ conversation with Empedocles. As Endymion 
describes the conflict between the moon and the sun he facilitates a means for both the 
characters and the reader to conceptualise a broader understanding of these warring 
sides. As Georgiadou and Larmour argue, this portrayal of the heavenly contest 
represents Lucian’s critical gaze towards contemporary philosophy.339 The significance 
of the moon and its spokesperson is also significant in terms of its overall function. 
Lucian’s VH includes a mirror upon the moon as one of its primary characteristics, 
offering the ability to allow the viewer to see and hear everything upon the earth (VH. 
1.26). The moon is treated in Lucian’s works as a privileged vantage point from which 
to view from above and is concerned with philosophical truth. This symbolism, albeit 
                                               
339 A. Georgiadou, D.H.J Larmour, ‘Lucian’s “Verae Historiae” as Philosophical Parody, 316. 
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far more explicit in Icaromenippus, is important for an assessment of Lucian’s 
dismissal of the philosopher-sophists, as will be explored further through Menippus’ 
dialogue with the Moon herself.  
The Moon of Icaromenippus has developed contempt towards the philosophers. 
However this criticism, while still directed at the degradation of philosophy in 
contemporary times stems from the fact that the Moon has personally been targeted. 
Rather than discussing more important aspects of philosophical truths, the Moon states 
that she is fed up with the philosophers concerning themselves with her characteristics, 
be it her shape and size or the place from which her light is derived.340 However the 
Moon’s true abhorrence relates to the activities of these so-called philosophers at night, 
and how in contrast to their proclamations of virtue during the day, she is embarrassed 
to allow her light to illuminate their acts of adultery and thievery (Icar. 20-21). The 
notion of the so-called philosopher as debauched under the cover of darkness and 
behind closed doors is evidenced, as argued earlier, in Lucian’s Symposium, paying 
credence to the Moon’s claims. The sham-philosophers, these philosopher-sophists, 
neither concern themselves with knowledge of the truth, nor do they perpetuate the 
good reputation of the real philosopher. The Moon not only views their deeds from 
above, but may also perceive their ignorance.  The Moon concludes that if Zeus will 
not destroy these philosophers, she will leave to find a place far away from them.  
 The Moon, in True Histories, is a place from which to view the world below. 
This idea is repeated in Icaromenippus, however in a slightly different manner. The 
Moon herself is the figure who views from above, and sees the truth despite the 
sophists’ proclamations and professions of knowledge and virtue. This she keeps to 
herself, not thinking it to be fitting to expose the pursuits of the sophists. However if 
one were to ascend, to search for the truth of her existence themselves, it is then that 
they might understand the philosopher-sophists’ false claims to knowledge and 
wisdom. 
 
Hermes 
                                               
340 A clear example of this is Plutarch’s work Concerning the Face Which Appears in the Orb of the 
Moon, which discusses such features of the moon alongside Plutarch’s broader concern with a 
philosophical understanding of the soul and its ascent. (M. Trapp, Philosophy in the Roman Empire: 
Ethics, Politics and Society, (Abingdon: Routledge) 2007).  
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The Charon dialogue reflects similar concerns to that of Menippus in the 
Icaromenippus dialogue. Although the characters, Charon and Hermes, are unable to 
reach the heavens (Cont. 2), they nevertheless are able to see the nature of mankind and 
their obsession with material wealth from above. The characters’ commentary upon 
humankind from above acts as a parallel to Icaromenippus’ criticism of philosophers, 
albeit being set in the 6th Century BC. Charon, being imbued with the knowledge that 
wealth is not retained in the afterlife, experiences sheer bewilderment while viewing 
human greed, and reflects upon the basic tenets of human understanding. Once again, 
it is argued that the philosopher-sophists have corrupted the human world, imposing 
their own obsession with reputation upon broader society. 
 The primary figures that Charon and Hermes observe from atop the mountains 
are Croesus and Solon, a Lucianic recreation of one of the key events from Herodotus 
Book 1 (Hdt. 1.26-56).341 The two observers look favourably upon Solon, who opposes 
Croesus’ praise of gold over other substances (Cont. 10-11). For the two gods, such 
admiration for gold and wealth is entirely nonsensical, for they know well that not only 
does wealth have no import after death, but the use of wealth to extend or enrich life is 
completely foolish: the fates of humans are sealed (Cont. 13-14). Wealth, it is shown, 
affects the outcome of the fates only in negative terms for the injured party. Croesus, 
Cyrus and Polycrates arrogantly see themselves as fortunate men, thus blinding 
themselves to the threats to their existence (Cont. 13-14). 
 By viewing the fates of these men from a perspective above the earth, it is made 
abundantly clear to Charon and Hermes that mankind is ignorant. The two interlocutors, 
upon viewing the masses, notice the presence of unseen objects, flying about the heads 
of the humans below. These are revealed by Hermes to be a conglomeration of “Hope, 
Fear, Ignorance, Pleasure, Covetousness, Anger, Hatred and their like,” of which 
Ignorance, Stupidity and Doubt swirl about on the level with humans (Cont. 15). The 
masses also do not see the thread of fate hovering above them, many of them tangled 
up in each other indicating who will enact their death and to whom their inheritance 
will be given. The masses, therefore, are likewise blind to their own existence, and are 
                                               
341 There is extensive secondary scholarship on this particular passage of Herodotus, namely S. O. 
Shapiro, ‘Herodotus and Solon’ Classical Antiquity 15: 2 (1996): 348-364; C. Chiasson, ‘The 
Herodotean Solon’ Greek and Roman Biblical Studies 27 (1983): 249-262; R. Lattimore, ‘The Wise 
Adviser in Herodotus,’ Classical Philology 34 (1939): 24-35.  
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unable to see the truth, and it is in their ignorance that they act in such a foolish manner 
(Cont. 17).342 It is only from Charon and Hermes’ high vantage point that they may 
view the reality of the human world, symbolising the incapacity of the philosopher-
sophists to encourage humankind towards a path of knowledge.  
 
Vision and Blindness  
 
The two texts are clearly dominated by the theme of sight, yet they also engage with 
notions of blindness. Throughout antiquity, vision and viewing was a common theme; 
as Morales outlines, the emphasis upon sight and spectatorship can be identified in both 
the Homeric epics, and Herodotean inquiry.343 For the present purposes, it is 
worthwhile to examine the vision motif in the context of the Second Sophistic period 
more broadly. The concept of vision as attested in philosophical and physiological 
sources is largely involved with the notion of touching the thing seen, be this 
extramissively or intromissively.344 For Chrysippus, and the Stoics more broadly, the 
“authoritative part of the soul” (τὸ ἡγεµονικόν SVF 2.866) emanates as a stream of fire 
from the eye so as to touch and illuminate the object seen, granting the capacity of sight. 
The Platonic notion of vision includes this extramissive method, yet also includes an 
emanation from the object viewed, which is then transmitted to the soul (Pl. Tim. 
45Bff.). Morales argues that this allows vision to be attached to “desire, mirroring and 
self-knowledge.”345 Vision and sight, as evidenced in the Cave analogy, is the antithesis 
of blindness, and ascent away from darkness provides the means for sight and thus, 
knowledge. However among authors of the Roman Empire, this relationship between 
vision and knowledge is arguably more reciprocal and subjective, as evidenced most 
                                               
342 Hermes gives the example of a man who, labouring over the building of a roof, subsequently falls 
off it once it has been completed, showing the inherent foolishness of humanity’s greed and pride, as 
death may occur at any time.   
343 H. Morales, Vision and Narrative in Achilles Tatius’ Leucippe and Clitophon (Cambridge 
University Press: 2004) 8-10. 
344 H. Morales, Vision and Narrative, 15-16. Morales states of visual theory during the Roman 
Empire“constructs vision as corporeal and haptic.” The Stoics, Ptolemy and Galen view sight as 
involving the projection of air from the eye to touch the object being seen (extramissive sight) while 
the atomistsconsider the object being seen as projecting particles so as to touch the viewers eye. 
(intromissive sight). Plato’s Timaeus combines the notions of extramissive and intromissive sight; the 
stream of fire from the eyes and the stream of fire from the object meet in the middle and hits the soul 
(Tim. 45Bff). For more on the ancient conceptions of viewing, see M. Squire, Image and Text in 
Graeco-Roman Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) and J. Elsner, Art and the 
Roman Viewer: The Transformation of Art from the Pagan World to Christianity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
345 H. Morales, Vision and Narrative, 17. 
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emphatically in Lucian’s de Domo and Philostratus’ Imagines. The two texts expound 
the theory of viewing as providing knowledge, but also suggest that one’s knowledge 
affects the very act of viewing. This reciprocity of viewing allows for the transmission 
of ideas and concepts. The vision motif is thus important for understanding vision as a 
means for truth and knowledge.   
Icaromenippus and Charon are not alone in the Lucianic corpus for their 
exploration of vision. Anderson comments briefly on Lucian’s use of the theme, and 
divides instances of viewing into three main categories: ‘miraculous vision’, ‘views 
from a vantage point’ and ‘spying on immoral behaviour’.346 In addition to those found 
in Icaromenippus and Charon, it is beneficial to explore other instances that may be 
identified as ‘views from a vantage point.’347 The most apparent of these is undoubtedly 
Lucian’s fictitious journey to the moon in the VH, which has been discussed above. A 
view from a vantage point is also predicted for the primary character in Hermotimus, 
who aspires to reach the dwelling place of Virtue itself through the study of philosophy. 
Mankind will appear to be like ants, now that he is so far above the earth (Herm. 5.14-
15).348 As has been evidenced in Chapter One, the view from above in a philosophical 
context is also found in The Fisherman, wherein Parrhesiades views the ‘fish’ from his 
position upon the Acropolis. The Fisherman’s ‘fish’ represent the ignorant philosopher-
sophists, making it likely that the figures upon whom Menippus and Charon look down 
are similarly indicative of ignorance, and false philosophical knowledge.  
Viewing, especially from above, may be seen as a means for many characters 
in Lucian’s works to gain increased wisdom. However, it also features as a means to 
reveal the cognitive blindness of others. Where Menippus and Charon have been 
granted sharpness of sight, and thus wisdom, the philosopher-sophists that remain in 
the human sphere are comparatively blind.  
 
While a more comprehensive of Menippus’ actual arrival and experience of the 
Heavens is discussed in the following chapter, it is worth briefly discussing the time 
                                               
346 G. Anderson, Lucian: Theme and Variation in the Second Sophistic  (Leiden: Brill, 1976) 16-17. 
347 A. Georgiadou, D.H.J Larmour, ‘Lucian’s “Verae Historiae” as Philosophical Parody, 316-318 
348 While there is no indication of exactly where the dwelling place of Virtue is, according to both 
Lucian and Hesiod, it certainly resides above the human world (Hes. Op. 289; Luc. Herm. 2.16ff.). 
Lucian’s Verae Historiae also refers to this Stoic ideal of ascending to Virtue when recounting those he 
sees residing on the fictional island, stating that the Stoics were absent as “ἔτι γὰρ ἐλέγοντο 
ἀναβαίνειν τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὄρθιον λόφον” (Luc. VH. 18.7-8). 
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spent with the gods, as it serves to reinforce the concerns of both the Moon, and 
Menippus himself. Upon arriving in the Heavens, Menippus expresses concern about 
his hybrid form; while his eagle wing would grant him sure passage, the wing of the 
vulture would not be so accepted (Icar. 22). Not willing to take the risk, Menippus 
politely knocks, and is shortly afterwards permitted entry. Menippus relays the 
concerns of the Moon, emphasising the unsatisfactory nature of the philosophers due 
to their lack of knowledge about the Heavens (Icar. 23). Zeus, impressed with 
Menippus’ ability even to reach the heavens (exceeding the efforts of Otus and 
Ephialtes), invites him to stay the night, so that Zeus may learn about the human world. 
It is on the second day of Menippus’ visit to the Heavens that Zeus calls an assembly, 
so as to address the problems of the contemporary philosophers.  Here, it is revealed 
that it is in fact the influence of philosophical ignorance that may account for this 
diminished dedication. Zeus earlier expresses similar concerns to the Moon, (Icar. 
20ff.) and states that the philosophers divide themselves up into schools, call 
themselves by various names, and:  
 
Then, cloaking themselves in the high-sounding name of Virtue, elevating 
their eyebrows, wrinkling up their foreheads and letting their beards grow 
long, they go about hiding loathsome habits under a false garb, very like 
actors in tragedy; for if you take away from the latter their masks and their 
gold-embroidered robes, nothing is left but a comical little creature hired 
for the show at seven drachmas. 
 
              (Icar. 29.17-26) 
 
The philosopher-sophists and their false professions of knowledge have become a threat 
not only to the human capacity for virtue, but also to their dedication to the gods. They 
“look with scorn on all mankind and they tell absurd stories about the gods”, (Icar. 
30.1-2) and are “creaturely things” (ταῦτα τὰ θρέµµατα Icar. 31.17) in their behavior. 
Zeus views the race of philosophers as thinking themselves to be the source of 
knowledge and virtue, but this is merely on account of their appearance as real 
philosophers. Once again, contemporary philosophers are defined by their desire for 
wealth and money, as Zeus asks (in an echo of the Moon’s concerns) once they are out 
of the public eye, “how can one describe how much they eat, how much they indulge 
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their passion and how they lick the filth off pennies?” (Icar. 30). The philosopher-
sophists are driven by greed, no longer striving towards virtue.  
 With this trait of the philosopher-sophists in mind, it is a small stretch to 
consider similar concerns addressed in Charon. Charon also becomes aware of the self-
proclaimed superiority of humankind. He states that those with wealth and power are 
“disdainful of the rest” (Cont. 13) and that “the multitude” (τὴν…πληθὺν) act as if they 
reside in hives: “Everyone has a sting of his own and stings his neighbour, while some 
few, like wasps, harry and plunder the meaner sort” (Cont. 15). The philosopher-
sophists seek only to live for their own gain, and rely wholly on furthering their own 
reputation among the masses.  In reality, they only appear to have the wisdom afforded 
philosophers, but their corruption of the masses through their appearance is of little 
concern, provided they are able to find renown. It is shown that in their ignorance, these 
contemporary philosophers think themselves superior to the rest of the world, yet since 
they do not have knowledge, they are the slaves to ignorance and deceit (Cont. 2). 
Hermes makes one exception to his claims about the ignorance of mankind, 
those who are devoted to truth, as they see clearly (ὀξὺ δεδορκότες; Cont. 21), the ὀξὺ 
referring back to the sharpness of sight that Charon himself acquired earlier in the 
dialogue. Additionally, they “stand separate” (ἀποσπάσαντες) from the rest, the same 
verb being used in Icaromenippus to denote Menippus’ separation from the clouds as 
he ascends to the vantage point (Icar. 11). Those who keep themselves separate from 
the masses, are considered neither ignorant nor imbued with human folly. Their sharp 
sight and detachment from human existence allows for them to view the world as it is. 
Through this parallel analysis, it may be proposed that Lucian’s Charon likewise 
questions the validity of philosophers. The philosopher-sophists, as they are depicted 
in Icaromenippus, are neither “better than the rest of us who walk the earth,” nor are 
they “sharper sighted than their neighbours” (Icar. 6.5-6), unlike those who in Charon 
are truly dedicated to the truth.   
 
As the two texts reveal, standing separately from the rest of humanity and philosophy 
is an essential means to gain sharp sight. The emphasis upon sight in the two dialogues 
encourages a comparative consideration of the role of blindness, and it is clear that 
Lucian means to characterise the philosopher-sophists as blind, and thus ignorant. In 
order to gain this sharpness of sight (and thus wisdom), the characters are shown to 
make an ascent, eventually coming to understand the truth of mankind and the heavens. 
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However one must also not only desire to learn the truth, but also recognise ignorance, 
characteristics that are attributed to Lucian’s Menippus and Charon, but the 
philosopher-sophists lack. Their own perceived superiority, and desire to maintain this 
such a lofty reputation, has placed fog over their eyes, removing their capacity to see 
the truth. Menippus observes that the philosopher-sophists are also entirely 
contradictory in their varying doctrines, yet expect to be able to persuade him of their 
philosophical disposition (Icar. 5. 18-22). Menippus however, is incapable of refuting 
or accepting entirely any of these doctrines, and it is acceptance of ignorance that 
facilitates his ascent. Similarly, Charon states that: “I know nothing at all about things 
above ground, being a stranger” (Cont. 2) professing his lack of knowledge and need 
for guidance. Humans, according to Charon, live in ignorance of the fates that have 
been spun for them, resembling little more than “bubbles in water” (Cont. 19) and 
leaves (Cont. 19, Il. 6.146). However as the character of Croesus reveals, they 
nevertheless believe they are capable of having power over the natural course of things. 
Charon shows the folly of humans, desiring wealth over virtue, and taken in 
consideration with the Icaromenippus dialogue, it is clear that this shift in human 
concerns can be attributed to the shift in the value of philosophical discourse. The 
corruption of the philosopher-sophist hybrid, in the context of these two dialogues, is 
spreading to corrupt both the elite and non-elite alike. Lucian’s dialogues speak to both 
of these audiences simultaneously, recognising their hybrid nature, and proving once 
again his successful hybrid is indeed superior to each of its two halves.  
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Science can destroy religion by ignoring it as well as by 
disproving its tenets. No one ever demonstrated, so far as I am 
aware, the nonexistence of Zeus or Thor, but they have few 
followers now.  
 
Childhood’s End, Arthur C. Clarke  
 
 
In the previous chapters, it has been established that the hybrid presents itself frequently 
throughout Lucian’s works, and is consistently utilised to critique the philosopher-
sophists who dominate Lucian’s contemporary culture. In the following chapter, the 
analysis of the hybrid continues this trend, however progresses beyond the heights 
considered in Chapter 4. The hybrid and corrupted nature of the philosopher-sophists, 
it is shown, has not only spread to the humans and made them driven by reputation and 
greed, but it has also become a source of corruption for the divine sphere. As shown in 
the previous chapter, Lucian distinguishes between the divine and the human sphere, 
showing that it is only from a higher vantage point that one is to understand human 
nature accurately. This distinction is further developed in the following chapter, as 
Lucian also offers a direct portrayal of the divine sphere itself. Importantly, we are 
shown the effect that the hybrid, corrupted philosopher-sophists have upon the 
perception of the gods.  
Newmeyer states, in the context of assessing the role of the animal as the other, 
that “the Homeric concept of otherness posits a sharper distinction between the divine 
and the mortal, than between human and non-human: in the world of Homeric epic, 
human beings are reckoned to be more like other animals than they are like the gods.”349 
In what follows, I discuss a number of Lucian’s dialogues that are concerned with the 
divine sphere, outlining the way in which they question this division between humanity 
and divinity. The philosopher-sophists, it is shown, have not only corrupted the human 
sphere, but also the divine, disrupting the divide between these two spheres. Lucian, as 
has been shown, frequently includes hybrid animals throughout his works, yet what is 
crucial is that rather than exclusively depicting hybrid animals and humans, Lucian 
includes the voices of hybrid deities. Given the context in which these hybrid deities 
are portrayed, it is argued that we are offered a reflection upon relationship between the 
                                               
349 S. Newmeyer, ‘Being One and Becoming the Other’ in The Oxford Handbook of Animals in 
Classical Thought and Life, edited by G. L. Campbell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 508.  
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human and divine sphere. Not only have the philosopher sophists corrupted the human 
world, but they have also corrupted the divine sphere, causing the impressionable 
humans not to dedicate themselves to gods, but rather favouring worship of the 
philosopher-sophists.  
As the previous chapter has shown, the hybrid philosopher-sophists corrupt the 
humans with their claims to false knowledge, encouraging them to place value on 
reputation and greed, as they themselves do. The hybrid deities that now occupy the 
Olympian heavens are cast as corruptions themselves, having been influenced, not 
unlike the humans below them, by the philosopher-sophists. Rather than the presence 
of hybrid gods as reflecting a Lucianic distaste with hybrid deities, the presence of 
hybrid gods serves to exemplify the problem with the philosopher-sophists. The false 
philosopher-sophist hybrids are poor replicas of the true philosopher, and have fooled 
everyone into thinking they are a source of true wisdom.350  
 
In assessing the use of hybrid deities in Lucian, it is necessary to analyse a few core 
dialogues, namely those that are situated primarily in the divine sphere. The following 
discussion assesses the presence of hybrid deities in the companion dialogues 
Parliament of the Gods and Zeus Tragoedus. These dialogues, it is shown, liken the 
state of the divine sphere to that of the human world. These hybrid gods are a corrupted 
mix, and it is clear that they stand as a metaphor for the corruption of the philosopher-
sophists. They are made up of false representatives and merely give the impression of 
wisdom in a strive to attain reputation and honour. This, as has been argued, is the 
opposite of a successful hybrid form,351 and acts in this instance as an allegorical 
commentary upon the state of philosophy in the world below.  
It is also useful to return to the final third of Icaromenippus in this context, as 
in this dialogue it is possible to observe the hybrid state of the Olympian sphere through 
the representation of Zeus and the infiltration of the mortal Menippus. The relationship 
between the actions of the philosophers and the composition of the divine sphere is 
                                               
350 Spickermann discusses the notion of animal gods and wisdom, outlining that Lucian is against the 
Plutarchan assertion that deities in animal form are capable of embodying divine wisdom, with Lucian 
choosing to favour the Greek pantheon over the foreign gods (W. Spickermann, Lukian von Samosata 
und die fremden Götter’ Archiv für Religionsgeschichte 11:1 (2009): 246-8). While Lucian’s use and 
critique of specifically foreign gods is assessed in the following discussion, the focus is the use of these 
gods as means to reflect upon the nature of Greek gods, the foreign gods acting as a point of 
comparison, rather than a direct critique.  
351 The successful form of the hybrid had been outlined previously in Chapter One.  
 159 
once again emphasised, and it is shown that the philosopher-sophists are not only 
responsible for the corruption of the divine sphere, but also for the diminished 
dedication of humans towards the gods themselves. In the final section of this chapter, 
the effect of the philosopher-sophists upon both the human and the divine sphere is 
illustrated through the Lucianiac characterisation of Peregrinus. In this work, 
Peregrinus is portrayed as a Christian-Cynic hybrid, devoted entirely to enhancing his 
own reputation and being revered as a god. This so-called divine man typifies the 
transition from dedication to the gods to dedication to false philosophers, and the 
commitment to reverence over true wisdom paints Peregrinus as the essence of the 
corrupted philosopher-sophist. The hybrid Peregrinus reflects precisely Lucian’s 
concern with the hybridity of the philosopher-sophists more broadly, and the portrayal 
of Peregrinus in the guise as a divine man underpins the effects that these hybrids have 
upon the perception of the divine sphere.  
These facets of the hybrid deity in Lucian’s works, and the insinuation that 
philosophical corruption has infiltrated the divine sphere, becomes especially 
significant when viewed through the Aesopic framework. The Aesopic fable, both in 
antiquity and in modern times, is strongly associated with the presentation of a moral, 
a lesson in human nature depicted through animal characters.352 It is this notion of 
morality that is significant in the context of the divine sphere, as the relationship 
between corruption of the human world and the diminished dedication to the gods offers 
a curious interpretation of the broader role of the philosopher-sophists. With the notion 
that the hybrid philosopher-sophists have corrupted the divine sphere, and the gods 
themselves being shown to lament their diminished dedication, there is the suggestion 
of a shift in the moral compass of broader society. Rather than looking to the Aesopic 
fables as a set of guidelines for morality, the path to virtue is instead guided by the 
principles of the philosopher-sophists. The false philosophers’ influence upon the 
human sphere has diminished the perceived value of the divine sphere, causing dissent 
within the divine sphere regarding appropriate and deserved worship. In reflecting upon 
the now-corrupted and hybrid nature of the divine sphere, Lucian proposes a return to 
                                               
352 As Legras aptly states: The fable (λόγος, µῦθος) has an intrinsically moral character that allows 
teachers to offer their students a scale of values, rules of conduct, precepts of practical morality. 
« La fable (λόγος, µῦθος) présente en effet un caractére intrinsèquement moral qui permetait aux 
maîtres de proposer à leurs élèves une échelle de valeurs, des règles de conduite, des préceptes de 
morale pratique » (B. Lagras, ‘Morale et société dans la fable scholaire Greque et Latine d’Égypte’ 
Cahiers du Centre Gustave Glotz 7 (1996) : 52.  
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Golden Age ideals for the divine sphere as well as the mortal sphere. This is not to 
suggest that Lucian has any particular alignment with one pantheon of gods, but rather 
that the worship of philosopher-sophist hybrids over those truly in the divine sphere 
represents a corruption of virtue, and of wisdom.  
 
Hybrid Deities  
 
The hybrid deity is a feature of many cultures throughout antiquity, the combined (often 
animal-human) form acting as a symbolic means to bridge the divine and human 
world,353 or in several instances in the Judeo-Christian tradition, representing an other-
worldly astral and magical power.354 Such traits are evident in the Egyptian pantheon, 
as the gods frequently appear in a zoomorphised form, adopting the head of a particular 
animal.355 The combined animal-human form that characterises many Egyptian gods is 
a core feature of the following discussion, and while the why and how of Egyptian 
animal worship is not detailed here,356 it is important to consider the symbolism of such 
worship given its reception by the Greco-Roman world. As we will see, the hybrid deity 
in this context is a frequent means for authors of antiquity to denigrate the character of 
an individual or group,357 due to the more general conception towards these Egyptian 
gods in the Roman Empire. The hybrid deity, for Lucian, is a false deity that serves 
merely to corrupt the pantheon of gods, concerned more with their reputation than with 
being a source of virtue and morality.  
Smelik and Hemelrijk’s overview of the conception of the Egyptian pantheon 
offers a significant starting point for the following discussion, especially in the context 
of critique of Egyptian animal worship during the development of Christianity.358 The 
                                               
353 E. Aston, Mixanthrôpoi: Animal-human hybrid deities in Greek religion (Belgium: Centre 
International d'Étude de la Religion Grecque Antique, 2011): 22. 
354 Z. Ameisenowa, ‘Animal-Headed Gods, Evangelists, Saints and Righteous Men’ Journal of the 
Warburg and Courtlaud Institutes 12 (1949): 21-45.  
355 K. A. D. Smelik and E. A. Hemilrijk, ‘Who Knows Not What Monsters Demented Egypt Worships? 
Opinions on Egyptian animal worship in Antiquity as part of the ancient conception of Egypt’ in 
ANRW II, 1861. See too J. Rives, Religion in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007) esp. 
Chapter 2.  
356 For a brief commentary on this, see H. te Velde, ‘A Few Remarks upon the Religious Significance 
of Animals in Ancient Egypt’, Numen :27 (1980): 76-82.  
357 K. A. D. Smelik and E. A. Hemelrijk note the occurrence of such an invective use in the context of 
Vergil’s denigration of Marc Antony, as he the “Roman abhorrence of Egyptian theriomorphic gods in 
order to create a hostile feeling towards Anthony and Cleopatra” (K. A. D. Smelik and E. A. Hemilrijk, 
‘Who Knows not What Monsters Demented Egypt Worships?,’ 1855. 
358 Given the extent of secondary scholarship on Greek religion and its development, this aspect of the 
divine sphere is not treated here, but rather the focus is upon the means by which religion is perceived 
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animal worship of the Egyptians provided a means for Christian writers, such as 
Theophilus (Ad Autolycum 1.10) to highlight the foolishness of the pagan pantheon, 
asserting that animal worship is the “grossest absurdity paganism had ever 
produced.”359 This drive by a number of Christian writers to utilise the hybridity of the 
polytheistic pantheon as a core attribute of their own apologetics shows the consistent 
use of the hybrid form as a means of denigration of the other, particularly in the context 
of religion. Lactantius, writing in the late third/early fourth centuries, states explicitly 
that Christianity and its followers cannot be considered irreligious, since “other men in 
other places worship trees and rivers, and mice and cats and crocodiles and many 
irrational animals” (Lact. Divinae Institutiones 5.21). Yet significantly, this use of the 
animal hybrid god is similarly used by non-Christian writers, utilising it as a means to 
denigrate Christianity and Judaism as a means to accentuate the lack of depth found in 
the monotheistic beliefs.360 Gilhuis expands upon the relationship of the hybrid to 
Christianity, noting that while the religion and its practitioners distance themselves 
from an association with the corrupted animal hybrid, it is nevertheless treated as a 
symbolic hybrid of Paganism and Judaism.361 The followers of Christianity 
acknowledge this hybridity, directly utilising it as a means of critiquing their 
aggressors, noting the absurdity of their claims of a Christian, hybrid god. The 
suggestion of such a deity in the Christian sphere is a reflection not upon the hybridity 
of their god, but rather, upon the hybridity of paganism itself.362 The hybrid deity as a 
means of critique during the rise of monotheism in Greco-Roman society is therefore a 
useful consideration in the context of the Lucianic hybrid, particularly given the varied 
and malleable means in which it is utilised. In denigrating a deity or deities, there is the 
suggestion that the critique extends to those who dedicate themselves to the deity in 
question. It is this polemic use of hybrid deities in early Roman Empire literature that 
                                               
during the Second Sophistic, and its particular use by Lucian in his satire. For a more comprehensive 
treatment of the role of Greek religion throughout the Greek and Roman worlds, see W. Burkert, Greek 
Religion (Malden: Blackwell, 1985); J-P Vernant Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays (Princeto: 
Princeton University Press, 1991); J. B. Rives, Religion in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007); H.S. Versnel, Coping with the Gods: Wayward Readings in Greek Theology 
(Leiden: Brill, 2001).  
359 K. A. D. Smelik and E. A. Hemelrijk, ‘Who Knows not What Monsters Demented Egypt Worships’ 
1989. 
360 K. A. D. Smelik and E. A. Hemelrijk, ‘Who Knows not What Monsters Demented Egypt Worships’ 
1990. 
361 Gilhuis, I.S. Animals, Gods and Humans: Changing Attitudes to Animals in Greek, Roman and 
Early Christian Ideals (Oxford: Routledge, 2006) 230.  
362 Gilhuis, I.S. Animals, Gods and Humans, 236. 
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provides a basis from which to develop an analysis of Lucian’s works concerning the 
gods. The contest between right and wrong deities offers a useful tool for comparison 
when considered in the context of dedication to the gods, or dedication to divine men. 
The hybrid deities, in Lucian’s works, are not even being worshipped, but rather the 
hybrid philosopher-sophists have adopted the mantle of worthy dedication. Their 
corruption of the human sphere is shown to have leaked into the divine sphere, 
corrupting it by offering an alternative that is in essence, nothing but a gross absurdity 
of the pure philosophical form.363 
It is important to note that the foreign hybrid deity is not strictly the focus in the 
following discussion, as while foreign religions do indeed feature in Lucian’s 
presentation of the hybrid deity, this is argued to be a reflection not of the corrupted 
nature of external pantheons of gods, but rather the Greek pantheon itself. What follows 
provides a brief outline of the presence of the hybrid form in the Hellenic pantheon of 
gods and divinities, allowing a deeper understanding of Lucian’s use of hybrid deities. 
The presence of foreign hybrid gods becomes somewhat secondary to Lucian’s critique, 
as a more targeted critique of Hellenic hybridisation becomes clear. The problem is not 
that hybrid gods are infiltrating the divine sphere, but rather that hybrid philosophers 
are corrupting the world above. The philosopher-sophists have effected a change upon 
the composition of the divine sphere, by actively seeking to diminish the belief in the 
gods. What’s more, the response from the divine sphere is to adopt the same hybridity 
that has corrupted philosophy; the gods are now more concerned with the appearance 
of wisdom and providence, ignorant of their own burgeoning hybridity.  
 Hybrid deities, it should be noted, are neither new nor uncommon by the time 
of Lucian’s writing. For purposes of clarity, I have chosen to continue using the term 
‘hybrid’ as a means to categorise these deities and objects of worship, however it is 
crucial to highlight that Aston, from whom I draw, prefers the term ‘mixanthropic.’364 
                                               
363 It is important to note that this critique against hybrid deities is not restricted to the Second 
Sophistic period. The hesitance towards or even fear of hybrid deities, as Clark outlines, pervades 
many texts of antiquity, namely Vergil Aeneid (8.698), who describes Egyptian gods as monstrous, 
Plutarch, who states that worship of animal gods lead “the weak and innocent into ‘superstition’, (On 
Isis and Osiris. 71) and Philostratus’ VA, wherein Apollonius states that the animal form of the 
Egyptian gods makes them “ridiculous” (6.9) (S.R.L. Clark, ‘Animals in Classical and Late Antique 
Philosophy’ in The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 43). 
See too I. S. Gilhuis, Animals, Gods and Humans, 55. 
364 E. Aston, Mixanthropoi, 12ff, esp. 14. Aston’s concerns with the term ‘hybrid’ relate precisely to 
the symbolic nature of the term, stating that it does not reflect hybridity of form, nor does it give any 
indication of a specific human-animal hybrid. As has been shown throughout this dissertation, the use 
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The main focus of the following discussion looks at the inherent hybridity of many 
figures of the Greek pantheon, encouraging the view that despite Greek and Roman 
dismissal of the foreign pantheons and their hybrid gods, it is clear that a number of 
hybrid deities receive a form of worship within Greek religion. The mere presence of 
hybrid deities therefore, is neither unusual nor disparaged, but rather, Lucian utilises 
their hybrid forms to reflect upon the nature of hybridity itself and its relationship to 
the human sphere. Significantly, the hybrid deities of Lucian’s works are not merely 
hybrids, but they embody the features of the corrupted hybrid, and are as concerned 
with their reputation and value as the philosopher-sophists below, owing to a shift in 
the very nature of divine worship towards a worship of the pseudo-philosophers.  
 Aston’s book, Mixanthropoi: Animal-human hybrid deities in Greek religion, 
provides a comprehensive and informative analysis of the presence and symbolism of 
hybrid gods, and thus it is neither necessary nor productive to replicate this analysis 
here. However, there are a number of key aspects of her work that deserve further 
discussion, particularly in relation to the representation of hybrid deities and the cult 
worship surrounding their hybrid forms. Core to this is the concerted distinction of the 
mixanthrope from the monster – and it is this aspect of her discussion that is of greatest 
significance to the following analysis. Corrupted monsters differ from mixanthropes in 
three primary ways; they are incapable of imbuing humans with morality, they do not 
shirk their remote and otherly nature and are, crucially, considered plural entities, rather 
than individuals.365 This, it is argued, it adopted by Lucian to great effect, as his 
inclusion of hybrid deities serves to stand in stark contrast to the ‘monstrous’ deities. 
The successful hybrid, the singular entity, exists separately from the corrupted masses, 
casting the philosopher-sophists not only as hybrids, but monsters.  
 The hybrid deity has a number of different forms. Their hybridity is reflected 
primarily in their representation, either as deities who are able to transform themselves 
into animals, or those whose forms are quite literally hybridised, adopting elements of 
the animal world to facilitate their role in the divine sphere. It is this latter type of hybrid 
                                               
of the word hybrid in this context does indeed reflect these features, and given its direct relationship to 
Lucian’s work, the term ‘hybrid’ is utilised.  
365 Given the focus of this chapter, it is worth briefly noting the Platonic perceptions of hybrid deities. 
A hybrid deity, for Plato and those succeeding him, is in its essence a false deity. A true god, should be 
“eternal, unchanging, non-composite, uncontaminated by matter” (Plut. De. E. 393e ff; N. Roubekas, 
An Ancient Theory of Religion: Euhemerism from Antiquity to the Present (Routledge: Abingdon, 
2017) 80). Such a definition also aligns well with the notion outlined in this chapter of differentiating 
between singular and plural deities; a true deity must act in a uniform and unified manner (Pl. Tim. 28). 
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that is discussed, for while divine metamorphosis certainly features frequently in 
mythological accounts, the focus here is not upon the fluidity and impermanence of the 
hybrid, but rather on its ability to occupy a unique space between two forms. The hybrid 
centaur has of course been discussed extensively in Chapter Two, however it is useful 
to return to this particular hybrid form in the context of cult worship. The centaur 
Cheiron holds an especial place in the following discussion, as he comes to represent 
the three primary features of the successful, or functional hybrid deity, embodying 
moral and civilised qualities, and existing as a singular entity. While Cheiron is at the 
forefront of this discussion, it should be noted that a number of other deities may be 
included in these various characteristics or roles, and will be treated as fitting.  
 
Lucianic Hybrid Deities  
 
In Lucian’s On Sacrifices, the satirist outlines the inherent idiocy of human devotion to 
and veneration of the gods. “The vain ones” (οἱ µάταιοι) are foolish for believing that 
the actions of the gods are, in this contemporary age, a reflection of human dedication 
(Sacr. 1). Lucian “ironisch abwertet”366 the gods, suggesting that those who believe 
such tales should be laughed at (or wept for) in their ignorance (Sacr. 14-15). Lucian 
proposes that the gods of the Egyptian pantheon, being depicted with the heads of 
animals, in fact are those who align truly with the worth of the heavens (Sacr. 14), 
positions the Greek pantheon as deities who merely appear to be worthy of devotion. It 
is this distinction between successful hybrid deities and the corrupted hybrid deities 
that is the focus of the following discussion. 
Spickermann divides the dialogues of Lucian that deal with hybrid, often 
foreign, gods into two primary categories: those that present foreign gods as infiltrating 
the Olympian space, and those that describe foreign gods in their own divine sphere.367 
In what follows, such a division is similarly utilised, concentrating predominantly on 
this notion of corruption of the divine sphere. The presence of hybrid deities is 
presented as having its root cause in the social make-up of the humans below. The 
hybrids below are shown to have a direct effect upon the composition of the divine 
sphere, and the replication of hybrid infiltration outside of the mortal realm serves to 
highlight the absurdity of its broader social acceptance.  
                                               
366 W. Spickermann, Lukian von Samosata und die fremden Götter,’ 249. 
367 W. Spickermann, ‘Lukian von Samosata und die fremden Götter, ’243 
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In three particular Lucianic dialogues, we are transported to the realm of the 
gods wherein it is possible to view these deities conducting their council proceedings. 
Two of these, largely considered to be companion dialogues (Jupiter Tragoedus and 
Parliament of the Gods) discuss the waning dedication to the Olympian pantheon and 
the presence of hybrid deities in the divine sphere. A third, Icaromenippus,368 expands 
upon the topics treated in the above two dialogues, yet it is unique in that it features a 
human infiltrating this divine space. The following discussion treats each of these 
dialogues in turn, and in doing so, it is shown that there exists a clear connection 
between the hybridity of the mortal and divine spheres, primarily through the notions 
of correct or justified dedication. Given the prevalence, as Anderson notes, of 
scholarship regarding the foreign deities in Lucian, a comprehensive assessment of 
Lucian’s use of the foreign is not treated here.369 Nevertheless, it is necessary to provide 
an overview of the above dialogues in order to assess their position in Lucian’s broader 
critique of contemporary philosophy. 
 
Jupiter Tragoedus 
 
Jupiter Tragoedus opens with the character of Zeus lamenting the diminishing of 
human devotion to him and the other deities. After some back and forth between 
himself and Hera regarding the nature of his lament (Hera is convinced it’s merely 
another love-affair), Zeus explains that he overheard a conversation between two 
philosophers (Timocles and Damis) discussing the existence of the gods, stating that 
humanity’s worship of the deities is precarious. In an attempt to rectify the situation, 
the gods agree to call together a meeting, wherein all of the gods from various 
pantheons are to be brought together in the manner of the Athenian assembly (JTr. 4-
5). Hermes asks Zeus how he should announce the meeting, to which Zeus recommends 
using “metre, and high sounding poetic words” (τὸ κήρυγµα µέτροις τισὶ καὶ 
µεγαλοφωνίᾳ ποιητικῇ, JTr. 6). However Hermes disagrees, arguing that given he is 
not a poet, it is likely that any attempt to appear as such would make him a laughable 
sight. This suggestion of the pretence of high-sounding speech strongly echoes the 
Lucianic perception of the philosopher-sophists. Yet where Hermes recognises that it 
                                               
368 Given the extensive treatment of this dialogue in the previous chapter, it is only the pertinent aspects 
of the narrative that are treated here.  
369 G. Anderson, Lucian: Theme and Variation in the Second Sophistic, 19. 
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would make him look ridiculous, the philosopher-sophists are content with acting as 
false sources of wisdom. This contrast between modes of speech becomes especially 
significant in light of Zeus’ subsequent requests. It is here that the dialogue introduces 
notions of hybridity, through the appearance of hybrid foreign gods and their associated 
notions of worth.  
With the assembly in motion, Zeus then plans the seating order, choosing to, as 
Hermes summarises, order them by wealth, not merit (JTr. 7-8). Zeus proclaims that 
each of the gods should be seated according to their material (ὕλη) and skill (τέχνη), 
with gold taking the first row of seats, to be followed by silver, then ivory, then bronze 
or stone and finally those of marble (JTr. 7). Hermes makes the apt observation that 
with this rule in mind, the front row of deities will be occupied solely by foreign gods,370 
naming Bendis, Anubis, Attis, Mithras and Men, deities made of gold and extensively 
honoured (πολυτίµητοι; JTr. 8).371 Unsurprisingly, the Olympian gods express distaste 
at foreign gods being considered more valuable than themselves. Deflecting the 
complaints from Poseidon, Aphrodite and Helios (in his form as the Colossos of 
                                               
370 Strabo, in the first century AD, exemplifies the assimilation of ‘foreign’ gods into the Greek 
pantheon, stating: "Just as in all other respects the Athenians continue to be hospitable to things 
foreign, so also in their worship of the gods; for they welcomed so many of the foreign rites that they 
were ridiculed for it by comic writers; and among these were the Thracian and Phrygian rites" 
(Geography. 10.3.18).  J. Pollack, O. Primavesi and F. Pressler, ‘Empedocles’ in Brill’s New Pauly, 
Antiquity volumes edited by H. Cancik and H. Schneider (2006) (http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-
9347_bnp_e329950).  
371 The hybridity of Anubis, given his common representation as having the head of a dog is clear, 
however it is worth expanding on the hybrid significance of the remaining deities included in this list. 
Bendis is largely characterised in ancient sources as being the Phrygian equivalent of Artemis, Hecate 
or Persephone, and is often characterised as an ‘orgiastic’ goddess, representing aspects of the 
Dionysian cults, being features alongside satyrs and maenads (C. Auffarth, ‘Bendis’, in Brill’s New 
Pauly, Antiquity volumes edited by: H. Cancik and H. Schneider (2006) 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e215260). Attis, in many depictions, is linked with the Cult 
of Cybele, a cult that is associated most often with the Galli (A. S. Takacs, A. Sarolta, ‘Cybele; in 
Brill’s New Pauly, Antiquity volumes edited by: H. Cancik and H. Schneider (2006) 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e625470). Such a characterisation of Attis and Cybele are 
included too within Lucian’s De Dea Syria, naming them potential foundation myths for the Syrian 
goddess (DDS. 15). Mithras, in a markedly different manner has associations with hybridity through 
the primary characterisation as sacrificing the bull. Gordon states, in relation to this aspect of the 
Mithric cult, that it “claimed to close the gap between god and man through a new myth about the 
origin of the sacrificial custom” R.L. Gordon, ‘Mithras’ in Brill’s New Pauly, Antiquity volumes edited 
by: H. Cancik and H. Schneider (2006) (http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e807080). Finally 
Men, traditionally considered to be the Phrygian moon god, is symbolic in the range of that which he 
oversees. Significantly, he is considered to be both the god of the heavens and of the underworld, while 
simultaneously being assimilated into the Greek pantheon (G. Petzl, ‘Men’ in Brill’s New Pauly, 
Antiquity volumes edited by: H. Cancik and H. Schneider (2006) (http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-
9347_bnp_e731610). 
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Rhodes), Hermes attempts to maintain the proposed seating order, only to give up at 
Zeus’ bequest (JTr. 12).372 
The remainder of the dialogue presents the group of deities formulating a plan 
by which to ensure their dedication remains intact. The first to speak on the matter is 
Momus,373 who not only states that he saw such diminished devotion to the gods 
coming, but also that it was inevitable, given the proliferation of honours being handed 
out to depraved and hateful men (JTr. 19). It is here that there is a clear indication that 
the events of the mortal sphere have a direct effect upon the composition of the divine 
sphere. Despite Momus’ assertion that there are even mortal men among them (in the 
forms of Dionysus, Herakles, Ganymede and Asclepius),374 Zeus asserts that he speaks 
foolishly, and is to be ignored (JTr. 23).375 The presence of hybrid deities in the divine 
sphere serves as a starting point for the following assessment of Lucian’s work. By 
showing a general distaste towards hybrid deities, it is possible to formulate more fully 
the effect that the philosopher sophists have had upon the composition of the divine 
sphere. The presence of hybrid deities themselves is ultimately the least of anyone’s 
                                               
372 In the sequel dialogue, this notion of value in the context of the foreign deities is revitalised, with 
Parliament of the Gods (discussed below) focussing more fully on the cause of hybrid deities and their 
presence in the Greek pantheon.  
373 Momus is perhaps best known from his role in a fable of Aesop (Perry 100), wherein he is depicted 
as critiquing the handicrafts of select gods, being Zeus, Poseidon and Athena. Notably, this fable is 
alluded to in Lucian’s Hermotimus, yet replacing Zeus with Hephaestus (Herm. 20). 
374 Talbert discusses the distinctions in antiquity between what he terms ‘immortals’ and ‘eternals,’ 
distinguishing between these mortal men in the divine sphere and the ‘proper’ gods such as Zeus. In the 
context of his discussion, such a distinction is utilised as a means of understanding the conception of 
the theios aner, the divine man, that presents itself prominently in figures such as Jesus (C.H. Talbert, 
‘The Concept of Immortals in Mediterranean Antiquity’ Journal of Biblical Literature 94:3 (1975) : 
419-436), but also through Apollonius of Tyana, and in some instances, Peregrinus. For discussions of 
Apollonius of Tyana as a theios aner, see E. Koskenniemi, ‘Apollonius of Tyana: a typical theios 
aner?’ Journal of Biblical Literature 117: 3 (1998): 455-467; M. van Uytfanghe, ‘La Vie ‘Apollonius 
de Tyana er le discours hagiographique’ in Theios Sophistes: Essays on Flavius Philostratus’ Vita 
Apollonii, edited by K. Demoen and D. Praet, (Leiden: Brill, 2009) 335-374; J. J. Flinterman, Power, 
Paideia and Pythagoreanism: Greek Identity, conceptions of the relationship between philsophers and 
monarchs and political ideals in Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius  (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1995) esp. 
5ff.; T. Schirren, Philosophos Bios: Die antike Philosophenbiographie als symbolische Form. Studien 
zur Vita Apollonii des Philostrat (Heidelberg: Bibliothek der klassischen Altertumswissenschaften, 
2005), and for an outline of the role of Peregrinus as a theios aner, see B. Blackburn, Theios Aner and 
the Markan Miracle Traditions: A Critique of the Theios Aner Concept as an Interpretive Background 
of the Miracle Traditions Used by Mark (Tübingen: Mohr, 1991) 90ff, with a discussion of the 
significance of Peregrinus in the context of Lucian’s dialogue being discussed below.  
375 Prior to addressing the matter of their dedication, Zeus and Poseidon discuss the nature of fate, with 
Zeus expressing incredulity that Poseidon believes that they as gods have any control of the nature of 
the fates of men. If they did, he asks, would he “have let the temple-robbers get away from Olympia?” 
(JTr. 25), exemplifying the apparent helplessness of the deity. Not only are the gods shown to be 
receiving diminished dedication, but there is the sense that they are ultimately helpless to rectify the 
situation. 
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problems; their hybrid form is unusual and foreign, but not unlike the Lucianic centaur, 
the corruption comes from within, and is merely symbolised by a hybridity of form. As 
will be shown in the context of the remainder of the dialogue and its companion 
Parliament of the Gods, the hybrid forms present in the divine sphere stand as a 
metaphorical critique of hybridity of the divine sphere. The corruption of the Olympian 
pantheon presents itself more fully as a twisted desire for reputation and fame, 
ultimately in light of a diminished dedication. With the human world turning to the 
philosopher-sophists instead of the gods, these philosopher-sophists are shown to even 
have the capacity to corrupt the morals of the divine sphere not only those of the world 
below.  
 
The second divinity to speak at length is Apollo who details the character of Timocles 
the Stoic, who is introduced in the opening sections of the dialogue as defending the 
honour of the gods (JTr. 17). Apollo recognises the philosopher’s intellect, however 
states that his sound is foolish and µιξοβάρβαρος (JTr. 27), and on account of this, 
proposes the delegation of a spokesman in order to ensure the Stoic victory – and retain 
human dedication to the divine sphere. Momus, the constant critic, dismisses the idea, 
encouraging Apollo instead to use his prophetic skill to determine the winner of the 
philosophical battle. However his prophecy merely serves to show that the human 
perception of the gods’ uselessness is entirely valid. Momus asserts that the only thing 
Apollo’s prophecy has revealed is that the mortal sphere is indeed foolish for having 
faith in the god at all, stating that the nature of his prophecies is as convoluted as the 
arguments of the sophists below (JTr. 31).376 This comparison between sophistic 
argument and prophecy is not uncommon tool in antiquity, the primary example of this 
being Philostratus’ own assimilation of the prophetic art with the sophistic method (VS. 
1). In the context of Lucian however, I suggest this comparison is pushed to its furthest 
limits, the likeness of the two arts being used in a derogatory sense rather than as a 
means of praise. The rhetoric of the philosopher-sophists is indeed similar to prophecy, 
but where Philostratus, in his Lives of the Sophists, uses this comparison to show the 
value of sophistry, Lucian maintains that such a comparison is only valid in their 
capacity to propose impenetrable, convoluted, and ultimately false truths.   
                                               
376 In encouraging Apollo to give his prophecy, Momus requests that his prophecy be clear, and “not 
itself in need for a spokesman or interpreter” (JTr. 30), an allusion to the necessity for the Stoic sophist 
needing a spokesman.  
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The last third of the dialogue sees the gods directing their attention to the mortal 
sphere, so as to listen in on the battle of wits between Timocles and Damis, who carry 
on their argument regarding the (non)existence of the gods. In the following discussion, 
the two arguments of the sophists are outlined, for the insight they provide in 
perceptions of the gods in the mortal sphere. The belief in the divine sphere is portrayed 
by Lucian as foolish, a sentiment that is evidenced too in his On Sacrifices dialogue, as 
discussed above. This, it becomes clear, directly relates to the infiltration of hybrid 
deities into the divine sphere. The hybridisation of the mortal sphere, in the context of 
the philosopher-sophists, has an effect upon the gods through a shift in their 
composition, ultimately formulating a pantheon that is no longer themselves dedicated 
to true divine providence, but rather, as with the philosopher-sophists, the gods are more 
concerned with their reputation. The suggestion that belief in these false gods is unwise 
can be seen as a direct critique of those who believe in the teachings of the philosopher-
sophists. Their prophecies are proven to be false and convoluted, and they are similarly 
useless in their profession of wisdom. 
 
The two sophists, Damis and Timocles, are presented as discussing the nature and 
existence of the gods, with each individual taking opposing sides regarding the 
(non)existence of the gods. Damis’ first argument relates to this assertion, contending 
that the gods did indeed exist, they have expressed no anger towards him, and what’s 
more, Timocles being angry on their behalf would earn him punishment for his 
disrespect of the divine will (JTr. 36-7). Timocles responds by proposing an argument 
for intelligent design, for which Damis immediately rebukes him, stating that such 
occurrences could just as well be a random event (JTr. 38). Seeing the ineffectual nature 
of his own stance, Timocles turns to Homer as a source of proof, since his works clearly 
show that the gods not only exist, but exhibit concern for the mortal realm. Once again, 
Timocles’ argument is deftly overturned by Damis, noting that while Homer is a good 
poet, he is still ultimately a poet, composing tales as a source of enjoyment, not truth 
(JTr. 39).  
Grasping at straws, Timocles retorts and suggests that if the gods did not exist, 
then all men and all nations must therefore have been deceived. In reply, Damis notes 
the wide variety of religions and beliefs, which serve to cause confusion about the 
nature of the gods. He lists those who worship hybrid deities, objects, natural 
phenomena – inciting an interjection from the god, Momus, essentially stating, “I told 
 170 
you so” (JTr.  42). Additionally, Damis rejects the validity of oracles precisely on 
account of their hybridity; Apollo’s prophecies are ἀµφήκης and διπρόσωπος, having 
double meanings, like the one which was presented to Croesus (JTr. 43). 
  These particular critiques are especially significant, on account of the clear 
dismissal of the value of hybrid deities. Momus had asserted previously that the 
diminished dedication to the divine sphere was inevitable, arguing that it was on 
account of the depravity that manifested in the human world. Here, such an assertion is 
expanded upon and evidenced directly as the depravity of the mortal realm relates in 
this instance to the widespread belief in hybrid deities. The divine sphere has become 
corrupted by the hybridity of the human sphere. Belief in the philosopher-sophists, in 
particular as a source of moral virtue, has overturned the role and responsibility of the 
divine sphere.  
 
 
Cult and Morality 
 
Prior to turning to the Parliament of the Gods and Icaromenippus dialogues, it 
is important to assess the inherent role of the gods, and the means by which the 
philosopher-sophists are able, in essence, to replace the divine sphere as a source of 
moral virtue. Hybrid deities, in the broader context of cult worship, are frequent 
throughout the Greek and Roman pantheon, however due to space constraints, these 
deities cannot be treated in full here. However two deities in question, Demeter and 
Cheiron,377 are a useful tool for understanding the way in which hybrid deities manifest 
themselves in the context of cult worship, and how they are able to instil a form of 
moral virtue upon those who offer dedication.  
In the case of Cheiron and Demeter, it is their relationship to the horse that 
hybridises them; Cheiron of course, is a centaur, and Demeter, in the guise as the 
chthonic deity Melaina, is often represented in art with the head of a horse.378 Despite 
having such overtly hybridised forms, these two deities are nevertheless consistently 
considered to have a positive influence. The role of the horse in Greek mythology, 
                                               
377 For the purposes of the following discussion, I include Cheiron as a deity on account of his role in 
cult worship. For further analysis of Cheiron’s role as a deity, see E. Aston, Mixathropoi, 91ff and E. 
Aston, ‘Thetis and Cheiron in Thessaly,’ Kernos 22 (2009): 83-107. 
378 E. Aston, Mixanthropoi, 99. 
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perhaps contributing to the violent nature of the centaur itself, is an animal often 
deemed wild and destructive, a characteristic shown most prominently through the 
myth of Diomedes’ man-eating horses (Hyg. Fab. 250; Diod. 4.15.3). The centaur 
Cheiron, however, is not shown to embody these attributes of his part-horse form,379 
but rather, is worshipped for the inherently human qualities. Cheiron, the famous 
teacher of Achilles and healer, stands as an exemplar not only of Greek wisdom, but of 
hybrid wisdom.380 Cheiron as hybrid deity makes an acceptable source of worship 
precisely on account of the distance from reality that the centaur Cheiron represents, 
both geographically381 and physically. As the popular nursery rhyme has shown, horses 
are largely ineffective in performing medical procedures, making the role of Cheiron 
as a doctor figure simultaneously implausible yet also wholly plausible, given that the 
role of educator and healer is attributed to his human form. The reader suspends 
disbelief in the imaginary in order to allow a justified and reasonable worship in the 
hybrid creature.  
Demeter Melaina, in this context, is similarly a hybrid deity with a hybrid role, 
being both geographically and temporally distant from the Greek pantheon, yet 
simultaneously entrenched in contemporary cult worship. The chthonic incarnation of 
Demeter acts in opposition to her Olympian alter-ego; she is hybrid in form, being 
frequently depicted with the head of a horse,382 and her role exists to show that the 
cultivation of grain and civilisation can be taken away as easily as it was granted (Paus. 
8.42).383 Aston outlines that Demeter Melaina, when not receiving the correct 
dedication to her cult, may “undo the process of civilisation completely” by denying 
humanity access to grain, necessitating a (re)turn to cannibalism, and uncivilised 
behaviour. She states that the association with her equine form is clear, due to the hybrid 
nature of the horse as both wild and civilised, not unlike the figure of Cheiron. She 
states:  
                                               
379 As will be shown below, Cheiron’s role as a civilised and ‘human’ centaur comes to be a result of 
his role as a named, singular entity – the race of centaurs broadly, as shown in Chapter Two, are far 
more prone to acting in a manner representative of their destructive horse form.  
380 See too E. Aston, ‘The Absence of Chiron’ Classical Quarterly 56: 2 (2006): 349-362, particularly 
350ff. for a discussion Cheiron as embodying many of characteristics of the so-called ‘underground 
hero.’For more on the concept of the ‘underground hero’ see Y. Ustinova, '"Either a daimon, a hero or 
perhaps a god:" mythical residents of sub- terranean chambers', Kernos 15 (2002): 267-288. 
381 E. Aston, Mixanthropoi 92 ff.  
382 L. Beschi, ‘Demeter’ in Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae IV: 4 (LIMC) edited by L. 
Kahil, München: Artemis Verlag, 1988, 328-332. 
383 E. Aston, Mixanthropoi 101.  
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“The horse is a domesticated, vegetarian quadruped that works on man’s behalf; 
but this side of its nature can vanish in a flash, to be replaced with the qualities of a 
thêr, a wild beast.”384 Such a description of the horse highlights the dual nature of the 
animal, being simultaneously a constructive and destructive force. This potential 
destruction is evoked through the hybrid figure of Demeter Melaina. Cult dedication to 
the figure of Demeter Melaina, the horse-headed god, acts as a preventative measure to 
ensure the continuation of civilised existence. Aston notes that Demeter’s role as a 
hybrid deity differs significantly from that of Cheiron, stating that her characterisation 
as a vengeful goddess is “completely at odds with Cheiron….works to preserve human 
civilisation,”385 whereas Demeter Melaina serves simply as a threat to its destruction. 
Although she is primarily a deity of Phigalian religion, her representation in Greek art 
and literature reveals the integration of her hybrid form into the Greek pantheon, and 
ultimately serves to warn against the act of transgressing against the divine.  
Cheiron and Demeter Melaina serve as starting points for the following 
discussion. They represent the quintessential hybrid, being a combination of the horse 
and human, and their role as hybrid deities largely serves simultaneously both to 
preserve and to threaten human civilisation. Yet the corruption that traditionally imbues 
notions of the hybrid is not attributed to the hybrid itself. In the case of Demeter, her 
potential as destructive is only incited by a form of corruption of the human realm, 
through their lack of cult worship. As will be shown in the following discussion, it is 
the subsidiaries of the hybrid deity that become the source of the corruption, becoming 
unable to maintain their role as a moral centre for humankind. As will be shown in the 
case of Cheiron, the hybrid deity itself maintains its uncorrupted role among the Greek 
pantheon, while the centaurs en masse, and their cult dedication embodies the wildness 
of the hybrid creature. Lucian’s work too, distinguishes between the singular and the 
plural in terms of dedication; the hybrid alone stands as a figure worthy of worship, 
while the philosopher-sophists as a group act as a mass of hybrids, becoming a 
corrupting force.   
 
Parliament of the Gods 
 
                                               
384 E. Aston, Mixanthropoi, 106. 
385 E. Aston, Mixanthropoi. 109. 
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In the discussion that follows, the corruption and inappropriate hybridisation in the 
divine sphere directly correlates with the diminished dedication of human beings. 
Moreover, it is shown that the invasive hybrid deities and their associates offer an 
analogy with the philosopher-sophists. Momus’ opinions on the nature of the gods and 
their diminished dedication in relation to hybrid deities increases in Parliament of the 
Gods; in Jupiter Tragoedus, Zeus had decided to deal with the matter of foreign deities 
and their relative value at another time (JTr. 12). It is here that such a topic is treated, 
and once again Momus takes centre stage with his personal critique. The primary 
consideration in the following discussion is the fact that Momus’ critique of hybrid 
deities is no longer focused upon the foreign gods. Rather, Momus extends his criticism 
to the hybridisation of the Olympian pantheon, provoking a further reflection upon the 
relationship between the divine and mortal spheres. The Golden Age of Greek 
philosophical pursuits have passed, and contemporary philosophical culture is 
dominated by corrupted, hybridised philosopher-sophists, who are more concerned 
with their reputation than with learning. Such an effect has likewise been transferred to 
the divine sphere, wherein the gods (as shown above) are concerned only with their 
dedication and not with expressing divine providence. Momus’ first complaint is 
directed at Dionysus, who is portrayed as not only being of foreign descent, but is also 
half-man (ἡµιάνθρωπος, Deor. Conc. 4).386 A large part of Momus’ critique of 
Dionysus rests upon the associated introduction of his clan to the divine sphere, these 
being “Pan and Silenus and the Satyrs,”387 who become similarly connected to 
                                               
386 It is worth briefly noting the way in which Dionysus is traditionally viewed (albeit falsely) as an 
arriving god. Such a theme presents itself in Euripides’ Bacchae, depicting him as arriving in Thebes, 
and there is a similar sense of arriving when considered in the context of his role as Dionysus 
Eleuthereus, becoming integrated into the Athenian conception of deities (A. Henrichs, ‘Between City 
and Country: Cultic Dimensions of Dionysus in Athens and Attica, in Cabinet of the Muses: Essays on 
Classical and Comparative Literature in Honor of Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, edited by M. Griffith and 
D. J. Mastronarde (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990) 259). For more detailed analyses of Dionysus’ role in 
cult as an arriving god, and for evidence contradicting such a representation, see S. G. Cole, ‘Finding 
Dionysus’ in A Companion to Greek Religion, edited by D. Ogden, (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 
2007) 327-342 and M. Detienne, Dionysus at Large, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1989).  
387 The Classical period sees the move of Pan from an anthropomorphised, upright goat to fully 
hybridised form of goat and man. (R. Herbig, Pan, der griechische Bocksgott: Versuch einer 
Monographie (Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1949) 53-7.) The goat element of Pan is predominantly 
related to the pastoral life, acting act the god of shepherds and animal-herding, acting as an important, 
and perhaps integral element of the success and maintenance of human civilisation.  Pan occupies a 
curious space in the world of hybrid deities, as despite the favourable elements of his goat aspects 
contributing to human civilisation, there nevertheless “existed an underlying awareness of their [the 
goat parts] potential to disturb and disquiet.” (E Aston, Mixanthropoi, 118.) The role of Pan, Silenus 
and the Satyrs cannot be discussed in full here, however it is nevertheless significant as an exemplar of 
the how a deity, in a plural form, may have a starkly different effect in the human realm. Rather than 
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foreignness and hybridity. This, states Momus, is the reason for humanity’s current lack 
of reverence towards the gods; the gods have become laughable and monstrous, (Deor. 
Conc. 5) no longer representative of true divinity.  
In these opening sections, it is easy to see the parallel to be drawn between the 
hybrid deities and hybrid philosopher-sophists, in particular in relation to notions of 
singular388 and plural deities that was outlined above. From an internal perspective, the 
gods are shown to be concerned with the lack of dedication afforded them from the 
human realm, this shift being attributed to the philosopher-sophists. It is argued that 
their hybridity has affected the composition of the divine sphere in two primary ways; 
their hybrid form has infiltrated the realm of divinity, allowing the ‘corrupted’ hybrid 
deities to occupy it, and significantly, humanity has not simply stopped worshipping 
the gods, but rather worships the philosopher-sophists. It is the former of these effects 
of hybridity that is important for the following discussion, as the corruption of the 
divine sphere with hybrid deities is shown to be a consequence not of the hybrid deities 
outlined above, but rather of the followers of these deities.  
In the context of this distinction between the singular and plural deity, it is worth 
returning to the discussion of centaurs found in Chapter Two.  In this chapter, it was 
shown that the hybrid centaur may take many forms, being depicted in both its 
traditional role as a violent and savage beast, and a humanised figure in the context of 
a family unit. As noted in Chapter Two and reiterated above, Cheiron stands as an 
outlier to such characterisations, being wholly distanced from the more general race of 
centaurs. The question of why there exists two different ‘kinds’ of hybrid identity 
comes down precisely to the distinction between singular and plural entities, the hybrid 
corruption being attributed to the influence of the many over the individual. As Aston 
notes, “the plurality of mixanthropes overrides individual identity and establishes 
instead a quality of the generic that is vital to the mixanthropic nature.”389 For fear of 
beating a dead horse, it will suffice to say that this overriding of the generic over the 
                                               
existing as a singular entity that serves to stand for the civilisation and progression of humanity and its 
virtue, they are a nameless mass, and a source of chaos, not unlike Lucian’s contemporary philosopher-
sophists. 
388 It is important to note that my use of the term ‘singular’ in this discussion should not be pushed too 
far. As Versnel discusses, there is rarely a singular identity of a deity, but more often than not, a single 
named deity will have multiple functions, which frequently translates into having multiple forms and 
rituals (H. S. Versel, Coping with the Gods, 35ff). For my purposes, the ‘singular’ deity is understood 
simply in direct opposition to the unnamed and undistinguished masses. 
389 E. Aston, Mixanthropoi, 299. 
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individual can be evidenced in the mythology of the centaurs themselves, with the mass 
of centaurs being the primary representatives of the corrupted hybrid form. 
 
 
Zeus 
 
From a divine perspective, the philosopher-sophists appear as a mass of corrupted 
hybrids, worthy of little more than mockery. This perspective too, exhibits itself within 
the divine sphere, for as the dialogue continues, more and more deities are considered 
by Momus to be corrupted hybrids, being false representatives of divine wisdom. The 
most significant among these is Zeus himself, for it was his transformations in the 
mortal realm that allowed the corruption of the heavens. Not only is Zeus himself a 
corrupted hybrid, but the composition of the divine sphere even permits Herakles and 
Dionysus to be appointed gods. Momus, moreover, asserts that Zeus has allowed an 
eagle into the heavens, along with a number of mortals (Attis, Ganymede), yet this is 
not the most absurd corruption of the heavens. Momus brings his diatribe back to the 
Egyptian hybrid gods, expressing pure disbelief that dogs, bulls, ibises, monkeys and 
billy-goats have been inserted (παραβύω) into the heavens (Deor. Conc. 10). Even Zeus 
himself, he notes, has been corrupted by the Egyptian pantheon, through his 
representation as Zeus-Ammon. Here, Zeus is portrayed as not only adopting hybrid 
forms in the mortal sphere through his transformations, but also in the divine sphere.390 
The mere existence of the gods, as Jupiter Tragoedus have shown, is precarious, 
as the hybridity of belief systems in the mortal realm has created confusion, not clarity. 
The hybridised deities act as a metaphor for the hybrid philosopher-sophists below, 
consequently, it is not unreasonable to assert that the validity of philosophy similarly 
hangs in the balance. In the following sections, Momus reveals the reason for the 
presence of hybrid, false gods, blaming the worship of abstract divinities on the 
                                               
390 The image of Zeus Ammon as having the horns of a ram in addition to his anthropomorphised form 
can be traced at least as far back as the sixth century BC, making his hybrid form an established aspect 
of his mythology. Parke describes a Cyreneiac coin from the sixth century BC that depicts a ‘Zeus 
type’ as a god with ram’s horns. (H.W. Parke, Oracles of Zeus, 203). Not only is Zeus shown to be 
concerned with his chthonic form as Zeus Meilichios (Icar. 24), but he is similarly concerned with the 
temple robbers of Dodona. At the shrine of Dodona, as Parke notes, there exists a head of Zeus 
Ammon which retains the traditional ram’s horns (H.W. Parke, Oracles of Zeus, 208). This connection 
between Dodona and Zeus Ammon may allow for Lucian’s particular critique of Zeus Ammon in the 
Council to be viewed in his broader representations of the divine, however given the obscurity of the 
cult reference, this can merely be speculation.  
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philosophers. The philosophers, having placed so much credence on devoting oneself 
to Virtue, Nature, Destiny and Chance, are precisely to blame for the absence of 
sacrifice to the true gods (Deor. Conc. 13), preferring instead to devote themselves to 
abstractions. It is here that a direct connection with Jupiter Tragoedus appears, for the 
way in which Momus is able to reflect upon the philosophers’ effect upon the divine 
sphere. The deities are to be made in man’s image, and through this insistence upon the 
philosophical influence, the hybrid sphere of Lucian’s Jupiter Tragoedus and Council 
of the Gods acts as a reflection of the hybridity of the mortal sphere. The hybrid 
philosopher-sophists have become a bane not only to humanity, but even the gods 
themselves.   
 
Icaromenippus  
 
Having outlined these two companion dialogues, it is useful to return to Icaromenippus, 
for a third view into the sphere of the divine.391 Here, the two primary concerns of 
Jupiter Tragoedus and Parliament of the Gods converge, not only portraying the gods 
as concerned with the state of the philosopher-sophists, but also presenting an active 
infiltration of the divine sphere. Menippus, a visitor from the mortal realm, becomes 
privy to viewing the world below from above, even being able to view the gods 
convening in an assembly. Yet unlike in the dialogues discussed above, Menippus’ 
infiltration in the divine sphere sees the gods having the agency to actively punish the 
philosophers, a stark contrast to Zeus’ assertion in Jupiter Tragoedus.   
Upon arriving in the Heavens, Menippus relays both the concerns of the Moon, 
and his own concerns, emphasising the unsatisfactory nature of the philosophers due to 
their lack of knowledge about the heavens (Icar. 23). Zeus, impressed with Menippus’ 
ability even to reach the heavens (exceeding the efforts of Otus and Ephialtes), invites 
him to stay the night, so that Zeus himself may learn about the human world. Concerned 
with the waning dedication towards him on account of the philosophical schools, Zeus 
asks of Menippus if any of the “descendants of Pheidias” (Icar. 24; τῶν ἀπὸ Φειδίου) 
are still remaining.392 The characterisation of Zeus in Icaromenippus emphasises Zeus’ 
                                               
391 For an overview of Lucian’s Icaromenippus, see Chapter 4. 
392 Such a phrase is possibly referring to his biological descendants who were, according to Pausanias, 
assigned the task of keeping the statue of Zeus clean (Paus. 5.14.5). Pausanias states in his description 
of the Statue of Zeus that “The descendants of Pheidias, (οἱ ἀπόγονοι Φειδίου) called Cleansers, have 
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desire to maintain his reputation in the human world. If the descendants of Pheidias no 
longer remain, there is no one to ensure that the image of Zeus is to receive continued 
dedication. This concern with worship, as has been evidenced above, reflects precisely 
the self-centred concerns of the philosopher-sophists.   
Zeus also laments the Athenian neglect of the Diasia festival, wherein 
dedicatees presented ‘bloodless offerings’ to Zeus Meilichios, as alluded to earlier.393 
Walter Burkert outlines Zeus Meilichios’ role as a chthonic deity, separate from Zeus’ 
Olympian characterisation. While many chthonic deities are traditionally associated 
with agriculture,394 Meilichios is more closely associated with the souls of the 
underworld.395 Zeus in his chthonic form is also largely represented either as a snake or 
in association with a snake, in contrast to the anthropomorphised form of Pheidias’ 
Zeus. The hybridity of Zeus’ form in this dialogue presents itself in the context of Zeus 
occupying a space between his Olympian and Chthonic forms, as this zoomorphised, 
chthonic characterisation of Zeus is immediately followed by a reference to the 
Olympieion. Zeus asks of Menippus whether the Olympieion’s construction has been 
completed, and given its role as a temple dedicated specifically to Zeus’ Olympian 
form, there is the suggestion that Lucian’s Zeus is equally concerned with his role in 
the Underworld and as an Olympian god. The combination of Zeus’ Olympian and 
Chthonic forms are useful in identifying the disparity, in his zoomorphised and 
anthropomorphised forms,396 and the three functions of Zeus reveal the diverse, hybrid 
nature of the god. While Pausanias’ discussion of the Pheidian statue includes the story 
of Zeus’ approval of his representation by means of thunderbolt (Paus. 11.9), Lucian 
                                               
received from the Eleans the privilege of cleaning the image of Zeus from the dirt that settles on it, and 
they sacrifice to the Worker Goddess before they begin to polish it.”  
393 E. Simon, Festivals of Attica: An Archaeological Commentary (London: University of Wisconsin 
Press: 1983) 13. See also Thuc. 1.126.6.4-5, who states that instead of blood sacrifices, the populace 
brought “traditional offerings of the country”. It should be noted that Jameson argues that Thucydides’ 
ἱερεῖα does not exclude animal victims from the sacrifice. Rather, he interprets the term to mean that 
the sacrificial offerings merely excluded sheep, on the basis of the Erchian sacrificial calendar and its 
suggestion of normal sacrifice practice.  
394 W. Burkert, Greek Religion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985) 200-201. 
395 Jameson considers Zeus Meilichios to preside especially over the ‘ancestral dead’ on account of the 
deity’s association with family cults. (M. Jameson, ‘Notes on the Sacrificial Calendar from Erchia,’  
Erchia Bulletin de correspondance hellénique 89:1 (1965): 161). 
396 Scott Scullion, in assessing Olympian and chthonic rituals, concludes that such a distinction 
between the two is largely a misapprehension. The Diasia festival in particular combines aspects of 
both chthonic and Olympian ritual practice, (S. Scullion, ‘Olympian and Chthonian’, Classical 
Antiquity 13:1 (1994): 79ff.) and states that “binary oppositions of the Olympian/chthonian kind 
generally need to be kept somewhat fluid” (S. Scullion, ‘Olympian and Chthonian,’ 118.) 
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offers a tripartite perspective, encompassing not only Zeus’ anthropomorphised 
Olympian form, but also his form as animal and chthonic deity of the Underworld.  
Zeus’ equal concern with these two appearances reflects the hybridisation of the 
divine sphere, and his concern with the relative dedication towards his two forms relates 
directly to the concerns presented by Menippus. Despite Menippus’ protestations that 
the human sphere considers Zeus to be the king of the gods, Zeus is shown to have a 
clearer perspective, arguing from experience that his “altars are more frigid than the 
Laws of Plato or the Syllogisms of Chrysippus” (Icar. 24). The insinuation here is clear; 
the lack of dedication offered to the divine sphere and its subsequent corruption is 
shown to have a direct relationship to the philosopher-sophists. Philosophical discourse 
in the present age has gone cold, no longer embodying the warmth that may be acquired 
through a true and informed pursuit of philosophical wisdom. This lack of warmth has 
similarly chilled the altars of the gods, to the extent that the value in the gods has ceased 
to exist. Rather than the humans below dedicating themselves to the gods, or to 
philosophy in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue, their source of morality comes from 
what Lucian views to be the bane of civilised society: the hybrid, corrupted, centaur-
like philosopher-sophists.  
 
Peregrinus 
 
The theme of the corrupted, uncivilised, philosopher-sophists and their relationship to 
the divine sphere culminates in the dialogue regarding the death of the Cynic turned 
Christian, Peregrinus (also known as Proteus).397 Through this dialogue, Lucian 
actualises the concerns expressed by the gods in the above dialogues, showing the 
quintessential hybrid philosopher-sophist as a corrupting force upon those around him. 
It is Peregrinus’ role as the epitome of Lucian’s satire that motivates him being the final 
figure in this discussion, existing as a hybrid figure that deserves little praise, and 
extensive mockery. Lucian’s dialogue on the death of Peregrinus can be divided into 
two main parts; the first deals with the biography of Peregrinus, while the final half 
details the manner and aftermath of his death. The characterisation of Peregrinus 
throughout is as a fraudulent philosopher who seeks only to gain reputation and glory. 
                                               
397 Due to space constraints, the following discussion is limited to the Lucianic characterisation of 
Peregrinus. It should be noted, however, that it is possible to see a similar examination of philosophers 
and hybrids through the characterisation of Alexander Abonoteichus, the false prophet and imposter.  
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Peregrinus thereby becomes the fullest example of the hybrid corruption that has been 
the focus of this chapter, and of this dissertation more broadly.  
 Lucian’s work on Peregrinus stands as the single source for the life and death 
of Peregrinus,398 and thus it is crucial to note that the following discussion makes no 
attempt at determining the truth behind Lucian’s account. Lucian maintains from the 
beginning that Peregrinus’ primary motivation was his love for reputation, and speaks 
of the dedication of his many followers. Primary among these is a Cynic named 
Theagenes, who vehemently defends the honour of Peregrinus against Lucian’s own 
vocal dismissals. Theagenes boldly claims that Peregrinus’ actions have simply been 
misinterpreted; not only do his actions “rival Olympian Zeus,” but his intention to self-
immolate (which Lucian later deems to be simply a means to regain his renown; Peregr. 
20) is not dissimilar to Heracles, Asclepius, Dionysus and Empedocles before him 
(Peregr. 4). In these early sections, Peregrinus is characterised by Lucian as a holy man, 
and acting in a manner similar to that of the other Olympian deities (with the exception 
of Empedocles). However Lucian does note that despite Theagenes’ extravagant claims 
in defending Peregrinus, he does not deign (ἠξίου) to compare Proteus with 
Diogenes,399 nor Antisthenes, nor even Socrates (Peregr. 5). Lucian (perhaps rightly) 
distinguishes between the relative value of these Olympian deities and the philosophers 
of the past, thus the comparison of Peregrinus to the deities is, on the face of it, 
ridiculous. However, the comparison is in another sense perfectly apt. The self-
obsessed, attention-seeking holy man is all too similar to the gods as they appear in 
Lucian. As the work continues, particularly in relation to Peregrinus’ association with 
Christianity and subsequently Cynicism, the connection between the gods and 
Peregrinus comes down precisely to their mutual characterisation as corrupted 
hybrids.400  
                                               
398 M.J. Edwards. ‘Satire and Verisimilitude: Christianity in Lucian’s “Peregrinus”’ Historia: 
Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 38:1 (1989): 89. See too G. Anderson, Sage, Saint and Sophist: Holy 
Men and their Associates in the Early Roman Empire, (London: Routledge, 1994) 31ff; 41-45.  
399 This comparison with Diogenes and the other well-known Cynics will be returned to below.  
400 It is worth noting here that Fields also discusses this particular passage, noting that the comparison 
with Peregrinus and Zeus goes further still. She notes that the Theaganes continues his speech, stating 
that “These are the two noblest masterpieces that the world has seen – the Olympian Zeus, and Proteus; 
of the one, the creator and artists is Phidias, of the other, Nature” (Peregr. 6). Fields argues that this 
inclusion shows that Theagenes partly rescinds his direct comparison with the deity, however more 
importantly, the notion that Proteus was derived from nature serves to imply that he is not simply 
comparable, but superior (D. Fields, ‘The Reflections of Satire: Lucian and Peregrinus’ Transactions of 
the American Philosophical Association 143: 1 (2013): 231).  
 180 
 The following discussion assesses Peregrinus’ Christian and Cynic lives in turn, 
as it is crucial to understand the background of the Lucianic depiction in order to 
understand the way in which his self-immolation acts as a parallel to the hybrid 
corruption of the divine sphere. As noted above, the discussion here is limited to 
Lucian’s account,401 which states that following his exile, Peregrinus turns to the 
Christian doctrine. In no short order, Lucian (through the voice of a Democritean) 
outlines that Peregrinus became a prophet and a θιασάρχης (Dionysian cult-leader), to 
the extent that he was regarded as a god (Peregr. 11). The extent of his worship by the 
masses culminates in his imprisonment, when he is charged with the crime of 
introducing the mystery rites (τελετή) of Christianity into the world. His arrest, 
however, did little to diminish the level of dedication afforded the divine man, who 
came to be called the “new Socrates” (Peregr. 12).402 Peregrinus, in this 
characterisation, becomes a martyr figure for his followers, a source of such divine 
wisdom that he is able to amass worship, and significantly, revenue (Peregr. 13). In 
adopting the tenets of Christianity, that encourage the transgression of the Greek 
pantheon in favour of the promises of community, Peregrinus stands as a figure to 
whom worship and holiness may come easily. Lucian states, “if any charlatan or 
trickster…comes among them [the people], he quickly acquires sudden wealth” 
(Peregr. 13), not as a result of true wisdom, but of sheer deception.403  
 In the sections that follow, the characterisation of Peregrinus becomes more 
convoluted, as the transition towards Cynicism stands as a striking development in the 
development of the divine man. While being imprisoned, Peregrinus’ desire for 
reputation becomes more insistent; dying in prison, he rationalises, would garner him 
even greater worship – an assertion that encourages his release from prison, as the 
                                               
401 For informed discussions of Peregrinus and the relationship to Christianity, particularly the 
motivations for his conversion, see G. Bagnani, ‘Peregrinus Proteus and the Christians,’ Historia: 
Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 4:1 (1955): 107-112; J. N. Bremmer, ‘Peregrinus’ Christian Career’ in 
Flores Florentina: Dead Sea Scrolls and Other Jewish Studies in Honour of Florentino García 
Martínez, edited by A. Hillhorst, É. Puech and E. Tigchelaar, 729-747, (Brill: Leiden, 2007) and M.J. 
Edwards. ‘Satire and Verisimilitude: Christianity in Lucian’s “Peregrinus”’ Historia: Zeitschrift für 
Alte Geschichte 38:1 (1989): 89-98. 
402 The motivations behind such a comparison are evident. Plato’s Apology of Socrates outlines that 
Socrates was charged for being an imposter (22) and a figure who is responsible for corrupting the 
young (24c). Socrates’ defence against such charges, in the context of Lucian’s Peregrinus, is used to 
frame Peregrinus as similarly unjust in his imprisonment: according to his followers. 
403 I. L. E. Ramelli, ‘Lucian’s Peregrinus as Holy Man and Charlatan and the Construction of the 
Contrast between Holy Men and Charlatans in the Acts of Mari’ in Holy Men and Charlatans in the 
Ancient Novel, edited by S. Panayotakis, G. Schmeling and M. Paschalis, (Barkhuis: Amsterdam, 
2015), 105-120. 
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punishment of imprisonment is no longer effective (Peregr. 14). Returning to his 
homeland, he learns that his possessions have been stripped from him, which apparently 
motivates his conversion to the Cynic way of life.404 Peregrinus, by this period in his 
life, is described as wearing “his hair long by now, dressed in a dirty mantle, he had a 
wallet slung by his side, the staff was in his hand.” These are the traditional and most 
recognisable features of the Cynic external appearance. What is more, in contrast to his 
depiction later in life, moments preceding his death (Peregr. 5), Peregrinus is (falsely) 
hailed by his followers as the only one worthy of praise equivalent to Diogenes and 
Crates (Peregr. 15). His Cynic transition culminates in his venture to Egypt, wherein 
he receives teaching from Agathobulus: a figure who studied alongside the esteemed 
Cynic Demonax (Demon. 3). Yet despite gaining the teachings of Cynicism through 
such praiseworthy channels, Peregrinus is characterised as still seeking reputation over 
true wisdom, merely using “philosophy as a cloak” (Peregr. 18). Despite being 
heralded as a god, and seeking to maintain his reputation as a holy man, his return to 
Greece sets up the beginning of his downfall, to the extent that he turns to Zeus, whom 
he had previously dismissed, to gain sanctuary (Peregr. 20), ultimately realising that 
his career as a holy man worthy of worship and praise, had come to an end.  
 Peregrinus rationalises that he was unable to gain further reputation through his 
actions as a living prophet, and thus is inspired die by self-immolation. He considers 
that being the centre of a spectacle so awe-inspiring (Peregr. 22) would surely provide 
him with the reputation and glory that he so desired. Although Peregrinus claims to be 
sacrificing himself for the “sake of his fellow men” (Peregr. 23), as an exercise in 
teaching them to not fear death and ensure hardships, Lucian deftly rejects such an 
assertion. Rather, he warns against imitating such a corrupted and vainglorious 
individual, simultaneously exposing those who worship the figure of Peregrinus. 
“Emulation” (ζηλόω) he states, “is not a matter of wallet, staff and mantle,” (Peregr. 
24) but an absolute and complete dedication to that which you choose to imitate. The 
followers of Peregrinus, much like Peregrinus himself, strive towards the appearance 
                                               
404 Earlier in the piece, (Peregr. 10) we are told by Lucian that Peregrinus was responsible for the death 
of his father; upon returning to his home city of Parium, the populace continue to mourn the death, and 
move to punish Peregrinus for his actions. Lucian goes on to relate the cunning ploy that Peregrinus 
enacts in order to rid himself of such a charge. For the purposes of the following discussion, however, I 
focus upon the transition of Peregrinus to Cynicism and the effect this has upon his characterisation, 
rather than the supposed motives. 
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of wisdom and do not hold true to the uncorrupted and valuable tenets that a true 
follower of religion or philosophy should hold. 
 
The figure of Peregrinus, as evidenced in Lucian’s depiction, is shown in this first half 
of the work to be a figure driven by greed and a desire for reputation, unable to commit 
fully to a virtuous existence. He is neither Christian nor Cynic, but a motley mix of the 
two, and he is neither man nor god. His relationship to the divine sphere becomes a 
sheer transgression of his correct boundaries; rather than becoming a hybrid of superior 
qualities to the two halves, he instead is source of corruption for the two spheres. As 
has been shown, his actions and striving for prosperity and glory amass numbers of 
followers under false pretences, and cloaking himself as a god or a philosophical 
teacher merely undermines the value previously attributed these lofty positions. Lucian 
supposes, reflecting upon Peregrinus’ intent to self-immolate, that the gods themselves 
are to relish the death of Peregrinus, stating that “no one of the gods would be angry if 
Peregrinus were to die an evil (κακῶς) death” (Peregr. 26). 
 In the context of hybrid gods, it is possible to view the figure of Peregrinus as 
the epitome of the corruption that exudes from the hybrid philosopher-sophists, as the 
hybridity of the world below is shown to directly affect society’s perception of the 
divine sphere. As has been shown through the three dialogues that are positioned in the 
divine sphere, this lack of dedication afforded them is hailed as one of their primary 
concerns. Humans no longer show dedication towards the gods, but rather towards men 
who portray themselves as divine in an attempt to gain reputation and wealth. This, as 
the Peregrinus shows, is precisely the extent of corruption that the hybrid philosopher-
sophists subsist upon.    
 
In this chapter, it had been argued that the Lucianic dialogues that situate themselves 
in the divine sphere should also be considered to constitute a critique of the philosopher-
sophists, through the way in which the texts are framed around notions of hybridity. 
Hybrid deities, are not rare, nor do they belong entirely to the realm of Eastern deities. 
Rather, they appear frequently and pervasively in the Greek pantheon, and this chapter 
serves to highlight Lucian’s manipulation of this aspect of cult dedication. It has been 
shown that the hybrid deity can be a source of value to humanity; the figure of Cheiron 
stands as a heroic and learned centaur, while Demeter Melaina ensures the survival and 
progression of the human race. However even these civilised hybrids have their 
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corrupted counterparts, and the indiscernible, nameless masses that come to exist as the 
progeny of these hybrid cult figures stand as representatives of destruction, as 
evidenced through the race of centaurs more broadly.  
  In the context of the Lucianic dialogues, this becomes even more significant, as 
he provides an insight into the societal makeup of the divine sphere. The personification 
Momus, in Parliament of the Gods and Zeus Tragoedus, stands as an outspoken 
individual who serves to highlight the present state of the divine sphere and its inept 
nature. The Olympian deities, once worthy of cult worship, are now dismissed as being 
of little value, and in the final third of Icaromenippus this diminished reputation is 
shown to be the direct consequence of the philosopher-sophists. In the context of 
Peregrinus, we are offered a form of case-study that serves to support the divine claims 
that the philosopher-sophists are a harmful source; Peregrinus, rather than encouraging 
civility and moral values, instead ensures that his own reputation becomes preserved,405 
and in this instance, directly diminishes the value of the gods. The hybrid philosopher-
sophists are not unlike the mass of centaurs: destructive, thoughtless and ultimately, 
interested in little more than ensuring their own worth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
405 I, and presumably Lucian himself, do understand the irony in continuing to speak about Peregrinus.   
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Conclusion 
 
I know that all of this is depressing, because it seems as if America’s 
reputation overseas is under attack from its own President. 
 
Trump is the worst of us, yes, but he’s not all of us. If I had to distil America 
down to one sound, it wouldn’t be the braying voice of Donald Trump 
screaming ‘America First.’ 
 
Donald Trump does not reflect America…America is not one thing, it’s a 
beautiful mess of contradictions, where good and bad are mixed together. 
 
Trump vs. The World: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver 
 
 
John Oliver’s role in the current political climate cannot be overestimated. As Wren 
states, late night commentators, often comedians, offer a means for “viewers, by proxy, 
to get in the last word,”406 allowing a reflection and ultimately rejection of what 
absurdity the day’s news has brought. “A dangerously unserious president,” she states, 
“has put our professional joke-tellers in a serious mood,”407 shifting the dichotomy 
between audience and commentator, and encouraging the audience not to follow along 
blindly. The era of Donald Trump, and the multitude of political commentators upon 
his presidency through a wide range of media outlets, is a useful means to understand 
the significance of Lucian and his satire within his own political climate. “It is up to us 
[comedians] to overturn and shake and deconstruct and weigh every system that 
governs life,”408 a responsibility that rings true for Lucian and his critique against the 
philosopher-sophists of the Second Sophistic.409 Lucian’s satires and their value to 
                                               
406 C. Wren. "Late-Night TV Turns Political." Commonweal 145: 3 (2018): 27. 
407 C. Wren. "Late-Night TV Turns Political." 27. 
408 A. Nancherla, “Comedians in the Age of Trump: Forget Your Stupid Toupee Jokes.” The Village 
Voice, 13 Dec. 2016 (https://www.villagevoice.com/2016/12/13/comedians-in-the-age-of-trump-
forget-your-stupid-toupee-jokes/). 
409 Belenger’s recent dissertation, Speaking Truth to Power: Stand-up Comedians as Sophists, Jesters, 
Public Intellectuals and Activists” discusses the comparison between contemporary comedians and 
rhetoricians of antiquity. While her work deals primarily with the ‘sophists’ of the ‘First Sophistic,’ it 
is nevertheless clear that the tools of sophistry are engrained in the socio-political commentary that 
defines contemporary comedians (J. Belanger, ‘Speaking Truth to Power: Stand-Up Comedians as 
Sophists, Jesters, Public Intellectuals and Activists’ (2017). Open Access Dissertations. Paper 610. 
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/oa_diss/610. 
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society, although temporally far removed from modern comedians and the Trump 
presidency, have much in common with the overall goal of comedy, that is, to hold the 
objects of satire accountable for their actions and beliefs on the public stage. Although 
Lucian did not have the medium of television and social media, his ability to effectively 
communicate his satire stems from the hybrid nature of his works, and his capacity to 
speak to both elite, and non-elite audiences. Lucian holds a lens to society, and does so 
in such a manner that encourages reflection upon the hybridity of the period of the 
Second Sophistic, and those who inhabit it.  
 
This dissertation has proposed that Lucian uses the theme of hybridity in order to 
critique contemporary philosophical ideals and practices, framing the philosopher-
sophists of the period as hybrids through their unsuccessful melding of the virtues of 
philosophy with the power of rhetoric. The theme of hybridity has been explored in 
multiple ways, and this dissertation recognises Lucian’s own hybridity, both in terms 
of his ethnicity and of his use of the serio-comic genre. Lucian, in a number of his 
works, underscores what a true hybrid and a false hybrid is, and the motif of the centaur 
serves to illustrate his point well, being simultaneously an admired figure through the 
mythical tradition surrounding Cheiron, while also being a source of violence and 
uncivilised behaviour, as evident in tales of the Centauromachy. I have argued that 
Lucian, rather than dismissing his hybridity, acknowledges (Bis. Acc. 33) and utilises 
it to create a more informed critique of the philosopher-sophists, establishing a series 
of works that serve to address both elite and non-elite concerns simultaneously.  
 This dissertation has comprised of five chapters, each outlining the means by 
which Lucian uses the motif of hybridity to achieve his critique of contemporary 
philosophers. The first chapter outlined the relationship of Lucian’s works to the 
Aesopic tradition, as the relationship reveals how many of the tensions of high and low 
culture are present throughout the fable, and within the tradition surrounding Aesop 
himself. By addressing the reception of the Aesopic fable from the Archaic period up 
to Lucian’s own time, it was shown how Lucian utilises the features of the Aesopic 
tradition to formulate his critique. The chapter also addressed the Life of Aesop, as it 
offers a clear image of Aesop’s philosophical pretence from the position of a slave.  
 The second chapter of this dissertation expanded upon the role of the centaur in 
Lucian’s works, and discussed the role of hybridity in the context of the mythical 
creature. This chapter first outlined the means of defining the philosopher-sophist as 
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derived from Plato, and then turned to the use of such a definition in Lucian himself. 
By outlining the Lucianic perception of the philosopher-sophist as being driven by 
greed, the chapter then assessed the way in which the imagery of the centaur was 
utilised to denigrate the philosopher-sophist, aligning the uncivilised and uneducated 
nature of the centaur with these false philosophers. Crucially in this chapter, it was 
shown how hybridity can serve a number of purposes, with Lucian likening his own 
hybridity to the ideal depiction of the centaur, seamlessly joined, and superior to both 
of its two halves.  
 Chapter Three addressed notions of hybrid wisdom. This chapter first outlined 
the significance of speech to perceptions of wisdom, and the way in which animal 
speech (or lack thereof) serves to be a useful tool for authors of antiquity to deny 
animals reason. With this idea in mind, the chapter then turned to Lucian’s Gallus, and 
I have argued that this dialogue offers an example of hybrid wisdom. The rooster, being 
given the capacity for speech, is able to teach his interlocutor how truly to value his 
existence, and I argue that this instance of hybrid wisdom stands in direct opposition to 
the ignorance and flawed hybridity of the philosopher sophists.  
 A further type of hybridisation, that is, the way in which Lucianic characters are 
shown to breach their traditional boundaries, was the focus of Chapter Four. This 
chapter focussed upon the motif of viewing from above, and proposed that Lucian’s 
positioning of his characters as looking down from above served to underscore the 
effect that the philosopher-sophists’ hybrid corruption has had upon the populace. In 
viewing from above, Lucian’s characters see human beings as merely driven by greed 
and their own reputation, which aligns with his own assessment of the pseudo-
philosophers. I have argued that the hybrid philosopher-sophists, through their desire 
to appear wise, have sufficiently fooled humanity, and thrive not on attaining wisdom, 
but attaining followers for their given school.  
 The fifth and final chapter in this dissertation expanded upon the themes 
discussed in the previous one, but instead focussed upon the divine sphere. This chapter 
first outlined the role of hybrid deities more broadly, before assessing the presence of 
these deities in Lucian’s works. I then argued that the presence of hybrid deities 
becomes less a critique of their hybridity as such and more of a critique of the effect of 
the philosopher-sophists’ corruption. The gods show dissatisfaction with their 
dedication from below, and they propose that this absence of dedication is the result of 
humanity’s dedication to the philosopher-sophists instead. Such an assertion was 
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exemplified through the study of Peregrinus, who represents the epitome of the 
corrupted philosopher-sophist. Driven purely by greed and reputation, Peregrinus 
stands at the core of corrupted hybridity, desiring followers over true wisdom.  
Using the Aesopic framework, the theme of hybridity was explored through 
various examples of the human-animal hybrid. I explored physical hybridity through 
the centaur, discussed hybrid wisdom through modes of speech, and finally the capacity 
for hybridity to stretch across multiple spheres. I have argued that Lucian frames the 
philosopher-sophists as hybrids who, through their concerted effort to appear as a 
source of wisdom, have in fact failed to reach such heights, merely becoming a source 
of corrupted, false wisdom. 
 
In my concluding remarks, I wish to move beyond the strict focus on Lucian and view 
his treatment of hybridity in the context of the Second Sophistic more broadly. It has 
been established that Lucian views the contemporary philosophers as corrupted 
hybrids, and uses the hybrid motif to explore and develop his satirical critique. As has 
been noted, Philostratus in his Lives of the Sophists makes the distinction between those 
who are true sophists, and those who are philosophers with the reputation of sophists. 
Among these is Dio Chrysostom, who, Philostratus states, declaims in the sophistic 
manner, but is nevertheless well versed in philosophy (VS. 7). Synesius too, portrays 
Dio as a sophist turned philosopher, noting the way in which his speeches are sophistic 
in style, but treat broadly philosophical themes (Syn. 1.59). In the context of Lucian’s 
broader critique of the philosopher-sophists, it is worth considering how he may view 
someone such as Dio. Given Dio’s description as a philosopher-sophist, it could be 
proposed that he is precisely the kind of individual whom Lucian intends to critique, 
however the way in which their works have similar goals and motivations410 would 
arguably align the two in a category of hybridity of their own; sophists in their style, 
but philosophers ultimately in search of truth rather than reputation. Lucian, not unlike 
Dio, is himself a form of philosopher-sophist, yet perhaps it is precisely his position in 
such a role that gives him the capacity to critique from within. There exists a recognition 
by Lucian of his position both within and outside of the Second Sophistic, which allows 
him to engage with hybridity in a unique and unassuming manner. His omissions from 
                                               
410 S. Swain, ‘Dio and Lucian’ in Greek Fiction: The Greek Novel in Context, edited by J.R. Morgan 
and R. Stoneman, (London: Routledge, 1994) 166-180. 
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the history books as a learned and influential figure is in and of itself an enlightening 
perspective from which to view his works. I propose that irrespective of his lack of ties 
to Herodes Atticus as a motivation for Philostratus’ omission from his VA, Lucian’s 
role in rocking the philosophical boat, especially given his similarities to Dio, belies a 
certain recognition of his simultaneous use and critique of the hybrid motif. The 
question of Lucian’s relationship to the more celebrated sophists of the Second 
Sophistic is not one to be answered here, yet such an analysis in the context of Lucian’s 
preoccupation with the motif of the hybrid could produce some illuminating studies to 
further understand Lucian’s works, and their role in the Second Sophistic Period.  
 By framing the philosopher-sophist as a corrupted hybrid, Lucian’s satires have 
an important role in attaining a more comprehensive understanding of the Second 
Sophistic period and those who lived during it. It has been shown that the motif of 
hybridity can, and has been, manipulated and moulded in a number of different ways, 
ultimately becoming a reflection upon the inherent hybridity of the period itself. In 
being a corrupted hybrid, the philosopher-sophists become harmful to the reputation of 
‘real’ philosophers, to the extent that true philosophical wisdom has entirely gone by 
the wayside. Lucian, in his role as social satirist, serves to reveal the false nature of the 
philosopher-sophists, their ‘braying’ being shown up to be contrived utterances that 
survive under the appearance of wisdom. The Second Sophistic period is indeed a 
beautiful mess of contradictions, where good and bad are mixed together, and it is 
crucial for Lucian to engage with the spirit of this complicated period of literary history. 
In adopting the motif of hybridity to frame his critique, Lucian is able to disentangle 
the good from the bad, merge the elite and the non-elite, and engage with the truths 
behind the fictions, creating a successful hybrid in a world of corrupted centaur-like 
sophists.  
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